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Abstract 
This research thesis details a year-long observation and analysis of Gladue 
(Aboriginal-specific) courts in Toronto from April 2013 – July 2014. The primary 
focus of this project is the way Gladue courts reconcile and interpret contradictory 
demands to both rehabilitate and incarcerate Aboriginal peoples in light of 
legislative and judicial requirements. Utilizing a discourse analysis methodology 
for observations and transcripts, this thesis sought to analyze how rehabilitation 
and punishment is conceptualized and implemented in Gladue courts given recent 
legislative changes. The overall effect is that neo-liberal and paternalist principles 
are chosen and applied depending on the individual circumstances of the case, 
with new punitive policies left for the most egregious offenders. This application 
underlines a law and order policy that is concerned with pragmatic/practical 
concerns and which leads to a discursive framework that objectifies Aboriginal 
peoples through racist/colonial conceptions of intrinsic victimization.  
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Introduction 
 The primary impetus behind this research has been based upon both 
personal and academic concerns regarding Gladue Courts. Gladue courts – named 
after a 1999 Supreme Court decision – are courts designed to deal with Aboriginal 
offenders in a way that respects all aspects of the Criminal Code of Canada (C-
46), in particular the order that “all available sanctions other than imprisonment 
that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, 
with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders” (s. 718.2 
(e)). During an undergraduate course on youth justice, I elected to focus my 
research paper on the topic of youth Aboriginal offenders but found little 
discussion about these individuals in criminological studies. Eventually, I found 
myself discussing the topic with an elder who then worked with Native Child and 
Family Services. I was granted an interview with him and similar individuals 
working with Aboriginal youths in conflict with the law and used their knowledge 
to help reveal and elucidate the Gladue principles’ relationship with Aboriginal 
youths. Soon thereafter, academic literature began discussing a rather troubling 
trend towards harsh, anti-rehabilitative justice collectively known as “the new 
punitiveness” or neo-punitive justice (Pratt et al. eds., 2005). This trend was 
originally based on American developments from the mid-90s, though I felt it was 
rather significant given new Canadian legislation enacted around the turn of the 
century echoed the rhetoric and ideology of what was thought to be a 
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phenomenon specific to the United States of America. The Youth Criminal Justice 
Act (2002) and the Omnibus Budget Bill/ Bill C-38 (2012) are two of the more 
notable contemporary bills that sought to transplant American-style punitiveness 
into the Canadian criminal justice system.  
As a result, I decided to focus my Masters research on both of these topics 
– Gladue courts (at the adult level) and the new punitiveness’ applicability to so-
called rehabilitative courts. Gladue courts are specialized courts designed in 
response to the 1999 Supreme Court decision of R. v. Gladue and are similar to 
other courts with the exception that they have additional Aboriginal-focused 
resources provided to them and are typically restricted to guilty pleas and bail 
hearings (formally called a judicial interim release). These additional resources 
are expressly provided so that the problems and issues highlighted by R. v. 
Gladue are mitigated as much as is possible. In particular, the judges had concerns 
about ensuring that sanctions other than imprisonment be considered by judges, 
particularly when an Aboriginal person is before the court and that their particular 
background circumstances be considered. In addition to this, the court also 
expressed concerns that certain sanctions or sentencing procedures appropriate for 
the accused person or offender were not being considered despite their relevance 
to the case given their Aboriginal heritage or connection (R. v. Gladue, 1999, 
para. 24, 36, 66).  
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The Gladue decision was not intended to place a different standard of 
sentencing for Aboriginal persons, but to emphasize the individualization of 
sentencing through the two concerns noted above (Manson, 2001, p. 79-80). The 
Gladue decision also highlighted some other issues regarding Aboriginal people’s 
difficulties with the criminal justice system, but these are the main focus of this 
research thesis. Regardless, Gladue courts are provided with additional resources 
and personnel so that the circumstances, alternatives, and background 
characteristics of Aboriginal accused persons/offenders are given proper 
consideration and a rehabilitative standpoint is promoted and encouraged by all 
court officials. 
It should be emphasized that Gladue courts function and follow the same 
procedures and formal requirements as other courts and, with the major exception 
being that they are usually restricted to judicial interim releases and sentencing 
dispositions. In the court process there are multiple formal stages in which an 
accused person moves from being charged with an offense. The decision to 
proceed with a trial or alternative measures is considered by the Crown 
prosecutor, defense counsels are retained, pre-trial release issues are considered, 
preliminary inquiries may be conducted, adjudication by a justice occurs, and, 
upon acceptance of a guilty plea or conviction after a trial, sentences are imposed 
(Roach, 2012, p. 4). With regards to pleas, this means that Gladue Courts only 
deal with accused persons who intend to plead guilty following the arraignment, 
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thus eliminating the criminal trial and immediately going to the sentencing 
hearing (ibid., p. 21). This sentencing hearing is informal in design, with little 
procedural guidance provided by the Criminal Code and usually entails the 
submission of a criminal record (if relevant), background information about the 
offender (in the form of submissions), expert opinion evidence, or witness 
statements. Whatever is used, both the Crown prosecutor and defense counsel 
usually end their submissions with a sentencing recommendation and can provide 
structured proposals and materials outlining their recommended sentence 
(Manson, 2001, p. 162-163). In some instances, both the defense counsel and 
Crown prosecutor present the same recommended sentence, called a joint 
submission. 
 Whether or not the accused person intends to enter a guilty plea, the 
resources and personnel available to the Gladue court can be sent to other courts if 
requested. Additionally, the guidelines and recommendations made in R. v. 
Gladue apply to all courts, regardless of their classification as Gladue courts or 
not. Discussions relating to judicial interim releases are also part of Gladue courts 
as the directive to avoid unduly incarcerating Aboriginal peoples applies to pre-
trial detention as well. Regardless of the type of proceeding in question, there are 
several key terms and phrases that will be referred to throughout this research 
paper and whose formal definitions are important to cover. The most important 
terms refer to the major sentencing principles, the formal powers of the prosecutor 
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(sometimes called the Crown or Crown prosecutor), the definition of onus, and 
the specifics of a hearing for judicial interim release (often called bail). 
There are six primary sentencing principles outlined in section 718 of the 
Criminal Code. They are : denunciation (“to denounce unlawful conduct”), 
specific and general deterrence (“to deter the offender and other persons from 
committing offenses”), the separation of offenders to protect the public (“to 
separate offenders from society, when necessary”), rehabilitation (“to assist in 
rehabilitating offenders”), reparation (“to provide reparations for harm done to 
victims or to the community”), and promotion of responsibility (“to promote a 
sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to 
victims and to the community”). In addition, section 718.1 details the fundamental 
principle of proportionality (that the sentence “must be proportionate to the 
gravity of the offense and the degree of responsibility of the offender”). Lastly, 
judges are directed by section 718.2 to also consider other sentencing principles 
that involve relevant mitigating or aggravating circumstances, including the 
circumstances of Aboriginal offenders and the prioritization of sanctions other 
than imprisonment in those instances that are reasonable for them (Criminal Code, 
1985, s. 718). 
The Crown prosecutor (sometimes simply referred to as the Crown) 
determines what charge with which an accused person is charged should proceed 
and which charges, if any, can be diverted out of court to alternative-measure 
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programs (Roach, 2012, p.3). This determination is based on what is called the 
Crown’s discretion (not to be confused with judicial/sentencing discretion), and it 
is often exercised in Gladue courts to allow for cases to be diverted to a 
community diversion program or the Aboriginal-focused Community Council of 
Toronto (CCT or CCP for Community Council Program), wherein the accused 
person admits and accepts responsibility for their actions and subsequently enters 
a treatment or other program and has their charges withdrawn upon its completion 
(Manson, 2001, 210). The decision to divert an accused person is made by the 
Crown prosecutor and it is guided by section 717 of the Criminal Code of Canada. 
Diversion is therefore not unique to Gladue courts, only its specific integration 
with the Crown prosecutor’s office (through the Aboriginal court worker (ACW)) 
and the sentencing principles of the court (through s.718.2 (e)). If a case goes to 
trial, then the Crown prosecutor’s role is to prove the accused person is guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt and that they do not have a relevant defence. As the 
Gladue courts studied here only dealt with guilty pleas, this role of the Crown 
prosecutor was not observed. 
The onus refers to the burden of proof placed upon the offender/accused 
person or Crown prosecutor to justify their position to the judge. In the majority 
of cases and crimes the onus is on the Crown prosecutor to prove his case, often 
beyond a reasonable doubt and while showing that the offender/accused person 
does not have a relevant defense. In the case of hearings about judicial interim 
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release, certain charges or elements may cause the case to become what is called a 
‘reverse onus’ case, wherein the accused person must justify to the court that they 
be allowed to be released and the Crown prosecutor need only dispute their 
claims. This reverse onus situation is specified by section 515.6 of the Criminal 
Code, which lists the major reasons for such a situation as: the accused person 
being charged with an indictable offense while on release for a still pending trial 
for another indictable offense, being charged with an indictable offense while not 
ordinarily being a resident of Canada, failing to comply with certain judicial 
release orders or undertakings while on release for a charge that is still pending, or 
if the accused person is charged with certain drug crimes. 
Judicial interim release (primarily referred to as bail) refers to the release 
of an accused person from custody (or ‘remand’) pending their trial. The decision 
as to whether or not the person is to be released is determined by the judge in 
advance of the trial and guided by the Criminal Code of Canada, notably sections 
515-529. This determination is done in court as part of a formal bail hearing 
wherein the judge, Crown prosecutor, the accused person, and the defense counsel 
hear/provide submissions and evidence as to whether or not the accused person 
should be given bail and, if it is granted, the nature of the bail. Witnesses, if 
present, may also be called upon to provide evidence and they may include 
hearsay so long as such statements are credible and trustworthy (Allan, 2001, 
p.189-190). There are three main reasons a judge or Crown prosecutor may seek 
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to keep an accused person in detention prior to trial – called the primary, 
secondary, and tertiary grounds. The primary grounds involve ensuring the 
accused person’s attendance in court. The secondary grounds involve ensuring the 
safety of the public and the possibility of reoffending. The tertiary grounds 
involve the need for detention in order to maintain public confidence in the 
administration of justice (Criminal Code, 1985, s.515 (10)). After all submissions 
have been made the judge issues a decision, clarifies any additional orders, and 
confirms the trial date. No matter what decision is reached, the accused person is 
still considered innocent until proven guilty and thus is not considered an 
‘offender’ until that time. Note that some Crown prosecutors may simply allow 
the accused person to be granted bail with some negotiated stipulations decided 
upon outside the courtroom/confidentially. In these instances, the Crown 
prosecutor is said to offer a consent release to the judge. 
Moving to methodological considerations, the primary focus of this paper 
is on how judges within Gladue courts reconcile competing and seemingly 
contradictory sentencing principles that call for harsh punishments and long 
austere imprisonments with lenient sentences and a mandate for rehabilitation. 
The primary focus, then, is on both a discourse analysis of Gladue Court actors 
and a critical analysis of the actual Gladue court processes that express these 
protocols and ideologies. I examined the ways in which judges and others engage 
with the contradictory orientations, how the actual results of their sentences 
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manifest, and how this then feeds back into the criminal justice system and new 
legislation, ad infinitum. As a result of these questions, new information and 
conclusions about Gladue courts and the differences between their intended 
conception of justice and its manifestation in practice, as well as the significant 
differences between Gladue courts and non-Gladue courts, would also emerge. 
The primary focus for all of this research are Toronto Gladue courts – 
specifically, the three Toronto adult courts that sit weekly. While all Ontario 
courts are required to consider the Gladue principle/decision, these three courts 
were highlighted for several different reasons. First, they reside in Toronto, the 
city and province with the largest number of Aboriginal peoples in the country 
(absolute numbers, not per capita) (Statscan, 2006). Second, they deal with adult 
accused persons only, thereby avoiding ethical concerns and legal prohibitions on 
identifying youth accused persons. Third, all of these courts are supported directly 
by Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto (ALST) lawyers as well as specialized 
staff and court workers. The specialized staff are at the service of the court and 
work alongside it, helping accused persons with questions, co-coordinating dates 
with defense counsels, and creating specialized treatment plans for the 
consideration of the Crown prosecutors and defense counsels. Though there are 
other specialized treatment courts they do not expressly deal with Aboriginal 
peoples (and some accused persons in Gladue would be transferred to those 
courts) nor do they have Aboriginal court workers to help support the day-to-day 
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operations and create culturally appropriate plans of care or provide other relevant 
treatment assets. Gladue courts act as both a limitation on the types of accused 
persons analyzed as well as a relevant subject area itself. In effect, Toronto’s 
Gladue courts are not just locations where the negotiation/reconciliation process 
between rehabilitation and punishment can be studied regularly (and ethically), 
but are also the ones where external and non-court actors are best able to influence 
the final decision and the major sentencing principles, either in favour of or 
against rehabilitation. To emphasize, Gladue courts have been examined primarily 
for two main reasons : to see how the new punitiveness conflicts with a 
presumably rehabilitative-based court, and to see how rehabilitation and 
punishment are conceptualized in the context of Aboriginal peoples and judicial 
precedents to consider them differently. Other factors, while relevant, have not 
been the primary reasons why this subject area was chosen. 
Gladue courts are not the exclusive venue for Aboriginal peoples nor the 
only location where s.718.2 (e) can come into effect – they are the courts where 
additional resources, training, and information is provided for the purposes of 
meeting the principles noted in R. v. Gladue. In other courts, the Gladue 
principles are still to be addressed and considered, though they may not have 
these additional elements and may only have the support of Aboriginal court 
workers when they are notified in advance. Gladue courts, in Toronto, were 
originally designed when the difficulties in implementing Gladue became clear. 
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Primarily, these difficulties related to knowing when an Aboriginal person was 
before the courts, and having the appropriate knowledge/context/resources to 
create and develop alternative sentencing regimes. The proposed solution was the 
creation of a court designed with these supports/resources and knowledge 
embedded fully.  The assistance of the Attorneys General of Ontario and Canada 
were offered, with the Ontario Legal Aid Plan and Aboriginal Legal Services of 
Toronto providing defense counsels and court workers for the court. In addition, 
the court was publicized to defense counsels, run during normal court hours, 
given an eagle feather from the elders of Toronto, provided with smudging 
services if requested, and supplemented with specialized training for judges and 
duty counsels from Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto and a community elder 
– eventually opening in October 2001 (Knazan, 2003, p. 3-4, 16). 
Two problems involved in prior applications of the Gladue decision were 
the judges’ inability to recognize an Aboriginal person and the lack of knowledge 
amongst Aboriginal communities about the Gladue principles themselves. In 
addition, when these issues were addressed there remained problems relating to 
knowledge about alternatives to imprisonment and access to them. The creation of 
Gladue courts was intended to meet these needs while also creating an atmosphere 
where an Aboriginal person would be given as much support as possible (ibid., p. 
4-5).  In addition to these elements, Gladue courts also utilize specialized 
background reports that are expressly designed to take into account the specific 
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circumstances outlined in the Gladue principles. These Gladue reports are similar 
to pre-sentence reports used in all courts, but differ in some major ways – besides 
their length, they are written and created by an Aboriginal person sympathetic to 
the circumstances described therein,  and can be used to draw comparisons 
between the pre-sentence reports made by probation officers. They can also 
include references to treatment recommendations or possible sentencing options 
through an associated plan of care, submitted during the court proceedings (ibid., 
p. 9-11). As part of this stated goal, Gladue courts also receive in-depth support 
and assistance from the Community Council of Toronto in implementing specific 
diversion agreements with Aboriginal considerations placed at the forefront. Bail 
cases are also considered relevant areas for the Gladue decision, and they are 
given support in Gladue courts in order for particular problems relating to lack of 
mobility, homelessness, and lack of surety options to be addressed. Primarily, the 
solutions to these long-term problems are developed through Aboriginal court 
worker assistance, plans of care, deferrals to residential programs (treatment-
based or otherwise) and direct financial assistance from Aboriginal Legal Services 
of Toronto in order to provide transportation to distant specialized programs such 
as the Ottawa-based Anchorage treatment facility. In addition, bail hearings are 
directly altered and presented in such a way that the court is more inclined to offer 
bail and are made with the specific circumstances of the case and Aboriginal 
person in mind (ibid., p. 13-14). 
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Gladue courts themselves primarily deal with guilty pleas and bails of the 
more minor variety (the most severe charge observed during the research was 
aggravated assault) but all offenses are to be subject to the Gladue principles and 
Aboriginal court workers can provide support to other courts if requested. This 
specific implementation of the Gladue court was not witnessed during the 
observation. In addition, some courts dealing with particularly severe charges are 
closed to the public. Within Ontario, there are a stated six Gladue courts: the three 
outlined and observed in this paper residing in Toronto (Old City Hall, College 
Park, and 1000 Finch courthouses), one at the Ontario Court of Justice in Sarnia, 
as well as two recently opened courts in London and Scarborough (April & Orsi, 
2013, p. 5). This same study also noted fourteen other specialized Gladue-based 
courts across Canada, with some provinces and territories having none due to their 
large Aboriginal population (such that courts were already familiar with the 
unique provisions for Aboriginal peoples and thus did not need specialized 
locations to implement them) or a preference for community-based justice instead 
(ibid., p. 1, 5-6).  
Literature Survey/Theoretical Framework 
Sociological/Criminological Theory : The New Punitiveness 
The punitive turn in Canada can best be described as a series of broadly 
neo-liberal, then neo-conservative, shifts in the conception and administration of 
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justice/punishments
1
. This shift began with the introduction of the Young 
Offenders Act (YOA) in 1984. The previous legislation - the Juvenile Delinquents 
Act (JDA) – was criticized for paternalistic and arbitrary results due to a lack of 
disposition guidelines. By allowing for large amounts of judicial discretion, the 
judiciary inadvertently created a system that allowed for biases and cleavages to 
become express elements in the form of laws that were both “oppressive and over-
intrusive [and] soft and ineffective” (Hudson, 2003, p. 40). The YOA expressly 
attempted to create a standard guideline for youth offenders through a gradual 
series of amendments – these led to a slow increase in overall prison 
length/punishment severity, with the 1993 amendments specifically referencing 
the importance of harsh punishment in creating “protection of the public” (Doob 
& Cesaroni, 2004, p. 19-20). The final result and overall trend was contradictory, 
with the YOA attempting to enforce more right-based orientations while also 
promoting neo-liberal discourses of community-based supervision/orders, a focus 
on offender-led treatment/rehabilitation, and retributive/harsh sentencing 
guidelines based on longer, more austere, prison sentences (Bala & Anand, 2009, 
p. 82-83). This pattern of increasingly polarized sentencing guidelines – where 
there was either little government interference/assistance or extreme organized 
control of offenders – continued  to the 2002 Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) 
and “get tough” remains a popular punitive rallying call inside and outside 
                                                 
1
 ‘Neo-liberal’ and ‘Neo-Conservative’ will be defined in the following pages as different 
criminological and political literature is discussed. 
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legislatures (Hartnagel, 2004, p. 363-364). In this respect, we have seen Canadian 
criminal laws reflect a near-constant level of contradiction – from the JDA 
attempting to allow for individualized sentences (thus allowing for bias and 
racism to be expressed), to the YOA attempting to create equal sentences for all 
(thus ignoring social/environmental factors and utilizing amendments to target 
specific problematic populations), to the YCJA attempting to make rehabilitation 
of youths a significant part of the criminal justice system (while also making 
youths subject to ever more discriminatory police laws, putting youths under the 
control of probationary officers, and advocating prison as the solution to any 
youth who has failed to rehabilitate themselves). 
These developments are relevant to Aboriginal justice and the current 
research topic due to their development/growth in concert with the previously 
discussed problems of Aboriginal over-incarceration. Most notably, the YCJA 
was put into practice three years after the Gladue decision and marked a 
significant shift away from a rehabilitative system and towards a policy of mixed 
dispositions where incarceration and rehabilitation were seen as equally valid 
methods of crime control. These policies and procedures were expressly designed 
to meet public and political demands to utilize incarceration more often and in 
response to what they saw as impossible to rehabilitate youth offenders. The link 
to Aboriginal peoples is based on the way these dispositions led to the same 
incarceration rates as the past system due to the inability of the Canadian 
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government to recognize the systemic factors behind Aboriginal criminality while 
also limiting rehabilitation programs based on related narratives of persistent 
offending. In effect, the YCJA and past youth criminal law acts represent 
emerging justice trends that continue to ignore the solutions to Aboriginal over-
incarceration and promote frames and perspectives that mirror racist and colonial 
perceptions of Aboriginal peoples as intrinsically criminal.  
The new punitiveness is described by Pratt et al. (2005) as a series of 
possibly global reforms aimed at re-creating the harsh criminal justice regimes of 
the past while simultaneously keeping prisoners and offenders in a tightly-
controlled and highly restrictive environment. They point to the “modern” 
punishment regimes of Foucault and note that, where once the state sought to 
teach their populations how to be docile and compliant, now the penal regime is 
concerned only with containing and dominating those citizens who have been 
deemed a waste of human life (p. xii-xiii). To put it another way, offenders are no 
longer people to be reformed but human bodies that are to be kept isolated from 
the rest of society. Criminals are therefore only discussed in view of the public 
such that they serve as a reminder and warning of what happens to citizens that 
refuse to comply with the new social contract of the state.  
David Garland, in contrast to Pratt et al., argues that the new-punitiveness 
is based upon the shifting abilities of the sovereign state. He argues that penal 
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policy has become so contradictory due to new limits placed upon states to 
“provide security, law and order, and crime control within its territorial 
boundaries” (Garland, 1996, p. 448). As a result, governments have implemented 
new policies and strategies to prevent the recognition of their failures: the two 
major forms are called adaptation and denial (Gray & Salole, 2006, p. 664). 
Adaptation follows more neo-liberal trends and ideologies, whereby the 
government acknowledges its inability to solely control crime and uses techniques 
of “responsabilization” to make citizens and non-state actors/agencies partly 
responsible for crime control and prevention (Garland, 1996, p. 452-458). There is 
also a redefinition of the success and failure of the prison system itself – police 
and prosecutors focus on only ‘serious’ (i.e. sensationalized or publicized) crimes 
and prisons and courts make success a matter of throughput, monetary cost, and 
customer (voter) satisfaction. In all instances, the criminal justice system is made 
to follow certain goals that are less likely to fail and externalities are blamed on 
factors out of their control and appeals to “random” or “opportunistic” offending 
patterns (ibid., p. 458-459).  Denial follows a more neo-conservative trend – here, 
the state uses harsh/more punitive policies to assert its right to govern and 
maintain social control by force. These denial strategies are often coupled with the 
otherization of criminals and an intentional escalation of pre-existing cleavages 
between different socio-cultural groups and classes (ibid., p. 458-464). Still, the 
new punitiveness here is not a new phenomena but the result of pre-existing 
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ideologies reacting to contemporary shifts in the administrative limits of modern 
government/society. As such, traditional rhetorical appeals are only used to 
provide the appearance of authentic ‘traditional’ crime control orientations.  
O’Malley critiques Garland’s thesis by arguing that the contradictory 
sentencing regime is a result of what he calls the “new right” politics : 
Broadly speaking the New Right consists of two distinct and in some ways 
competing trends of thought: a neo-conservative social authoritarian 
strand, and a neo-liberal free-market strand (Gamble, 1986, 1988; Levitas, 
1986; Hayes, 1994). The resulting alliance, although usually referred to as 
neo-liberal in current criminology, is in practice far less coherent than a 
single political rationality. (O’Malley, 1999, p. 185) (Emphasis in original) 
The seemingly contradictory nature of criminal policy is thus conceptualized as 
the result of these two ideologies forming an alliance of convenience under their 
shared ideological hostility to welfare-interventionist policies and shared 
ideological support for the free-market (ibid., p. 188). That there seems to be 
ideological inconsistencies is not the result of the fundamental limits of the 
sovereign state (as Garland says) because such problems represent areas where the 
two ideologies have no common ground (ibid., p.188-189). Regardless of the 
cause of the new sentencing guidelines, both Garland, Pratt, and O’Malley agree 
that the end result is a regime that simultaneously promotes austere prison 
conditions, a shift away from rehabilitation, the promotion of community 
supervision and diversion initiatives, and the advocating of purely individualized 
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criminal narratives. It is in this context that we will begin studying the new 
punitiveness in the context of Canada, and Gladue courts specifically. 
 Part of the impetus behind this research is the result of both a lack of 
emphasis on Canadian Aboriginal peoples and the criminal justice system in the 
criminological literature, as well as a debate within the literature about whether or 
not the punitive turn has actually occurred in Canada (and in what ways). Much of 
the work on Canadian criminological literature focuses on youth crime and the 
question of whether the punitive turn has actually occurred. Even in those papers, 
there are few instances where either topic is questioned with regards to Aboriginal 
offenders/accused persons. For instance, work by Doob and Sprott (2004, 2006), 
Hogeveen (2005, 2005, 2006), Hartnagel (2004), Faucher (2009) and Bala, 
Carrington, and Roberts (2009) focus predominantly on youth crime and present it 
as the major barometer of what Canadian penology is turning towards, primarily 
since non-youth criminal legislation have implemented less drastic or publicized 
changes. Conversely, Landau (2006), McCaslin (2005), Proulx (2003), Green 
(1998), Dickson-Gilmore & La Prairie (2005), and innumerable government 
papers and reports over the last 20 years focus primarily on the ways Aboriginal 
peoples interact with the justice system in general, but have paid only slight 
consideration to the effect new punitive legislation will have on contemporary 
trends and challenges. Lastly, there remains a small subset of researchers who pay 
particular attention to the new punitive turn and the contradictory sentencing 
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paradigms it creates – in Canada, some notable authors/papers include Hannah-
Moffat & Maurutto (2012), Moore and Hannah-Moffat (2005), Hutchinson 
(2006), and Meyer and O’Malley (2005). These authors are far from agreed on 
both the nature and extent of the punitive turn, but most agree that the turn is 
weaker or more diverse than the one present in the USA.  
 For the purposes of this research thesis and the historical background 
behind it, we shall focus primarily upon those courts, principles, and studies 
(government-made or not) that deal with Aboriginal peoples in the criminal 
justice system and the effects of the punitive turn both overall and in these 
contexts. Therefore, youth-specific policies will be referenced in passing but will 
not be a primary part of this summary. Suffice it to say that their conclusions 
mirror much of what will be said in the general analyses of the new punitiveness, 
though the debate remains much more contested and arguments remain on 
whether or not the current trend is mere rhetoric (in the research by Doob, Sprott, 
and Hartnagel) or has become gradually enshrined in legislation and is only 
waiting to become policy (in the research by Hogeveen). It is important to note 
that youth Aboriginal offenders have been researched in the past, with research by 
Yessine & Bonta (2009) and Latimer & Foss (2005) suggesting that there is some 
overrepresentation of Aboriginal youth due to complex and interrelated 
background factors that led to a higher level of what they term “criminogenic 
needs” (Yessine and Bonta, p. 457-458) or “risk/need levels” (Latimer and Foss, 
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p. 494) which lead judges to implement harsher sentences due to the perception of  
persistent offending. This objectifying terminology is never criticized by these 
authors for its lack of agency and Eurocentric orientations – as point of fact, these 
terms are even present in the guidelines for the creation of pre-sentence reports 
within the Ministry of Justice (Hannah-Moffat & Maurutto, 2010, p. 271). 
Criticism and counter-discourses seem to only emerge from Indigenous theorists 
outside of this discipline, and these analyses will be discussed later in the thesis. 
 To begin, Moore and Hannah-Moffat’s research on the new punitiveness 
takes on a more supportive view of Pratt et al.’s thesis, with some caveats : 
“First, the notion of a punitive turn fails to capture the complexity and 
diversity of Canadian penality… Second, the definition of punitiveness as 
it exists within the penal-turn literature is too narrow” (Moore and 
Hannah-Moffat, 2005, p. 85). 
Punishment in Canada, they argue, is both rehabilitative and punitive – in fact, 
“therapeutic discourses and practice are also punitive” (ibid., p. 86). Their central 
argument revolves around the idea that neoliberal rehabilitative discourses are 
punitive through their coercive elements and related austere treatments and 
custody locations (ibid., p. 86-89). Simultaneously, there has been an 
administrative resistance to such punitive discourses, and an ongoing commitment 
to more rigid/standardized treatment regimes (ibid., p. 89-93). Therefore, there is 
a dichotomy between the desired organization of the criminal justice system and 
the discourses and methods it uses. By supporting rehabilitative programs while 
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encouraging harsher punishments and the notion that crime is an individual 
phenomena/decision, the Canadian government creates what they call a “neo-
liberal veil” that masks a punitive discourse under the reality of clinical, austere, 
and wholly alienating custodial conditions (ibid., p. 97-98). 
 Meyer and O’Malley also have an entry in Pratt et al.’s book, and they 
contrast with Moore and Hannah-Moffat in that they argue that Canada is not 
oscillating between punitiveness and liberalism (or even covering one with the 
other) but is actively implementing a “balanced approach” that is “distinctly 
Canadian” (Meyer & O’Malley, 2005, p. 206). They argue that Canada has 
directly looked at the punitive turn occurring in the USA and implemented a 
system that seeks to maintain rehabilitation and offender supports (ibid., p. 207-
208). While they acknowledge Moore and Hannah-Moffat’s argument, they state 
that such contradictions were present even in welfare sanctions prior to the turn, 
and that the “official discourse” of penal modernism remains against further 
punitiveness (ibid., p. 208). Though the research and some conclusions are 
admittedly a bit dated (they state that Canada has no mandatory drug laws, and 
that the new Conservative government is unlikely to implement new harsher 
policies (ibid., p. 210, 214)), their overall argument is that Canada’s punitive turn, 
if it is occurring, cannot be subsumed or covered under the same aegis that 
represents the global or American version (ibid., p. 213). 
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 Hannah-Moffat and Maurutto later expanded their work in a 2012 article 
on specialized treatment-focused courts. Building on past research on “penal 
excess” and “neo-liberal penal patterns”, they attempt to see how past 
(presumably rehabilitative) penal strategies are altered (Hannah-Moffat & 
Maurutto, 2012, p. 202). They focus both on sentencing and bail patterns in order 
to better understand how rehabilitative techniques and the growth of arms-length 
community agencies have recreated and rebuilt the penal regime into a newer, 
different, yet still coercive model (ibid., p. 203). Part of the impetus for their 
research is congruent to my own, as they want to see how the bail process 
changes, how communities are involved, how treatment providers become more 
influential, and how the multiple actors involved blur the lines between state and 
community (ibid., p. 205). However, unlike this thesis they do not specify a 
specific type of offender/accused person as a relevant research subject. 
Regardless, their conclusions eventually grow to mirror their past work in the 
New Punitiveness – the goal of treatment is to create a “governable liberal 
responsible subject” through a melding of welfare, therapeutic, and coercive state 
apparatuses and the resulting hidden layer of penal governance (ibid., p. 210-211). 
Though based on drug treatment courts, they conclude that community actors are 
key to the unusual Canadian penal regime and the resultant mix of interconnected 
welfare and penal discourses that simultaneously support and challenge the 
punishment/control focused criminal ideology so prevalent in contemporary 
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legislation (ibid., p. 214-215). Burns and Peyrot (2008), in comparison, focus on 
drug treatment courts in California and the resulting problems that emerge for a 
standardized treatment regime and how it simultaneously leads to harsher 
treatments for some (who then prefer incarceration) and lenient treatment for 
others (who deliberately exploit the system) (p. 721-722). What is notable for this 
thesis (and why it is mentioned alongside Hannah-Moffat & Maurutto) is that 
these judges have utilized their other discretionary abilities and interactional 
authority to make treatments more individualized and responsive while still trying 
to keep them lenient enough that incarceration is not preferred by the offender 
(ibid., p. 739-740). Here, again, we see legal protocols limiting the ability of 
judges to create rehabilitative sentences combined with judges utilizing informal 
protocols to retain some discretion and socialize the offender into accepting the 
rehabilitative regime in spite of the penality surrounding it. Though the origins are 
different, the methods are similar and help to raise questions as to how different 
outside resources and rehabilitative/court orientations can influence the overall 
melding between punitiveness and rehabilitation. 
Next, Steven Hutchinson also criticizes O’Malley’s previous thesis, in this 
case focusing on the issue of so-called neo-liberal influences/alterations. Like the 
previous authors, he identifies that past so-called rehabilitative regimes were not 
as powerful as some “catastrophe” theorists think, and that fines were and still are 
the most frequently used penal sanction while remaining shadowed by the threat 
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of incarceration (Hutchinson, 2006, p. 445-448). Thus, he disputes that the past 
was ever as rehabilitative as it is presented and that the so-called catastrophe is as 
severe as is said – modern penal policy, he says, has a “braided” nature whereby 
correction and repression remain ever-present (ibid., 448). One such “braided” 
movement is the trend of therapeutic justice, an orientation that directly echoes 
the Gladue decision and the overt goals of section 718.2 (e) :   
Following from this, ‘therapeutic justice’ has come to refer primarily to 
judicial approaches that address criminal behavior as a problem requiring 
non-traditional sanctions and/or social services in addition to traditional 
measures. Proponents of therapeutic justice generally agree that crime is 
most aptly conceived as a manifestation of an offender’s ‘illness’ in body 
or character, and that the focus of the justice process should therefore be 
on rehabilitation, healing and teaching accountability, rather than punitive 
incarceration….Despite different practical manifestations, the therapeutic 
justice model has several core themes that include a reliance on a 
combination of authorities in treating offenders (e.g. a psychologist, a 
social worker, a judge, etc.), the ‘treatment’ of offenders as individual 
cases and the correction of ‘pathologies’, ‘routines’, ‘habits’ and 
‘behaviors’. All of this involves enhancing skills and ties to communities 
in order to facilitate reintegration post-treatment. (ibid., p. 453). 
 
Despite this, Hutchinson identifies Gladue courts as an example of “restorative 
justice”, defined by him as a justice orientation that acts as a counterweight to 
punitive policies and which aims to target social causes of crime and aim to treat 
crime as a problem that can be solved (ibid., p. 451-452). Even though he 
identifies therapeutic courts as revolving around specialized problems like drugs, 
alcohol, and domestic violence, Hutchinson places Gladue on the restorative side 
of the spectrum. This is possibly because he identifies restorative justice 
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initiatives as relying on individual-specific clinical factors over social/historical 
factors, and the assumption that these programs are incompatible with the 
welfare-based policies that made up pre-catastrophe rehabilitation (ibid., p. 455).  
If this is the case, he has wrongly identified the historical causes behind the 
creation of Gladue courts in Toronto and ignored the collective experiences of 
Canadian Aboriginal peoples as a result – whatever the reason, his classification 
of Gladue courts is incorrect
2
. Disregarding this criticism, he still acknowledges 
that neither approach may be entirely altruistic and may simply become a new 
tool for control and authority over offender/accused persons (ibid., p. 451 & 456). 
In this, he references the previous work by Moore and Hannah-Moffat, and the 
idea that “risk/need” factors are the key element behind the neo-liberal shift and 
the resulting control and authority exerted by seemingly rehabilitation-focused 
courts whereby they make the offender the sole factor behind the crime and 
potential treatment (ibid., p. 458). Therefore, this article most clearly articulates 
the link between Gladue courts, the new punitiveness, and the continuing debate 
over the final ideological form (though admittedly the mention of Gladue remains 
minor). What is significant, however, is that it remains ambivalent over the 
potential changes and developments within and without the post-catastrophe penal 
regimes.  
                                                 
2
 Restorative Justice, and its definition in the eyes of Indigenous justice scholars, will be covered 
in more detail in the next section of the Literature Survey/Theoretical Framework 
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 As a final point, and to lead in to the Indigenous justice literature, there are 
two papers that deal expressly with Gladue courts in a manner akin to this thesis. 
First, a third paper by Hannah-Moffat and Maurutto published in 2010 entails 
research on pre-sentence reports (PSRs) within the entire criminal justice system, 
and a contrast between these elements and Gladue reports. In general, they 
identify conventional pre-sentence reports as having a “risk-based focus” that  
present a “decontextualized and limited understanding of the impact of racial 
histories on offending, sentencing, and treatment options” (Hannah-Moffat & 
Maurutto, 2010, p. 264). In the case of PSRs in the context of the Gladue 
decision, they make race (and gender) issues secondary to clinical (“actuarial”) 
risk (ibid., p. 265). PSRs, as a result of the formal requirements and outlines, 
focus primarily on historic and dynamic factors and identify the historic factors as 
static and unchanging (ibid., p. 269). The objectification that occurs when this 
interpretive framework is applied to Aboriginal peoples is serious, as it inevitably 
links both types of factors in such a way that Aboriginality itself is interpreted as 
intrinsic to criminality and removes any agency or hope for healing. The 
viewpoint created in this manner is a continuation of longstanding racist and 
colonial biases and serves to continue to harm Aboriginal peoples and 
communities. There are even more objectifying elements within PSRs such as the 
mandatory order to include “criminogenic needs”, and an order to refer to the 
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offender/accused person through their surname in order to avoid “personalizing 
the offender” (ibid., p. 271).  
The major issue with this process is that it is also embedded within Gladue 
reports, creating an interpretation wherein holistic assessments and community 
considerations are bracketed by racist terms that objectify the Aboriginal person 
specifically because they are Aboriginal. In effect, Aboriginal peoples are 
presented as both high risk and high need, thereby being viewed as an offender 
that requires a paternalist and intensive sentence for his own benefit (another 
mimicking of racist and colonial biases) (ibid., p. 274-275). Gladue reports are not 
always so counter-productive because they sometimes situate and frame these 
elements through the lens of race relations and personal thoughts and desires, 
thereby re-contextualizing elements that PSRs would use to mandate treatment as 
historical patterns that place them at risk (ibid., p. 278). This, in turn, results in a 
problematic discursive framework that similarly objectifies Aboriginal peoples 
and presents them as without agency, primarily through perceptions of intrinsic 
victimization rather than criminality. This problematic discursive framing and 
application is a key problem within Gladue courts, and its actual effects and 
rhetoric will make up a significant portion of the analyses within the thesis. 
 The second paper that deals with Gladue courts is a PHD thesis by Andrée 
Dugas (2013), which utilized a constructivist discourse analysis of Gladue court 
transcripts/cases in order to examine the “original issues which may be hampering 
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the practice of section 718.2 (e), quashing its potential impact on aboriginal 
offender alternative sentencing which may differ from those suggested by modern 
penal rationality” (p. 32). A central point in the paper is the concept of modern 
penal rationality (MPR), an orientation and framework described by Alvaro Pires 
and which underpins the perspectives of punishment and sentencing in modern 
criminal law (ibid., p. 32, 35). Though it will be explained further when it 
becomes relevant to the data analysis, MPR is an orientation that can broadly be 
described as both binary and utilitarian in outlook. It is binary because it views 
rehabilitation as possible only outside the confines of custodial conditions and 
punishment (representing deterrent and denunciatory elements) as requiring 
custodial isolation from the public via imprisonment (ibid., 37-55). It is utilitarian 
in that it primarily views offenders/accused persons through mechanistic and 
deterministic orientations that prioritize the necessity of punishment as a tool for 
social safety and deterrence of crime (ibid., p. 57-60). In addition, with regards to 
Canadian law, the sentencing principle of “protection of the public” is a key 
discourse that emphasizes the socially exclusionary aspects of justice and can 
counteract the ability of the Gladue principles and s.718.2 (e) (ibid., p.103-104). 
This principle is further emphasized via appeals to practical concerns and 
presuppositions that only custody is able to keep the public truly safe from crime 
(ibid., p. 105-106). Overall, then, Dugas finds that MPR thought is embedded 
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within all courts and has an overall nullifying (or even counter-productive) effect 
on the implementation of Gladue/s.718.2 (e) (ibid., p. 114, 139-140).  
These conclusions and factors help to articulate why this research on 
Gladue courts is so necessary. Alongside the past silence on the subject of 
Aboriginal peoples’ over-representation in the criminal justice system and 
prisons, there remains continuing questions on how the Gladue principles are 
implemented, how they respond to current and emerging penal initiatives, and the 
effects of new and more coercive justice policies on the judiciary and their 
possible growth under the guise of rehabilitation and equality. 
Perspectives on Indigenous Justice 
 Past government and criminological research on Aboriginal offenders and 
Aboriginal justice trends tend to identify the same problems and patterns with 
regards to the causes of the long-standing problem of Aboriginal incarceration 
rates and the conception of Aboriginal people’s perceived ‘risk’. Following the 
1991 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, the predominant conclusion was 
that the current colonial and assimilation-based policies of the Canadian 
government are the cause of fundamentally destructive changes in Aboriginal 
people’s lives and that this relationship must change for the damage to be repaired 
(Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 1996). Similar 
government-made literature outside of this commission continues this analytical 
focus on Aboriginal peoples with respect to both their incarceration trends and 
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general socio-economic status. The 1999 Manitoba Justice Inquiry, for example, 
supported this conclusion and listed several different recommendations in order to 
enact meaningful improvements in the relationship between Aboriginal 
communities and the Manitoba criminal justice system. Notably, they echoed the 
Gladue decision and the related 1996 amendments : 
 “Incarceration should be used only as a last resort and only where a 
person poses a threat to another individual or to the community, or where 
other sanctions would not sufficiently reflect the gravity of the offense, or 
where the offender refuses to comply with the terms of another sentence 
that has been imposed upon him or her” (Aboriginal Justice 
Implementation Commission, Aug 19 2014).   
 
In addition to these government inquiries on Aboriginal peoples in the justice 
system are government reports that include more theoretical and qualitative 
investigations of past and future trends from criminological and Indigenous 
studies theorists. These general government papers and Indigenous justice 
analyses are the main focus of this section of the thesis. 
  The government-produced reports generally focus on an in depth-
qualitative or quantitative analysis of Aboriginal peoples from either a custodial, 
treatment, or socio-economic standpoint. There is rarely any consideration given 
to Aboriginal people’s perspectives except as they conflict with co-workers in 
government-run rehabilitation programs and government officials. For instance, a 
1992 report on substance-abuse pre-treatment identified the need for education 
and treatment programs to engage in cross-cultural awareness and co-operation 
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(Solicitor General Canada, 1992, p. ii-iii, xvi-xvii, 7). This same report noted 
extensive intergenerational trauma and a link between Aboriginal people’s 
substance abuse and crime (ibid., p. vi – vii). In addition, it confirmed the 
effectiveness of the pre-treatment program provided it remained fully 
funded/supported (ibid., p. xiii). Another report noted a continued overreliance on 
prison, the marginalization of Aboriginal peoples in society (particularly on 
reserves) and the significant effect of childhood/family dysfunction on criminality 
and how these disadvantaged individuals move out into urban populations out of 
desperation (La Prairie & Ministry of Solicitor General, 1996, p. ii-iii). It goes 
without saying that (government-defined) risk  variables are significant factors 
behind prison sentences, that on-reserve communities have different risk factors 
than off-reserve ones, and that prison/incarceration is considered overused and 
mostly ineffective in comparison to an integrated community approach (ibid., vi-
viii).  
There are a wide variety of such government-produced Aboriginal justice 
reports, and they all address the same general findings. A series of three reports 
released in 1998, in particular, have focused on urban Aboriginal corrections 
(APC 17 CA (1998)), the role of Aboriginal elders in sex offender treatment 
(APC 18 CA (1998)), and community corrections and healing projects for 
Aboriginal peoples (APC-TS 3 CA (1998)). All three reports have found the need 
to have integrated support for programs in communities/prisons, an organized and 
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planned response to these programs, and for both government and Aboriginal 
peoples to be respectful to one-another
3
. More significantly, these and similar 
conclusions have been echoed by the comprehensive work contained in the 1996 
Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples and their roundtable on 
Aboriginal Justice issues, and even then these issues of integration, funding, and 
the restoration of Aboriginal-made justice initiatives were yet to be acted upon by 
the Canadian government (Blackburn, 1993, p. 35-38). Even more general 
research – on all offenders – reached similar conclusions with regards to the long-
term problems caused by incarceration regardless of the background of the 
prisoner. In one such report, prison terms (particularly long prison terms) are 
more likely to exacerbate criminality (Smith at al., 2002, p. 20-21). In another 
general research report, conducted in 2005, Aboriginal peoples continue to have a 
lower socioeconomic status than the general Canadian population (Ekos research 
Associates Canada (EKOS) & Canada, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 
Communications Branch, Strategic Planning, 2005, p. 3). What was striking in 
this paper was the finding that cultural support was also significant for the 
purposes of gaining some measure of self-esteem and self-determination (though 
not to the same degree as socioeconomic elements), that the change from reserve 
to urban living is the main factor behind the frustrations and problems faced by 
                                                 
3
 pages ii-iii, 30-31, 38-39, and 49-53  for Linden, Clairmont & Government of Canada, 
Aboriginal Corrections Policy Unit in APC-TS 3 CA; pages 20-30, 33-35 for Nuffield & Ministry 
of Solicitor General Canada in APC 17 CA, and pages 15-16, 21-24, 27-28, 30, 33-37, 60-65, 89-
91, 93-101, and 107-111 for Ellerby & Ellerby  in APC 18 CA 
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these Aboriginal peoples, and that better programs/support (or even the promotion 
or pre-existing programs) would be of great benefit (ibid., p. 25-26).  
The main issue presented by these and other reports is the slow progress 
(if not outright failure) of the government of Canada to both acknowledge the 
social context and foundation Aboriginal crime/offending and begin sharing the 
responsibility (and power) to solve criminal-justice problems with Aboriginal 
communities themselves. Additionally, from a critical standpoint, there is an 
outright refusal to consider anything other than one-sided integration between the 
Canadian government and Indigenous communities. This perspective remains 
strong despite the fact that the recognition of Aboriginal self-determination would 
remedy many of the complaints about cultural disagreements or ignorance. There 
are also additional problems relating to the objectification of Indigenous peoples 
through the clinical and detached perspectives used as well as the formation and 
presentation of Aboriginal peoples as lacking any agency except when granted it 
by the Canadian government itself, effectively making the terminology and 
research process part of this alienating and colonial orientation. Gladue court 
research is related to these trends in that the courts in question directly implicate 
some of the community actors in the sentencing process. Furthermore, Gladue 
courts attempt to integrate these groups/organizations while also taking into 
account the individualized sentencing paradigm, a historical background focus, 
Aboriginal cultural awareness and assistance, and a sometimes complete 
35 
 
detachment from sentencing and enforcement orders (via diversion). Thus, part of 
this research is designed to also examine how these problems are manifesting in 
modern Gladue courts and how the different actors involved attempt to reconcile 
their seemingly contradictory orientations to justice – in this case, the 
contradictions are between individualized neo-liberal justice and colonial 
perspectives rather than the more commonly problematized 
punitiveness/rehabilitation paradigms. 
 Within Aboriginal justice and Indigenous theoretical literature, these and 
other themes continue. Dickson-Gilmore & La Prairie (2005) tackle more general 
issues of restorative justice and communal justice, and they note several 
recommendations which need to be followed if true restorative justice to be 
enacted – notably, a need to educate Aboriginal peoples about the nature of the 
Canadian Criminal Justice System, and a concerted effort on both sides to keep 
restorative justice and political imperatives separate (Dickson-Gilmore & La 
Prairie, 2005, p. 185-186). Restorative justice projects, as they are currently 
conceived, are decidedly alien to most Indigenous communities and have only 
incrementally improved the lives of local residents and alleviated concerns 
relating to continuing victimization (ibid., p. 187-196). Other authors have similar 
concerns with Aboriginal justice due to the seemingly uncritical implementation 
of its processes and the subsequent inability of associated programs to adequately 
meet either community or government demands for real and authentic change 
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(Moses, 2005, p. 228). More troubling, the empirical data implies that, when not 
correctly implemented, restorative justice (and even section 718.2 (e)) can lead to 
even more custody-based control and the creation of certain psychological and 
social effects that can increase the likelihood of reoffending/recidivism (ibid,, p. 
229-230). These problems are exacerbated in the urban setting, where community 
links with offender/accused persons are lessened and governmental control is 
even stronger (Daes, 2005, p. 231-232). These works also argue that the causes of 
crimes are the same for Aboriginal peoples and non-Aboriginal peoples, so any 
meaningful change or improvements will be of benefit to the entire Canadian 
population (ibid., p. 233, 236). 
 These issues and related problems of government subordination are 
complemented by Craig Proulx in his assessment of the ALST’s Community 
Council Project (Diversion) in Toronto. He posits that the primary goal and 
benefit of such programs are their ability to recreate/establish communities in the 
urban environment (Proulx, 2003, p. 185-186). Part of the appeal, and 
effectiveness, of this program is in this Aboriginal-focused orientation and desire 
to link offender/accused persons back into a community support network (ibid., p. 
187-188). Most importantly, the CCP is not neo-liberal in orientation or as rigid in 
procedures as the conventional criminal justice system (ibid., p. 189-191). The 
CCP is, in both orientation and design, a way for Aboriginal peoples to engage 
with the criminal justice on their own terms while simultaneously creating a 
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community support network that is wholly reflective of their environment and 
priorities (ibid., p. 196-197). Diversion programs are significant in the context of 
this research in that, in their conception described by Proulx, they are able to meet 
the needs and requirements stated by Dickson-Gilmore and La Prairie while also 
simultaneously working within the pre-existing criminal justice system – Gladue 
Courts specifically. As will be shown later in the thesis, Gladue courts rely to a 
great extent on diversion resolutions. Despite this, their actual enactment and 
protocols are completely hidden to the court public and, in the research, it was not 
very clear if the judge or Crown prosecutor were aware of their protocols any 
more than the researcher was. As such, Proulx’s work doesn’t just shine a 
spotlight on the utility of diversion in the context of Aboriginal peoples and the 
associated problematic discursive framework of Aboriginal history, but it also 
serves to explain and contextualize procedures that were otherwise closed off to 
the researcher. 
 Wanda McCaslin’s anthology on Indigenous and restorative justice tackles 
a whole host of related issues, voices, and concerns with regards to Aboriginal 
Justice – foremost among them being “decolonizing the law” and recreating it as a 
tool for empowerment rather than marginalization (Henderson & McCaslin, 2005, 
p. 5). This movement is, in their minds, not unidirectional. Colonizers and their 
government need to make authentic efforts to actually improve relationships with 
Indigenous peoples (Valandra, 2005, p. 42). As part of this process, a return to 
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community-centric and healing-based Aboriginal law is to be enacted (Lee, 2005, 
p. 100-101)(Cousins, 2005, p.146-147). Besides these general trends and 
discussions, the book also includes a specific section by Judge Turpel-Lafond on 
the nature and implications of the Gladue decision – the importance of cultural 
training, cooperation between Crown prosecutors and defense counsels, extra 
workload for defense counsels looking into background information, the need to 
ensure Gladue is not used as a simple reduction in custodial dispositions, the 
increased length of proceedings, and the change in outlook from being a judge to 
being a mediator between Indigenous peoples and an unjust/colonial society 
(Turpel-Lafond, 2005, p. 280-293). What is emphasized here is that Aboriginal-
specific justice must take into account a multiplicity of values and actors while 
remaining both flexible and organized, particularly when specifically 
disadvantaged or disorganized groups are involved (Lane et al., 2005, p. 377-
379). Indigenous justice, therefore, can be conceived as a holistic way of life and 
action rather than a simple procedure or organizational orientation (Breton, 2005, 
p. 430-431). For the purposes of the thesis, McCaslin’s anthology highlights a 
new contradiction between Indigenous and colonizer frameworks, namely in how 
Gladue principles and courts are, at best, designed to mitigate the colonial 
discourses and orientations in such a way that the communities in question can 
actually speak their mind and maintain their own forms of justice. When such 
procedures are implemented in an urban context, judges and Crown prosecutors 
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must make it a point to actually create a community from the (presumably) 
divergent and unconnected groups of Aboriginal peoples in the setting. Therefore, 
from the perspectives of Indigenous-justice advocates and restorative justice, 
Gladue courts are expected to eventually hand off some of their authority and 
power to the community they serve in order to establish the social bonds that 
prevent criminality from developing in the first place. Specifically, Gladue courts 
are supposed to serve as liaisons between colonisers and Indigenous peoples and 
attempt to empower Indigenous communities and allow them to implement justice 
their own way. Thus, the research must also consider the contradictions and 
conflicts between both restorative and colonial justice and between rehabilitation 
and punitiveness, all while examining how power and legal authority is 
conceptualized in Gladue courts. It is possible that, as a part of the neo-liberal 
shift and the new punitiveness, this orientation and goal has become subverted 
into the control-focused and ultimately harmful forms of therapeutic justice 
described by Hannah-Moffat, Maurutto, Moore, and others – that is, as a tool for 
enhanced control and individual-pathology based ideologies that only serve to 
make marginalized individuals and communities even more so. 
 Indigenous justice theories can be considered counter-discourses to both 
the punitive turn as well as the neo-liberal and impersonal ideologies embedded in 
s.718.2 (e) and the modern penal orientation. Indigenous justice, as a concept, 
encompasses three aspects according to Usher and Lawrence (2011): 
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“1. They address problems relating to collective experiences of historical 
and ongoing colonial trauma. 
2. Their values and processes are rooted in Indigenous epistemologies. 
3. They are implicated with broader questions of Indigenous jurisdiction 
over justice systems.” (p. 91) 
Criminological theorists have, as noted previously, utilized objectifying language 
and analyses that serve to create problematic discursive frameworks of 
criminality, specifically with regards to Aboriginal peoples. Because of this 
language, the approaches and methods advocated by the criminal justice system 
inevitably reduce issues of collective trauma to simplistic and individualized 
Aboriginal background reports and circumstances. Similarly, by remaining rooted 
in the current criminal justice system and the assimilation-based approaches of the 
Canadian government, the Gladue principles and related Aboriginal-focused 
‘sentencing alternatives’ retain problematic elements that run counter to the aims 
and goals of Indigenous justice. Because of this, these government recommended 
revisions might be considered not just counter to Indigenous justice as a concept, 
but also the stated goals of the Gladue principles. Specifically, the difference lies 
in the focus within Indigenous justice on encouraging Indigenous-led alternatives 
and recognizing the circumstances of Aboriginal peoples and their link to 
systemic problems and the criminal acts they precipitate. Aboriginal over-
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incarceration, in the eyes of Indigenous justice scholars, is about more than the 
courts and sentencing principles but extends into historical trends, cultural 
knowledge, and Aboriginal autonomy over their own justice initiatives. 
 A related problem that concerns the difficulties in implementing 
Indigenous justice is the way certain geographic variables can limit the ability of 
courts to implement and access Indigenous epistemologies and support. These 
variables are primarily based on the courts’ proximity to two types of Aboriginal 
rehabilitative resources – actual Aboriginal personnel (to manage and create 
culturally appropriate programs) and financial resources (to maintain full-time 
personnel, rent/purchase property to hold such programs, and to inform judges, 
Crown prosecutors, defense counsels, and offenders/accused persons of the 
presence of such sentencing alternatives). In this research, Judges perceived 
financial resources to be more prominent in urban locations (where such programs 
and resources are better supported by government or non-profit organizations) and 
personnel as being easier to gather in rural and reserve locations (where 
Aboriginal supports, in the form of sureties, family members, or elders are 
perceived to be closer or more common). This perspective is only partially 
supported by demographic research done on urban and off-reserve communities. 
Most notably, urban Aboriginal peoples were predominantly immigrants to the 
city in question and have considerable difficulty finding affordable housing, 
employment, education, and childcare support that can allow them to actually 
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volunteer or work alongside rehabilitative programs (Ekos research Associates 
Canada (EKOS) & Canada, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 
Communications Branch, Strategic Planning, 2005, p. 9 – 13).  
Conversely, rural provinces and locations have been found to have 
significantly high levels of disparity between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
peoples with regards to community well-being indexes based on education level, 
employment, income, and housing (Clatworthy & Peters, 2011, p. 134, 140 – 
141). However, based on that same research and Statscan (2006) numbers, 
Ontario has not just the largest total number of Aboriginal peoples but the second 
smallest disparity between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples. Therefore, we 
can see that the perception of urban Aboriginal peoples as being less able to 
support treatment programs (due to a lack of community) is partially incorrect, as 
such locations have significant numbers of Aboriginal peoples and smaller 
financial disparities than rural locations. It is possible that judges and other 
judicial experts may be misinterpreting the cultural shock and unfamiliarity with 
government programs faced by recent Aboriginal immigrants to urban settings as 
a lack of actual interested persons or third party supports, and this can stymie 
efforts promoting Indigenous justice initiatives (Ekos research Associates Canada 
(EKOS) & Canada, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Communications 
Branch, Strategic Planning, 2005, p. 9 – 10, 14 – 16). 
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There are still other misinterpretations of Aboriginal peoples and their 
experiences with the criminal justice system. Within the debate about the punitive 
turn there are also issues regarding the “Eurocentric debate” and its apparent 
recursions when examined from the standpoint of colonial studies (Brown, 2002, 
p. 404-405). Penal modernity is said to entail three main tenants: “rationality, 
scientism, and restraint” and these elements are presumed incompatible with neo-
punitive ideologies (ibid., p. 403). When the historical injustices of the colonial 
era are analyzed (in India, specifically) then there is a clear synergy between penal 
excess and the leniency of modern carceral systems (ibid., p. 409). Within India 
these systems formed to create an Indigenous (Indian) criminal identity based on 
racist and colonial biases, with the primary threat being their resistance to the 
evolution of the colonial state (ibid., p. 413). The identification of “criminal 
others”, the subsequent advocacy for harsh punishments, and the emphasis on 
criminal “risk” were all part and parcel of the colonial era and emerged in 
response to conflicts within that context (ibid., p. 417-419). In this respect, 
O’Malley’s theory is expressly referenced and described as an exploration of the 
modernization process itself rather than a sign of its dysfunctions (ibid., p. 419).  
Criminological literature, and its Eurocentric biases, ignore these colonial 
contexts and their significance as predictors of the punitive turn; in addition, they 
mimic their discourses and frameworks when they speak of and utilize clinical 
and (presumably) neutral terms such as ‘criminogenic needs’ or ‘risks’. 
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 Even outside of the punitive-turn thesis, there are express differences 
between Indigenous and criminological literature with regards to the use of 
Indigenous epistemologies and perspectives which aim to remedy problems of 
otherization and risk-need analyses. These terms and processes are intrinsically 
linked to this modernization perspective and the related colonial processes. In a 
Gladue context, these terms are supposedly remedied via the greater Aboriginal 
cultural awareness – unfortunately, the routines of the court and overarching 
ideological focus on practical issues keeps these problems present. The main 
exception to this is diversion agreements with the CCP, which is expressly 
utilized outside of the court system and aims to emphasize the human element of 
the Aboriginal person in question. The Indigenous theorists discussed previously 
– notably Craig Proulx – are the ones who best express how Indigenous justice 
frameworks can help to mitigate this perspective and allow modern penal 
practices to be divorced from their colonial frameworks and interpretive schemes. 
If implemented more thoroughly, these sentencing alternatives can limit or 
subvert the problematic neo-liberal and Eurocentric ideologies collectively 
covered under the term of penal modernity.  
Legal History  
 Much of the history (legal, academic, or otherwise) relevant to this 
research thesis ranges from decades-old to the recently written. As such, an 
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exhaustive discussion of all the legislation and research even remotely related to 
the topic would not be possible. Instead, this section will focus on relevant past 
events as well as how public and political viewpoints on the topic of Canadian 
courts and Aboriginal justice are now rapidly shifting. 
 The first official government recognition of the problem of 
overrepresentation of Aboriginal peoples in Canadian prisons occurred in 1967, 
when the Canadian government finally recognized the trend and stated its 
intention to curb the trend (Monture-Angus, 2005, p. 275). By 1991 this trend had 
continued unabated and a new paper by the Law Reform Commission of Canada 
initiated a new two-pronged approach to Aboriginal justice. First, the criminal 
justice system must make an effort to reform the way it deals with Aboriginal 
peoples in the system, specifically “’accommodating’ aboriginal culture, 
experience, and tradition within the existing justice system” (ibid., p. 276). 
Secondly, Aboriginal peoples themselves must make an effort to recreate 
indigenous “justice systems” and attempt to implement them in conjunction with 
the Canadian penal system; their recommendation was that Canada must give up 
some of its autonomy in this respect, and allow Aboriginal communities to create 
their own individualized programs and organizations (ibid., p. 276-277). 
 In 1996 a second major change with respect to Aboriginal justice occurred 
with the addition of s.718.2 (e) in the criminal code of Canada and its subsequent 
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clarification in the famous case of R. v. Gladue. The case involved a 19-year old 
Aboriginal woman named Jamie Gladue living off-reserve charged with killing 
her boyfriend. She was found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to three years 
in prison, on the grounds that section 718.2 (e) of the Criminal Code of Canada 
did not apply to Aboriginal peoples living off-reserve (R. v. Gladue, 1999, 
para.15-18). She then later appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeals that 
this provision did in fact apply to her regardless of where she lived; the court 
unanimously agreed with her argument that s.718.2 (e) did apply to all Aboriginal 
peoples, but only one judge dissented with the sentence ordered (ibid., para.19-
23). Eventually the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, who 
agreed with the Court of Appeals with regards to s.718.2 (e) and the requirement 
that “all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the 
circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to 
the circumstances of aboriginal offenders” (ibid., para. 24). In addition, they spent 
a considerable portion of the case outlining the history of the sub-section, the 
continuing overrepresentation of Aboriginal peoples in the criminal justice 
system, and the specific application of s.718.2 (e) (ibid., para.25, 28). The 
Supreme Court thus affirmed that the sub-section required judges to approach 
Gladue’s sentence differently :  
In our view, s. 718.2(e) is more than simply a re-affirmation of existing 
sentencing principles.  The remedial component of the provision consists 
not only in the fact that it codifies a principle of sentencing, but, far more 
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importantly, in its direction to sentencing judges to undertake the process 
of sentencing aboriginal offenders differently, in order to endeavour to 
achieve a truly fit and proper sentence in the particular case … What 
s. 718.2(e) does alter is the method of analysis which each sentencing 
judge must use in determining the nature of a fit sentence for an aboriginal 
offender.  In our view, the scheme of Part XXIII of the Criminal Code, the 
context underlying the enactment of s. 718.2(e), and the legislative history 
of the provision all support an interpretation of s. 718.2(e) as having this 
important remedial purpose. (ibid., paragraph 33) (Emphasis in original). 
The main effect of the Supreme Court decision was in these and similar 
statements. Primarily, that “prison is to be used only where no other sanction or 
combination of sanctions is appropriate to the offence and the offender” (ibid., 
para.36) and that “the background considerations regarding the distinct situation 
of aboriginal peoples in Canada encompass a wide range of unique circumstances, 
including, most particularly: (A)  The unique systemic or background factors 
which may have played a part in bringing the particular aboriginal offender before 
the courts; and (B)  The types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may 
be appropriate in the circumstances for the offender because of his or her 
particular aboriginal heritage or connection.” (ibid., para. 66).  
This guidance to the lower courts holds particular importance to the 
current research thesis, as it and subsequent sections of R. v. Gladue describe the 
importance of certain information for cases involving an Aboriginal person as the 
defendant, but contains only vague guidelines on how to implement these 
background considerations or to find Aboriginal-led or otherwise alternative 
justice regimes. It is in light of this problem that certain Canadian courts have not 
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just implemented specialized dates and locations for these Aboriginal-specific 
cases, but have also invited assistance and support from Aboriginal legal groups 
and professionals in order to facilitate the overall examination process. As 
detailed previously, the first set of Gladue specific courts emerged in Toronto in 
cooperation with Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto. In other provinces, these 
Gladue-focused courts were considered (in the eyes of the judiciary) already 
present due to demographic issues, emerged in concert with other specialized 
courts (domestic violence, or drug treatment courts, specifically), or were already 
embedded in Aboriginal communities (April & Orsi, 2013, p. 5). The primary 
focus of the research paper, then, is in identifying how these specialized ‘Gladue 
courts’ approach section 718.2 (e) while taking into account new legislation that 
may limit their ability to find appropriate alternatives or stymie the flow of 
resources that provide them with the context to make alternative orders in the first 
place. 
Recent Developments 
 Recent commentaries on new and old criminal legislation throw even 
more confusion over the exact role Gladue and other rehabilitative courts play in 
contemporary criminal policy. As late as in 2009 the then minority Conservative 
government of Canada began rolling out “tough-on-crime” legislation that was 
attacked by political opponents and undercut by its own inability to offer actual 
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proof that mandatory minimum penalties work (Geddes, 2009, p. 21). When their 
2008 omnibus bill became enacted into policy in early 2013, a raft of new 
criticisms and outright defiance of the policies therein came to the fore. For 
instance, on November 12, 2013, the Ontario Court of Appeal struck down section 
95.2 (a) of the Criminal Code of Canada regarding a mandatory minimum of three 
years for any possession of a loaded restricted or prohibited weapon on the 
grounds that it infringes section 12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms – the 
clause forbidding cruel and unusual treatment or punishments (R. v. Nur, 2013, 
ONCA 677, s.4, 205-207).  In another instance, the Correctional Investigator of 
Canada tabled a report noting that over the past decade there has been a 75% 
increase in visible minority inmates, an increase of 80% in incarceration for 
Aboriginal women, and a 23% increase in the costs of corrections – all for a 
negligible change in crime rates (CBC News, Nov 25 2013). Even prostitution 
laws and the changes to the victim fine surcharge (VFS) have been targeted by 
judges, such as the recent Bedford case (wherein the anti-prostitution clauses 
recently enacted where deemed unconstitutional due to their excessive scope and 
infringement on their constitutional security of the person) which struck down 
three prostitution laws on the basis of the Charter yet again, and the subsequent 
criticism of the victim fine surcharge by judges who argue the costs are unrealistic 
for most offenders (CTVNews.ca, Jan 7 2014).  
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In a surprising twist, even conservative pundits are sceptical of the recent 
changes – an editorial by Christie Blatchford in particular called the changes to 
the victim fine surcharge “boneheaded” and the planned changes to victims-rights 
and criminal justice involvement inappropriate in light of recent changes 
(Blatchford, National Post Online, Dec 17 2013). The implications for this 
research and past punitive academic analyses are obvious, as there is now a 
conflict between Conservative ideologues and academics, judges, and bureaucrats 
on the basis of the new punitiveness in its more American form. Whereas past 
legislation (the YOA and YCJA) were primarily ‘punitive’ in orientation due to 
their focus on making punishments less arbitrary (and thus able to respond to 
specific circumstances and treat relevant problems) more recent changes – notably 
the 2013 Omnibus Budget Bill/Bill C-38 – are expressly referencing American 
political rhetoric, identifying prison as the only solution to criminal acts, and are 
dismissive of scholarly and government research that shows the effect on crime 
rates is negligible. What is intriguing is that the conflict between all these 
ideological orientations is being fought in courts and in public opinion pieces. 
Through constitutional challenges judges are making particularly harsh new 
punitive legislation null and void, and advocates for more egalitarian and efficient 
justice are speaking out and making their case that the new legislation has no 
basis in actual policy or evidence-based research. The new punitiveness’ scope 
and implementation cannot be determined simply by examining any new 
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legislation passed, but must also take into account the ideological underpinnings 
of its supporters and the way the directives can be subverted through the actions 
of judges and other legal professionals. Thus, within Gladue courts, we can see 
how rehabilitative orientations don’t just clash and combine with new punitive 
policies and neoliberal contradictions, we can also attempt to analyze how 
informal protocols and processes give Gladue courts the option to override neo-
punitive legislation in favour of what they feel best exemplifies the proper role of 
Gladue courts. Whether this leads to a utopian welfarist orientation, the neoliberal 
contradictions of the early 2000’s, or a completely new ideological principle is 
part of the major research goals of this thesis.  
Methodology 
 The research thesis took the form of a three-part research plan that aimed 
to triangulate the various methods and processes used in Gladue courts, both in 
and out of court. The initial overall research stage was made up of three parts – 
observation, transcript analysis, and interviews/data analysis. Note, however, that 
due to constraints that will be addressed later, the interview section was 
eventually subsumed under the observation portion, therefore making the final 
research plan two-part.  
 Observations took place at the three main Gladue courts in Toronto – 1000 
Finch court, College Park court, and Old City Hall court. I observed near weekly 
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at the 1000 Finch court from May 5, 2013 to November 4, 2013. College Park 
court was also observed weekly, from July 11, 2013 to November 7, 2013. 
Finally, Old City Hall court held Gladue cases twice a week (Wednesdays and 
Fridays) for the full day. I observed at least once a week from May 15, 2013 to 
November 6, 2013. Notably, I also attended during mid-December and mid-
January 2014 simply because as I was present at the court for other business 
relating to transcript orders. Additionally, three weeks involved both Wednesday 
and Friday observations, making this the setting with the most observation days 
total. As a final note, due to transportation issues, observations at Old City Hall 
were often finished before all the cases were concluded – around 4:00 pm. 
 The observations themselves were done naturalistically. I entered the court 
as a public observer and simply recorded what was said, done, intimated, implied, 
or performed. Recording devices of any electronic origin are not allowed in court, 
so all observations were made by pen and paper. Additionally, prior to the start of 
the proceedings, I would copy the day’s docket, which contained the names and 
offenses of the accused persons assigned to the court for the day. Notably, some 
of the dates had no docket available, I was unable to copy it in its entirety, and/or 
it was missing certain cases/offenses. In these circumstances I did my best to 
record any relevant information from the statements made by the Crown 
prosecutor and defense counsel. Note that the reverse was sometimes true, as not 
all the cases on the docket were heard each day and some offenses were 
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incorrectly added to the docket. As such, I combined both observations and 
docket recordings in order to get the best picture possible of the current day’s 
proceedings and the crimes being discussed during a case. 
 The overall methodology for observation, and the data analysis to a lesser 
extent, was similar to research done by Bouhours & Daly (2007). In their 
examination of the sentencing remarks by judges to youth sex offenders in 
Australia, they analyzed the sentencing remarks and rationales of the judges in 
question, referring to a precise transcript of the speech made (p. 376). Unlike this 
research thesis, they did not cover the preceding remarks from the defense counsel 
and Crown prosecutor, such as a summary of the offense, the offender’s criminal 
history, or relevant mitigating or aggravating factors (Daly & Bouhours, 2008, p. 
505). Conversely, this thesis did not have verbatim transcripts of the sentencing 
speech by the judge except for those few cases which had transcripts ordered for 
them. Both this research and theirs did not extensively cover those whom the 
remarks are directed towards, the judge’s aims, and whether or not the offender 
understood the sentence (ibid., p. 506). Their research also used a similar analysis 
procedure as in this paper, specifically in the way some content analysis 
procedures (using a detailed coding schedule) were used in concert with deductive 
and inductive approaches in order to understand the “latent and manifest” 
meanings of the case (Bouhours & Daly, 2007, p. 378).  However, this research 
thesis also integrated discourse analysis methodologies as part of the coding 
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process and looked at the relationships between the code sets, patterns within 
them, and the formation and presentation of such speech and conversations. 
Furthermore, as a result of the limited number of transcripts available to order, 
certain transcripts were marked as particularly relevant or interesting during the 
observation period and analyzed after this coding process was complete (typically 
due to delays in receiving such transcripts). It should be noted that, despite the 
divergent topics, there was some similarity between the conclusions reached by 
their research and this one, notably the way the sentencing remarks/rationale was 
primarily a “one-way” performance and that it often included threats to escalate 
the punishment in the event of reoffending (Daly & Bouhours, 2008, p. 513, 515).   
 Court cases marked as particularly interesting or important enough to 
require transcripts were based on a few different informal criteria. For one, I made 
it a point to try to have a roughly proportional number of cases from each 
location. This proved particularly difficult for 1000 Finch court, as it had few full-
length cases until later in the observation timeline. Conversely, Old City Hall and 
College Park had a surplus of such cases, and I decided to prioritize those cases 
that had the greatest number of discourses related to the research criteria and/or 
were relatively short cases (and therefore less expensive to order a transcript for). 
Additionally, transcripts were ordered as soon as possible since the process takes 
time and it was necessary to ensure that they were finished prior to the beginning 
of the writing phase of the thesis. In general, the main research criteria I wanted to 
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examine through the transcripts were the presence of new punitive issues (new 
legislation and drug crimes most notably) or notable instances of punitiveness 
being subverted (particularly when in conflict with the new punitiveness). 
Unusual and informal comments by any actor – notably the judge or Crown 
prosecutor – were also significant elements I wanted to examine in a transcript. 
Some cases would have transcripts requested simply because the offender/accused 
person was in a transcript already requested, and in this instance I was interested 
to see how different judges approached the same offender/accused person or 
crime and if the discourses or sentence changed and for what reasons. When 
possible, I tried to focus on guilty pleas rather than bail hearings, as the 
sentencing principles being researched primarily influenced those sections of the 
Criminal Code. Lastly, I also attempted to prioritize any interesting cases that 
involved female offenders/accused persons, as Gladue courts deal with both men 
and women. Specifically, judges during the observation period have commented 
that Gladue courts see a larger proportion of women offenders/accused persons 
than any other courtroom – a statement buttressed by recent data showing that the 
incarceration rate for Aboriginal women has increased by 80% over the last ten 
years (CBC News, Nov 25 2013). As a result, it was important to have at least one 
transcript involving an Aboriginal woman in order to better analyze this troubling 
trend. Once a case was deemed particularly relevant based on these criteria I 
would then fill out a request form and make the order the next day. Usually, I 
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would go over all the cases observed every 2-3 weeks and make note of any 
interesting cases, then fill out the forms for 1 or 2 cases to be dropped off at the 
start of the month.  
 Observations were later transcribed by hand into a Word Document, often 
with one document per day of observation. Afterwards the files were imported 
into WEFT QDA qualitative analysis software and coded as described in 
Appendix A. Each ‘group’ of code-sets were coded in their entirety before 
moving on to the next set, primarily to allow for both an exhaustive coding 
procedure, and to ensure that the coder did not give preference to certain similar 
code types. Additionally, over the course of the analysis some new code-sets 
would be created if they were necessary and others would be revised if mistakes 
were spotted. Several code-sets were designed to both provide interesting cross-
tabulations and observations as well as to provide ‘sanity-checkers’ to ensure that 
the problems and limitations of the software were mitigated as much as possible. 
These problems, when present, were mentioned in the relevant table and analysis. 
To summarize them briefly, the primary issue involved the software interpreting 
the relationships between certain code-sets as being less numerous than they 
should be. In many instances, this problem was inconsequential (as the main 
concern was with the rates and percentages of these code-set relationships) or 
remedied by directly checking the relationships by hand. 
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 Data analysis occurred afterwards, and followed a two-stage process. The 
first stage was a simple review of the relevant code-sets, often via cross-
tabulations to see where some similar codes coincided. In some instances these 
code-sets would be cross-analyzed with other more general coding categories 
such as total case numbers (to eliminate repeat instances within a case) or the type 
of proceeding (to clarify the prevalence of certain charges, and to delimitate 
between the standard court proceedings and non-Gladue or incomplete cases). To 
specify, sometimes the court would hear cases involving non-Aboriginal peoples. 
This was often the result of the Gladue court for that day being combined with the 
general guilty plea court (due to a lack of cases or scheduling problems) or the 
result of a case from the previous day being transferred/moved to the currently 
sitting Gladue judge in order for it to be completed. ‘Incomplete’ cases involved 
observations that were never observed fully due to the case being traversed to 
another court (when Gladue court was particularly busy that day) or were cases 
that were left incomplete as the researcher had to leave before they had finished. 
That said, a direct observation of these two problematic case/proceedings types 
showed that they were small in number and small-talk/informal interviews with 
some court actors gave the impression that these non-Gladue cases were not too 
far removed from Gladue-specific policies. Regardless, after this preliminary 
reading a more complex cross-analysis amongst relevant topics would be enacted 
in order to see how certain discourses, cases, processes, and other code-sets 
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interacted and intersected. In some instances, this necessitated the creation of new 
code-sets in order to create the aforementioned ‘sanity checkers’ or when some 
code-set groups became big or distinct enough to necessitate the splitting of a pre-
existing code. Some examples of these revised tables are Table 2 : 
Treatment/Punishment Location by Proceeding Type, and Tables 5 & 6 : 
Sentencing Principles and Bail Concerns by Sentence/Decision. 
The second stage of the analysis entailed a detailed overview of the cross-
tabulations between each code-set in the form of relationship tables, checking that 
certain groups were coded and counted correctly and deriving basic statistics and 
percentages across them in order to better understand the numbers and incidence 
rate of some significant code-sets. One such significant analysis involved 
identifying which codes-sets were repeated most often per case, and seeing which 
code-sets had notably high or low rates of direct/side-by-side referrals (for 
example, seeing if certain sentencing principles are directly mentioned alongside 
particular victim/offender/accused person characteristics or were stated as part of 
a different argument/submission). After this, a general analysis would be created, 
often once per code-set. This analysis would attempt to contextualize the findings 
and highlight the relevance of the statistics and observation to the overall research 
project. In particular, the analysis would look at unusual statistical inferences and 
comparisons to other related code-sets and attempt to explain any incongruities. 
After this process of observation and analysis was completed for each major code-
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set of a table, a final analysis would be performed on the entirety of the code-sets 
in question. The goal of this final analysis is to draw comparisons across similar 
code-sets and explain the relationship between certain court activities, processes, 
actors, and discourses. After this process was completed for single table/code-set 
group, it would be repeated on another set. In some instances the analysis would 
skip some code-sets or combine particularly small or similar ones.  
As part of the final data analysis stage, after all code categories/tables had 
been analyzed at least once, any particularly relevant combinations of code-sets 
would be created and observed/analyzed as before. The primary focus of this 
stage was to ensure that particularly interesting combinations of codes and 
discourses would be compared correctly and only after they were given an initial 
cursory examination via the above analysis. This additional analysis was therefore 
designed to both explain unusual findings from the initial analyses, but also to 
place certain important code-sets under a critical lens and ensure that all the 
aspects of interaction and relevance were examined. In total, the overall data 
analysis of just the code-sets took approximately 3 weeks, and it involved 11 
tables and repeated incidents of revision with respect to the overall coding file as 
problems and errors were spotted. After this series of code-set observation and 
analysis had exhausted all possible interesting or relevant cross-tabulations, I 
reviewed all of the data and research gathered by them and began comparing with 
transcript observations in order to reach the final conclusions below.  
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Transcript analysis was much briefer than the observation and data 
analysis portions as the cases in question were included as part of the observations 
previously. The primary method of the transcript analysis was an in-depth 
analysis of the formation and presentation of the discourses utilized in court – 
their formedness (the formation and presentation of the speech), their organization 
on the basis of information exchange, and how certain structural elements affected 
their content (either formal requirements of the court, or socio-structural 
limitations). In addition, much of the transcript analysis also involved checking 
and cross-referencing some of the conclusions drawn from the observation, 
particularly as it related to the exchanges between the judge and the defense 
counsel or their client. After this, there was some analysis of how the transcription 
process itself may have altered or influenced the discourses spoken and served as 
additional structural or limiting elements. Finally, some notable cases or 
exchanges were detailed with respect to the general conclusions drawn during the 
data analysis. 
The interview portion of the data analysis was originally designed as 
informal interviews that aimed to provide greater context for certain problematic 
cases or features. They were not designed as their own substitute for data or 
observations out of concerns that this would take too much time to fully 
incorporate into the research project as well as issues of confidentiality. As the 
observation periods progressed I gradually began developing rapport with the 
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court workers, Crown prosecutors, and defense counsels typically working at the 
Gladue courts. Unfortunately, only some were regular participants in Gladue 
cases and would not make good interview subjects. Despite this, several did agree 
to answer any questions I had or to be interviewed more formally. However, these 
interviews never came to fruition for both ethical and pragmatic concerns.  
 Ethical concerns were based around the confidentiality of the interview 
participants. As stated previously, only a few court actors were commonly seen in 
Gladue courts, and only a dozen or so could really be considered well-versed 
enough to provide adequate information or satisfying interviews. As such, any 
formal interview would likely breach rules of confidentiality and anonymity. 
Gladue court actors in Toronto are a small community – approximately 6-7 
Aboriginal court workers, and an equal number of duty counsels and Crown 
prosecutors. Judges, unfortunately, rotated around the court too quickly for any 
rapport to be developed. As a result, I was forced to conclude that any interview 
process would be unlikely to fulfill ethical obligations while also providing 
valuable research data; this was in spite of pre-existing approval for such 
interviews. 
 Thankfully, court developments made the point moot. Many of the major 
court actors, including some judges, would inquire often about my research and 
answer any questions I had about the proceedings and Gladue court itself. While 
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this did facilitate much of the rapport-building mentioned above, it also helped to 
eliminate the need for me to actually engage in the interview process itself. Judges 
would even sometimes invite other researchers present in courts to brief question-
and-answer sessions with the assistance of some Crown prosecutors and defense 
counsels. These, too, would provide me and other interested parties the ability to 
ask any relevant questions and receive answers off the record. As a result of this, 
the actual need for any informal interviews (on the basis of context exploration) 
was rendered unnecessary. Often, judges and Crown prosecutors would make it 
quite clear why they made the decisions and actions they did, leaving me with few 
questions about specific cases. These questions and other brief conversations were 
written down and included as part of the observation notes of the day in question.  
 This research and analyses were not without their limitations, both 
methodological and practical. One major problem was with the particular 
orientation and experiences of the researcher. Though the researcher had some 
experiences and knowledge of both court observation methods, criminal policy, 
and Aboriginal/Indigenous theoretical foundations, there remains problems of 
positionality due to his lack of connections to those communities as well as his 
academic orientation. There are also problems with interpretation of the data due 
to this positionality, as well as the way this may have coloured his observation 
notes during that phase of the research. It was due to these concerns that the 
researcher sought to analyze transcripts alongside his field notes. There is also the 
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possibility that these personal characteristics altered the reception/response from 
court actors with regards to questions and discussions. 
There were also some emotional distress on the part of the researcher 
caused by the observation portion. About one case per week of observation would 
involve some form of personal crises on the part of the offender/accused persons 
encountered, and some of these would recount highly personal traumas that 
unfortunately would continue to occur. The judges, Crown prosecutors, and 
defense counsels present seemed to be aware of these particular individuals, and 
were similarly at a loss of how to deal with them. Though some form of emotional 
distance is necessary in any academic work, qualitative research of this kind 
makes such detachment difficult to do and such incidents frequently troubled me 
throughout the observation process. A criminological approach necessarily 
demands this detached orientation, though other approaches would see this result 
as valuable information and data in and of themselves. Primarily, this response 
could be seen as a sign of the humanizing effect of the background information 
process and limitations of the criminal justice system. Further examination of 
these cases and background reports, in retrospect, show these humanizing 
incidents and moments of individualization to be rare – most often, the 
offender/accused person was rarely presented as anything other than a series of 
tragic incidents and histories. This pattern of discursive framing contravenes the 
intentions of the Gladue decision and serves to objectify Aboriginal peoples and 
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subject them to the same racial and colonial biases of the past
4
. Regardless, in 
some instances the researcher was mistaken for an offender/accused person by the 
court or other members of the public, and some of these individuals became 
slightly embarrassed when he told them that he was a researcher and had no 
(criminal) business in the court. The defense counsel, court workers, and even a 
few judges were also particularly interested in conversation with the researcher, 
and these helped to alleviate his nervousness and feelings of alienation from the 
entire proceedings. 
Another potential problem was the sampling method/section used for the 
court locations and cases. Due to financial issues, the researcher could only 
observe at Gladue courts in Toronto. While this was one of the best locations to 
study Gladue courts – the large Aboriginal population and two full-day courts are 
unprecedented in Canada – this does mean that the rationales and conclusions 
derived from them only apply to these or similar contexts.  Three important 
elements in any Gladue decision – the effects of institutional racism, treatment 
centre access, and community supports – are differently applied to a large 
cosmopolitan urban centre rather than a rural community or a wide-ranging 
suburb. Even then, there are problems that arise due to the urban immigration of 
Aboriginal peoples into Toronto and how that directly changes the 
                                                 
4
 This problematic discursive framework of Aboriginal peoples makes up a significant portion of 
the Data Analysis and Discussion 
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offenders/accused persons seen in the Gladue court. As a result, we must take 
these conclusions, rationales, and interpretations with caution, as Toronto is an 
exemplary example of these factors and can only really be compared to other 
major metropolises.  
 A related problem is based upon the selection process for the transcripts 
ordered. Due to the previously discussed financial constraints, only relatively 
short cases could reasonably be ordered while maintaining a large enough sample 
size – courts charge per page, with most of the transcripts costing approximately 
$70 or so. Similarly, the researcher elected to select cases with notable or 
unexpected discourses rather than what could normally be expected, as well as a 
self-imposed limitation to have at least one transcript detailing a diversion and a 
bail. In addition, in order to have a somewhat broad sample of examples the 
researcher also desired to have two or more instances of the same offender being 
tried for different offenses/for reoffending. Therefore, these transcripts should be 
studied and analyzed with these conditions and problems taken into account – not 
to mention legal restrictions with regards to recordings and transcriptions within 
the court.  
 The technical problems related to the research process were primarily the 
result of the limitations of the coding process. The qualitative analysis software 
had some peculiarities – most significantly, it cannot adequately code separate 
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lines of code/discourses into different passages. A ‘passage’ is any unbroken set 
of text, typically between one to three sentences long. The problem is that if there 
are two passages coded identically which have no text between them, the program 
instead interprets/parses them as a single passage that may in fact be several lines 
of discourse /text long (or, alternately, a single line of discourse). Because of this, 
it is difficult to adequately gauge the frequency of certain discourses and their 
commonality in court contexts. Similarly, when cross-tabulating between certain 
code sets each passage only applies once, rather than any number of times 
required. For instance, if a single long passage of text is coded as [code a], and 
within that same text are two separate lines/passages coded as [code b], then the 
software cross-tabulation will only see one instance of direct correlation between 
[code a] and [code b] even when it should be two. Because of this, at several 
points in the research analysis it became necessary to recode substantial portions 
of the notes. In addition, it meant that some of the analyses had to take these 
peculiarities into account as they may have skewed the data in an unusual 
direction. This was primarily countered by the previously mentioned recoding and 
in-depth analyses, but the researcher also made it a point to check certain unusual 
correlations by hand and focus on percentage-based patterns/trends rather than the 
total values. 
 Another problem with the data analysis was the way the notes were made. 
As they were verbatim transcriptions of the notes made during the court 
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observations, there were several instances of short-hand terminology and many 
cases were split up due to the nature of the court proceedings. Though much of 
this was countered by including official transcripts into the analyses, as well as 
the researchers growing experience with such note-taking procedures, it did mean 
that the analysis software may have had several cases/numbers of cases increased 
due to their inclusion into data sets even when their practical value to the research 
was small. That said, the focus on percentage-based correlations and direct 
examination of the data helped to alleviate this concern. Furthermore, the fact that 
court cases are so split up and take place over multiple parts of a court session is 
an important finding that should not be ignored or made ‘invisible’. 
 A final problem that only emerged late in the observation/research period 
was the rapid shifts in court proceedings brought on by recent criminal legislation. 
Most notably, changes to mandatory minimums regarding drug offenses and the 
raising of the victim fine surcharge and restrictions on waiving it. Both of these 
changes were put into practice mid-late October 2013, and unfortunately the 
researcher set a personal deadline to finish observation by the start of November 
2013. As a result, only a few cases/observations actually managed to include these 
recent changes despite their critical importance to the overall research project. 
Thankfully, later in January 2014 there was a day in which more observations 
were possible and the changes between then and the previous observations were 
rather stark. As a result, these concerns are mitigated by this incidental 
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observation, albeit only partially. However, prior to these changes the court and 
related personnel were aware of the upcoming effects and mentioned/criticized 
them frequently off the record.   
The Production of Transcripts 
 The actual processes involved in various cases follow a certain pattern. To 
begin with, nearly all of the cases/transcripts were ‘split’ between multiple court 
instances. That is, first the judge asks what case is ready and then requests that the 
accused person be brought up from the cells below. While they wait, the 
preceding case is resolved, paperwork is read in advance, or other conversations 
are spoken. These ‘in-between’ discourses are not recorded as part of the 
transcript. Once complete, the judge asks the defense/duty counsel what offenses 
will be resolved, if the case is a bail (and what onus, if so) and only after this does 
the proceeding begin. In some instances, questions/confirmations about 
Aboriginal heritage are performed here. A small number of judges/accused 
persons issue specific questions and discussions about the charges to be plead to. 
These questions are determined based on the judge/accused person in question; 
for instance, some judges are specifically concerned about this based on 
problematic past experiences, and some accused persons are known to plea 
regardless of the charges.  
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 Following this brief conversation is the plea inquiry (in the event that it is 
not a bail proceeding). This takes up a significant portion of the proceedings, and 
entails a long question-and-answer session by the accused person and either his 
defense counsel or judge. In this instance, they are coached through the questions 
in order to ensure that they understand all the charges and what a guilty plea 
entails. Though this plea inquiry seems to be rather easy to answer, judges place 
great emphasis on the accused person comprehending the intricacies of pleading 
guilty and will be upset if it is later shown that they did not do so. After the 
inquiry has been satisfied, the accused person is arraigned in another long speech 
wherein the clerk simply stands and reads the offenses without interruption and 
little acknowledgement from the rest of the court. Some transcripts omit the 
arraignment entirely and simply have a notice that “the arraignment was entered 
at this time”. 
 The facts of the case are next read by the Crown prosecutor. This is 
another long speech that is rarely interrupted, though in contrast to the others the 
Crown prosecutor may sometimes speak clearly and with authority or they may 
stumble over their words. This difference is predicated over whether or not the 
facts have been written down beforehand and have been written/noted in an easy 
to comprehend way. The facts, being derived from police reports and CPIC 
criminal records, are often scattered amongst different texts/sources and can 
sometimes contradict one another. It is when this confusion is present and the 
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Crown prosecutor has had little time to prepare their thoughts/read the work that 
there is the most apprehension and ill-formed discourse. The accused person, as 
well, may similarly stumble or show trepidation in speaking (admitting) the facts 
and will sometimes question them or clarify certain elements. If the accused 
person denies them or has a substantial enough clarification to make, then the 
judge will question him about these discrepancies since he supposedly was 
familiar with the facts based on the plea inquiry. While small clarifications may 
simply cause the Crown prosecutor to redefine an offense, an outright denial or 
substantial clarification can cause the judge to strike the plea out and order the 
defense counsel to prepare a trial date as a plea is inappropriate based on their 
response.  
 Once the facts have been read in and admitted by the accused person, the 
judge pronounces them guilty (thereafter referring to them as an ‘offender’ or 
convicted person) and the Crown prosecutor can begin their submissions. Often, 
the first submission is the offender’s record, which must be reviewed by them or 
their defense counsel to ensure that the information is correct. Victim impact 
statements (VIS), if present, are also submitted at this time and given to the judge. 
In the event that the plea concerns multiple crimes or sentences over a long period 
of time, the judge will often ask the Crown prosecutor to explain and detail the 
dates of the offenses in order to create a ‘timeline’ and determine the time 
71 
 
between each occurrence. Following this, the Crown prosecutor usually offers 
their position with regards to the final sentence. 
 The Crown prosecutor’s submission is where another long uninterrupted 
discourse begins, and it often entails several minutes of constant speech without 
outside inputs. Unlike the facts of the case, this position is stated (often read 
aloud) clearly and succinctly, with little stuttering or ill-formed discourses. In 
addition, the Crown prosecutor also speaks to aggravating and mitigating factors 
and how they directly influence their position. The Crown prosecutor also directly 
references and declares what they regard as the appropriate sentencing principles 
in this case and their relevance to the offender/accused person, victim, and/or the 
public. In some instances, the Crown prosecutor may also refer to some expected 
appeals and desires from the offender/accused person and leave them without 
comment or directly refute them on the basis of their reasonableness. In general, 
this is the point where the discursive processes and analysis mentioned in the 
upcoming data analyses occurs. It is usually at this point where the judge’s mood 
and final sentencing position is ‘set’ and any following discourses and rhetoric 
only alters/shifts it by degrees. 
 After the Crown prosecutor’s position and recommended sentence is 
stated, the defense counsel has his opportunity to speak. Typically, he will clarify 
the nature of the submission (joint or not) followed by the pre-sentence 
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(background) report of the offender./accused person If there is a physical copy of 
the report, then it is usually passed up to the judge at this point if it is not in his 
possession already.  Background reports often start with upbringing-based 
histories, with an emphasis on the most severe circumstances and experiences – 
often with direct references to Aboriginal and colonial histories. The defense 
counsel, in another long uninterrupted speech, deliberately ties his rhetoric and 
sentencing principles to the offender/accused person’s life and attempts to create a 
narrative that shows how these problems contributed to the charges in question. 
The judge, too, will ask questions about the background report in order to 
ascertain what influenced or precipitated the crime. Even without the background 
report, judges seek to understand why the crime occurred and will, if necessary, 
ask the offender directly. Other significant questions involve the relationship to 
the victim, ties to the location where the crime occurred, his current 
job/employment prospects, and past treatment histories. After the general 
background report, the defense counsel will begin to offer his major submissions. 
These background characteristics are where the Gladue principles are most often 
mentioned (and linked to the past background report) but frequently this section is 
an ad-libbed or improvised critique of the Crown prosecutor’s case. These 
discourses, again, appear ill-formed despite the fact that the defense counsel is 
rarely, if ever, interrupted. This is likely due to the fact that the defense counsel is 
reacting to the Crown prosecutor’s submissions for the first time, and needs to 
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consider the body language and initial interpretation of the judge. Even with these 
limitations, these final and major submissions are where most of the rhetorical 
power of the Crown prosecutor’s discourse is derived and the judge’s position 
shifts the most drastically.  
 Witnesses, sureties, or any other person to be directly questioned and 
sworn in are done so during the appropriate submissions – either the Crown 
prosecutor’s or the defense counsel’s. These questions are predominantly ill-
formed despite their methodical formation and planned nature. The questions are 
often stated with hesitation and repeated if the answer is not understood or 
incomplete, and the answers themselves are stated slowly and with some 
stuttering and self-correction. The entire process is designed and acted out such 
that the witness is almost led into referencing the rhetorical goals and discourses 
of the questioner or deliberately echoes their specific interpretations and their 
links to the values and concerns of the court system. In effect, the witnesses are 
utilized as supporting discursive elements and are rarely utilized as a way to enter 
new submissions or topics into the case. 
 After all the submissions are complete, the offender/accused person is then 
asked if they want to speak directly to the judge or make their own submissions. 
Again, despite the predictability of this stage of the court proceedings (the judge 
is required to grant the them the opportunity to speak, and defense counsels notify 
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them in advance or let them prepare a written letter in its stead) the discourses 
made by the offender/accused person are typically ill-formed and stated in a 
nervous or cautious manner. Stuttering, hesitation, and the avoidance of direct eye 
contact are common. This can also be somewhat conversational in format, with 
the judge directly asking questions to the offender/accused person in order to 
directly confirm some facts or to engage with some of the direct submissions 
made by them. For instance, the judge may object to claims about treatment by 
referencing the record, or they may ask for more background information that was 
not disclosed in the background report. 
 Lastly, the judge makes their decision and the reasons for it. The 
explanation begins with a listing of relevant mitigating factors, and then 
aggravating factors. After this, the judge can rationalize or explain the 
applicability of the Gladue principles to the case in the event that such principles 
were slightly vague or otherwise unclear. Sometimes, the judge will directly speak 
to the offender/accused person (that is, use ‘you’ instead of their full name) and 
speak to their history – criminal, personal, treatment, or otherwise. What are most 
common here are direct reprimands or appeals regarding their potential treatment 
or future reoffending. This monologue gradually segues into a formal statement of 
the sentence and the relevant conditions, and this may also include a direct 
warning or appeal to them about the consequences of reoffending and the overall 
purpose of the sentence (i.e., the main sentencing principle). Probation orders, or 
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similar sentences, are explained in detail if applicable and the judge may ask the 
offender/accused person directly if they understand the conditions. Any waiving 
of the VFS, or the withdrawing of charges by the Crown prosecutor, are done last. 
With this, the case is over and the offender/accused person is escorted out with 
their defense counsel following. 
 There are some caveats and clarifications to be made here with regards to 
these surface observations and the typical formation and flow of the court. For 
one, sometimes the defense counsel makes their submissions before the Crown 
prosecutor, often when there is a joint submission. In these cases, the Crown 
prosecutor does little more than affirm what was said by the defense counsel 
rather than make the argument himself. Another rare discourse is made by the 
judge during the end of the Crown prosecutor’s submissions, and it details a 
confirmation that their position is what was written down in the preparatory 
document rather than what was stated during their submissions. In this instance, 
the judge is deliberately looking to check that any discrepancies are not actual 
flaws but are the result of misspeaking. Lastly, some cases, notably bails, skip 
some sections or rearrange them. Bails, for instance, do not include an 
arraignment or a plea as the accused person is not being tried or admitting guilt 
for anything. 
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Discourse Analysis  
 The original theoretical framework of the research thesis was based on 
critical discourse analysis. As my preparatory readings on discourse analysis 
theories grew I began to consider the possibility that the new punitiveness and 
rehabilitative orientations are also used in both a functional and interpretive 
fashion; that is, as both a method of framing certain submissions and court 
statements and a tool for encouraging an offender to desist from crime in 
whatever way is best for them (Heracleous, 2006, p. 11-17).  Critical discourse 
analysis theories were also relevant to certain criminological texts as well – 
notably, the so-called “catastrophe theorists” described by Hutchinson (2006) 
previously. In these theorists’ eyes, the punitive shift is directly based around 
express goals of control and domination. In contrast, other discourse analysis 
theorists would approach the punitive turn via alternative discourse analysis 
processes in order to ascertain the effects of new legislation with regards to the 
separate domains within the criminal justice system (judges, police, Crown 
prosecutors, etc.) – O’Malley, Hannah-Moffat & Maurutto, and Doob & Sprott, 
for example.  
Indigenous theorists are similarly divided on their conceptions of 
Canadian justice and their usage of critical theories, and those theorists that do 
utilize a critical perspective (such as McCaslin) can emphasize other analytical 
77 
 
processes when discussing Indigenous-led justice and restorative programs. The 
main issue is that this research thesis is primarily built upon the work and research 
of these authors and must necessarily consider their approaches and methodology 
when deciding what orientation is most appropriate for this thesis. Because of the 
divergent approaches utilized by different authors, the decision of what process to 
utilize is more difficult to make and adapting only one may emphasize certain 
processes and conclusions at the expense of other equally valid ones. 
It is probable that critical discourse analysis is effective only in the context 
of the Canadian punitive turn and politicking (that is, not the 
effect/implementation of them in Gladue courts). Primarily, this is because many 
of the criticisms and examinations made of the punitive turn and the criminal 
justice system are based on macro-level processes and legislative trends rather 
than the unique and particular implementations of them ‘on the ground’ or in 
courts. In this macro- context, all three elements of discourse – textual, discursive-
practice, and social-practice - are exemplified and the ideologies and power 
embedded in them are explicit. For instance, textual elements are at their most 
literal – legislation directly calls to mind punitive elements, politicians repeat 
party lines and slogans verbatim, and the media echoes public concerns and 
outcries in a way most beneficial to their ratings and political concerns 
(Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000, p. 448). Discursive-practice elements are also 
expressly called up in the ways that legislation is conceived and moved through 
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the political and public realms until finally being signed into law; ultimately it 
ends up in the courtrooms where a second stage of contextualization and 
alteration is performed (ibid., p. 448-449). Finally, social-practice elements are 
the end-goal of the legislation and call to mind domination and control as the 
express purpose of any law. This includes the use of discourse in creating popular 
conceptions of criminals and citizens such that particular political power is 
maintained and ideological and normative conceptions of justice are made a tool 
for greater influence (ibid., p. 449). 
 In this context, the classical Foucauldian conception of modern penality 
and discipline is directly referenced and compared to the precursor eras where 
punishment and repression were key elements (Seidman, 2008, p. 181-182). This 
orientation fits perfectly when broad strokes of the new punitive movement are 
examined – particularly catastrophic conceptions of the new punitive turn – but is 
too focused on both the extremely powerful and extremely weak actors to 
accurately represent the multiplicity of actors in the court context and the 
subversive discourses and methods they use. Court agents can be aware of the 
importance their speech has on the proceedings and the way it may influence the 
future prospects of offenders (directly via the sentence, and indirectly due to the 
associated effects of it) and to make the argument that they are unaware of these 
elements and effects – either on the record sentence or associated effects – will 
similarly rob them of the agency and reflexive thought already shown through 
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existing criticisms of discourses and orders that they feel are inappropriate. In 
some instances, judges and lawyers will call these discursive practices out on their 
obviously divisive goals and attempt to challenge them in their own way.  
Thus, outside of a general broad-strokes analysis, critical discourse 
analysis and the Foucauldian paradigm fall into significant problems, particularly 
issues of reductionism (with regards to the reasons and meanings behind 
discourse) and an overreliance on psychoanalysis (wherein there is a suspicion of 
what is manifest and a preoccupation with the hidden meanings of texts) (Burman 
and Parker, 1993, p. 158-160, 163). These problems are also related to criticism 
by Martyn Hammersley, who notes that some researchers utilize the orientation in 
an overly polarized and activist manner and (in the case of the current topic) this 
could lead to an excessive focus on offender/accused persons and 
judges/politicians rather than other court actors and could also encourage 
inappropriate comparisons to all courts and jurisdictions rather than delimitating 
between specialized and mainstream/criminal courts (Hammersley, 1997, p. 239, 
244-245). 
Interpretive discourse analysis, in the context of this thesis, is primarily 
concerned with four out of the five main approaches identified by Heracleous : 
hermeneutics, rhetoric, symbolic interactionism, and storytelling (Heracleous, 
2006, p. 38). All of these methods are primarily applied to the court setting and 
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submission stage rather than political or out of court elements . It is partly because 
of these ‘on-the-ground’ elements that this discourse analysis theory is considered 
more relevant for Indigenous-led and non-catastrophe theorists. These methods 
allow for reflexivity and agency to be granted to both authorities and those they 
presumably control. Regardless of these factors, there are several different 
methods that may be relevant. For instance, hermeneutics is primarily concerned 
with textual interpretation, and is therefore fundamentally related to the way 
judges and Crown prosecutors interpret both statutory law and background 
submissions relevant to the offender/accused person (particularly the Gladue 
report). Though these interpretations may differ from that of the writer and vary 
from court to court, they are nevertheless standardized through judicial 
precedence and commentary as well as their specific historical context (that of the 
punitive turn, and rising Aboriginal and criminological theoretical scholarship) 
(ibid., p. 38-40).  
Rhetorical approaches look at speech and arguments themselves as well as 
the context and situation in which they are used and their persuasive power. For 
Gladue courts, this approach is concerned with all the court actors outside of a 
joint submission, wherein each actor is appealing to specific rules/norms that are 
taken for granted or they are directly arguing against them on the basis of other 
competing rules (for instance, the new punitiveness can be argued against on the 
basis of practicality and effectiveness). Some of these common rhetorical 
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elements are enthymemes, which include unstated and assumed premises that are 
taken for granted by the audience/actors but not necessarily the larger society. 
These enthymemes can contribute to some of the conflict between lawyers/judges 
and the lay public/offender/accused persons who are not privy to the reasons for 
these processes/premises and who may mistake them for omissions or internal 
formal processes rather than spontaneous interpersonal constructs (ibid., p. 40-
42).  
Symbolic interactionism focuses on how interaction and meanings shape 
one another, often in an observational and interview context. Besides the obvious 
link to the methodology and the limits of the research thesis, symbolic interaction 
in the Gladue context is concerned with how certain meanings and discourses are 
institutionalized in the form of precedence and rote actions. Besides sentences and 
judicial discretion, symbolic interactionism can also apply to the small subset of 
actors involved in Gladue courts and how certain discourses and processes grow 
to develop certain meanings and roles alien to an outside observer. For instance, 
legal shorthand and informal processes that are used to keep the court moving 
smoothly or which occur behind the scenes that are outside the purview of the 
court yet nonetheless are essential to the overall process (ibid., p. 44-45). For 
similar reasons, symbolic interactionist theories can also directly implicate 
harmful or problematic discursive frames – built upon the assumptions and 
routines of the court and the values therein – that can undercut the presumed goals 
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of Gladue and which may lead to continued issues of unconscious 
marginalization.  
Finally, the storytelling approach focuses on how stories fulfill certain 
needs for the storyteller. In the Gladue context, there are cathartic effects from the 
Gladue report and the ability for an offender/accused person to explain and 
humanize themselves given the larger structural effects that may have shaped their 
upbringing. This is slightly different than the normal use of storytelling methods, 
but it still emphasizes the presentation, context, and meaning behind the story and 
how its interpretation is arguably more important than its literal meanings (ibid., 
p. 45-46). In this instance, both Indigenous justice and criminological literature 
are both concerned with this element of discourse analysis from a framing 
perspective – notably, Hannah-Moffat and Maurutto’s (2010) work on PSRs 
described previously. 
 Functional approaches view discourse as a tool for actors to use in their 
everyday lives. The primary method of discourse in this context is to create 
metaphors in order to allow for greater understanding, coercion, or to facilitate 
negotiation (ibid., p. 65). Metaphors utilize three forms – semantic (speech), 
spatial (location), and embodied (relational), though embodied metaphors go 
beyond this basic classification in that the metaphors and objects they relate to are 
often are constructed and practiced by the very actors in question, thus drawing on 
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contextual and particularistic settings and actors. That is, embodied metaphors are 
neither static nor universal (ibid., p. 65-67). Embodied metaphors, for instance, 
are actively created and changed over the course of societal interaction while 
being altered by the speech and locations therein. In this sense, they can be 
considered the result of an interaction process that integrates both semantic and 
spatial metaphors in order to create a discourse that extends into societal actions 
and modes of thought.  
In the context of Gladue courts, functional uses of discourse revolve 
around embodied metaphors, primarily ones relating to the collective construction 
of the sentencing principles and their relation to the offender/accused person and 
his sentence. For example, Crown prosecutors and judges may differ on how 
specific deterrence is defined and to be enacted, and this metaphor implicitly 
references the offender and their circumstances. Following this, a metaphor of 
specific deterrence is created in reference to a particular type of offender (perhaps 
an unrepentant, violent criminal, for example), and this metaphor construction is 
repeated often enough that mentioning specific deterrence or a violent, 
unrepentant offender immediately calls both concepts and metaphors to mind. 
Thus, to an outside observer, some descriptions and discourses seem unfinished 
when in reality they are embodied metaphors that were constructed outside of 
their purview. In some instances, these metaphors can change subtly over time in 
response to new legislation or organizational imperatives, while in some cases, 
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these metaphors are directly challenged or questioned by an outside actor 
(defense/duty counsels, offenders/accused persons, or politicians) and are altered 
in turn or force a confrontation with unconscious thought patterns (ibid., p. 74). 
These types of embodied metaphors directly speak to Indigenous justice theories 
and concerns about the continued preference for Eurocentric definitions of justice 
as being solely about punishment or rehabilitation, never traditional “healing” 
(Henderson & McCaslin, 2005, p. 4)(Lee, 2005, p. 99-100). In these instances, 
embodied metaphors of the court system ignore anything other than rehabilitation 
or punishment based sentences and enforces a false dichotomy that marginalizes 
Aboriginal peoples on the basis of continued subordination to colonial legal 
systems. 
 A discourse analysis methodology as described above is particularly 
appropriate given the multiple types and functions of discourse in the court 
setting. Textual discourses arise from multiple actors and manifest in different 
ways – police reports, criminal records, letters, background reports, the sentencing 
rationale, and of course legislation itself. Verbal discourses also have different 
forms, from speeches summarizing (or emphasizing) the textual discourses above, 
Crown prosecutor and defense counsel submissions, formal statements and 
protocols, personal submissions and appeals, admonitions and pleas, as well as the 
final on-the-record sentence. There are even silent physical 
discourses/communication, such as the physical setup of the court room, the 
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different physical restraints placed on an offender/accused person, emotional 
outbursts, protocols relating to when speech is allowed, refusals for last 
statements, and omissions from textual discourses. These are not exhaustive lists, 
but the point to be made is that not only is there a deluge of information admitted 
to a court proceeding, but they each have different forms and are altered by both 
their presentation and application.  
A simple background report, for instance, is the entirety of an 
offender/accused person’s history and life, condensed into a document through an 
interview and written by a complete stranger to them. It is then given to defense 
counsels, Crown prosecutors, and judges who are similarly estranged and are not 
aware of any omissions or statements deemed unimportant by the interviewer or 
interviewee despite their possible relevance. After this, these actors discuss the 
report but only insofar as they can highlight information they feel is relevant to 
their goals and which can vary depending on the offender/accused person or the 
personality of the Crown prosecutor. Next, each of these actors must take into 
consideration all the information they feel is relevant and contrast it to what the 
others promote (even other actors outside of court, such as the public), eventually 
arriving at a ephemeral ‘shortlist’ of relevant facts and items that is then applied 
to the sentencing principles and legislation (which has in turn gone through much 
the same group reinterpretation process, both in the court setting and in the sense 
of norms and taken-for-granted beliefs). The methodology and interpretations 
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used to create this shortlist sets the precedent to be followed in subsequent cases 
with slight revisions and alterations, possibly to the point where it becomes a 
structure in and of itself (the scope of which can vary, but should be considered 
limited to the specific courthouse in question at the least). Thus, a simple 
conversation can, through the discursive process, come to influence national 
standards and practices with regards to Gladue courts as well as the smaller-scale 
organizational and personal activities relevant to the actual administration and 
application of the law and legal norms/beliefs. 
Probably the most important part of the court process – and the main focus 
of the thesis – is the actual sentencing rationale. Each judge is expected to include 
a rationalization/explanation justifying the sentence with direct references to 
submissions or sentencing principles. This is a significant element of court 
discourse, as an observer is able to see how the judge interprets, frames, and alters 
the speech/text. For instance, the judge may ignore one mitigating factor in 
preference for another, or he may omit statements made by the offender /accused 
person on the basis that they are not important to the process. What is significant 
is that these patterns of interpretation/framing can be compared across multiple 
actors, offense types, and settings such that a pattern of interpretation and 
application of court discourse can be created and particularly relevant or 
important variables can be identified.  
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Furthermore, from the critical standpoint, discourses used in court or in 
relation to criminal sentences are quite literally used as tools of control and 
domination – albeit presented as beneficial in the grand scheme of things. These 
discourses also go through the communal interpretation phase as described above, 
and therefore implicitly involve Foucauldian conceptions of unspoken discourse 
and how speech from positions of power can be used to marginalize and render 
other positions invisible. For instance, judges often abstain from directly 
mentioning harmful colonial policies even when they are relevant to the 
circumstances of Aboriginal offenders (as the Gladue principles dictate). That is, 
they would mention incidents of foster care, cultural genocide, and forced 
assimilation without directly naming the racist government policies in question 
that created them. In so doing, they erase these events and make them seem 
legitimate in the eyes of society. This specific utilization of Foucauldian thought 
is directly implicated in the theoretical frameworks of Indigenous justice 
literature, where theorists posit that the modern system of enforcing subjugation 
and “assimilation” is not just counter to Aboriginal peoples’ beliefs, but also 
rooted in colonial thought and ultimately counterproductive and self-defeating 
(Huculak, 2005, p. 161-162). Similarly, offender/accused persons who reference 
colonial frameworks (in the form of background incidents of racism, 
institutionalized or otherwise) can directly challenge these and other dominating 
discourses with respect to the egalitarian preconceptions of Judges and public 
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norms. The effectiveness of these criticisms differs depending on how 
dehumanized the Aboriginal person becomes through these impersonal 
background processes and the clinical orientation of the modern judicial 
framework, though Gladue courts are designed to allow an offender/accused 
person to feel a sense of community and present themselves as more than a 
alienating list of criminal charges and risk/need analyses. More significantly, 
judges need to consider how sentencing principles and legislation can possibly 
legitimate these dominating colonial frames and actions while taking into account 
contradictory demands and directive from defense counsels, the Gladue decision, 
and legislation such as the Charter. In this sense, the conception of “penal 
modernity” is contrasted with neo-punitive reactionary ideologies (as in the 
criminological literature) as well as Indigenous justice critiques and arguments 
that challenge the racial basis of the legal system as well as the recent conflicts 
presumed by catastrophe theorists (Brown, 2002, p. 403). 
Interpretive and Functional approaches are preferred in comparison to 
classical critical discourse analysis because of the important micro-elements 
involved in this paper’s analysis and methodology as well as their emphasis on 
evaluation and shared construction of the discourses observed/anticipated.  These 
factors are still present in Foucauldian critical discourse analysis processes, but 
are (in the evaluation presented here) more prominent in the alternative 
approaches. In addition, these elements are essential to the analysis topic since the 
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primary focus of the thesis is the specific judges within certain Gladue courts as 
well as their reactions/adaptations to neo-punitive policies. As a result, these 
approaches were prioritized over a critical discourse analysis but did not 
completely override it, particularly when the analysis turned to larger macro-
trends or specific instances of controlling or domineering discourses. This 
understanding and application of discourse analysis is therefore primarily defined 
here as an explicit examination of textual and verbal information in order to 
understand the phenomena and processes behind sentencing rationales in the 
contemporary Gladue court context. As a result, discourse analysis in this thesis is 
oriented towards the verbal application (speech) of textual and verbal directives 
(court submissions and criminal legislation, respectively). This orientation, in 
turn, is predicated upon the presumption that there are multiple directives and that 
the speakers in question must reconcile them or utilize alternative discourses to 
avoid incongruities between the two. This reconciliation process, if it is present, is 
the primary focus of the thesis and overall analysis. 
Discourse analysis is therefore the only real means for this examination of 
judicial reconciliation to occur. Criminal legislation is discourse in and of itself 
and as described previously there have been contradictory findings and results 
from academic research focused on Canadian criminal legislation (with little 
research done on their in-court implementation). The contemporary contradictions 
between the Gladue principles and s. 718.2 (e) and new punitive legislation like 
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the Omnibus Budget Bill/Bill C-38 act as further signs of conflict within the 
ideological and moral frameworks of the Canadian criminal justice system. When 
we take these issues into consideration and how this conflict is escalating, it 
becomes more apparent that formal court speech and discourse are being used as 
tools to promote these ideologies while also being the very subject matter that is 
being debated. Thus, we come to the research subject itself – the judge and 
Gladue courts. In Gladue courts, the difficulties in reconciling rehabilitation and 
punitiveness becomes ever more apparent due to a more explicit directive to 
rehabilitate as well as the historical and contemporary patterns of domination and 
control inflicted on Aboriginal peoples though various agents of Canadian society, 
including the courts themselves. Additionally, Gladue courts involve a multitude 
of non-court actors as well as agencies that can possibly support or criticize the 
criminal justice system. Judges are also uniquely suited to a discourse analysis, as 
they are required to actively navigate a multitude of discourses – from within and 
without the court – while also having to rationalize their decisions and sentences 
in respect to these submissions and considerations. If we consider less critical 
orientations or frameworks, we must still take into account how this negotiation 
and reconciliation process is constituted and representative of other outside 
factors and past patterns of discourse, thus highlighting possible institutional 
inertia and the way that distorts the fundamental application of justice. That 
possible distortion is one of the main concerns of this thesis, as there is a need for 
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criminal justice legislation to accurately reflect political priorities (whether based 
on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the prerogatives of the Judicial system, or 
partisan political issues), and this discourse analysis can explain how these 
distortions occur and highlight possible ways to remedy them. These priorities 
differ in their primary ideological framework and goals, and only judicial values 
and charter-based priorities have shown even tacit support for reducing 
Aboriginal people’s overrepresentation in the criminal justice system. Partisan 
priorities (in the form of direct political ideologies within the neo-liberal Canadian 
political system) can even be considered opposed to this attempt at healing the 
damage caused from colonial and racist policies and support the continued  
escalation of Aboriginal over-representation within the justice system. 
 The other main concern – how these political priorities are indicative of 
rehabilitative and neo-punitive ideologies – is to be discussed in light of judicial 
discretion and negotiation, which is similarly based around discourses (functional, 
critical, or otherwise) and their eminently social construction. Thus, the Gladue 
court setting serves not only methodological problems of sampling and/or 
procedural concerns (the cases heard and the explicit directives), but it also 
highlights the area where these conflicts, questions, and contradictions are made 
most apparent. The discourse analysis to be performed in this thesis is not just 
utilizing this topic out of a personal preference, but also because it is the perfect 
arena in which to examine the academic and political issues currently being 
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debated as well as their long-term effects on Canadian society, Canadian norms, 
and the actual implementation of justice itself. More starkly, it can also illuminate 
how recent attempts to decolonize Aboriginal peoples may be in conflict with 
contemporary colonial institutions and reactionary legislative changes. 
Data Analysis 
Preliminary Information 
 I will begin with some details of the research process and the locations of 
the research. All of the observations were written and transcribed in point form as 
the court dialogue was far too fast to be recorded in its entirety, and much of what 
was said were based on form responses or formal statements with the 
offender/accused person’s name in the correct location. Furthermore, many cases 
were ‘broken up’ over the course of the observation as different actors would 
bring up a case only to be interrupted by another one. As such, the actual 
observation note transcripts often have some cases divided up over the course of 
the day/observation and have some repetition of statements/discourses/data as the 
case is brought up later on in the day. Most cases do not suffer from this effect, 
but the transcripts maintained this separation in order to properly emulate the 
sometimes confusing nature of court cases. Note that some interesting cases had 
transcripts ordered for them, and as such their unique analysis and data will be 
done separately from the observation and cross-tabulation analyses. The following 
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sections will entail references to the terminology of the coding software as well as 
some of the problems and quirks of its parsing logic. Furthermore, many of the 
code cross-tabulations and relations have some interesting correlations and values 
that will make up much of the focus for their respective sections. See Appendix B 
for an explanation about the coding software and terminology, and Appendix C 
for the interesting correlations and notes. These interesting correlations and notes 
form the bulk of the data/information to be discussed, and should be considered 
integral to understanding the discussion or used in lieu of directly reviewing the 
specific cross-tabulation table and noting the intersections personally. 
 The research took place over three court locations. 1000 Finch Court only 
holds Gladue court for half a day each week and is often combined with non-
Gladue guilty pleas. It is also primarily concerned with shorter cases and often 
had less than 6 cases per day; moreover a majority of these cases were remands or 
otherwise rescheduled. As such, 1000 Finch Court is not a significant location 
with respect to this research, though many cases and outside support workers do 
sometimes attend there. College Park and Old City Hall (OCH), on the other 
hand, both contribute roughly the same amount of data to the overall research, 
with slight differences in that College Park has longer proceedings than OCH on 
average. OCH and College Park sometimes transfer cases to and from another, 
though OCH has slightly more support in the form of specialized courts. Because 
of these factors, the majority of cases and observations are drawn from College 
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Park and Old City Hall, with their differing levels of outside support and 
resources. 
 Finally, several of the tables discussed and analyzed here were split up 
into multiple parts in order to allow for them to be properly displayed and to 
comply with certain formatting guidelines. As a result of these requirements, 
many of these ‘split’ tables utilize some short-form terminology. It is therefore 
recommended that interested readers refer to the appendices (to clarify any 
confusing terms) or check the attached supplementary files (which are the same 
tables here, but not split up or divided across multiple pages).  
Table 1 : Proceeding Type 
Drug Prop. Viol. Bail Plea Diver. Rem. FTC Misc. Odd 
Res.
Unkn.
Drug 38 20 2 18 9 2 8 15 5 4 4
Prop. 20 170 53 51 70 24 29 82 19 10 9
Viol. 2 53 104 34 37 12 21 44 15 8 2
Bail 18 51 34 115 7 0 3 40 14 8 38
Plea 9 70 37 7 147 2 2 73 13 8 35
Diver
s.
2 24 12 0 2 53 1 10 1 0 20
Rem. 8 29 21 3 2 1 376 26 14 4 16
FTC 15 82 44 40 73 10 26 142 20 13 4
Misc. 5 19 15 14 13 1 14 20 39 4 0
Odd 
Res.
4 10 8 8 8 1 4 13 4 27 8
Unkn
.
4 9 2 38 35 20 16 4 0 8 115  
(Figure 1 – Table 1 : Proceeding Type) 
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 Table 1 cross-tabulated the specific resolutions for each proceeding. Note 
that there is no offense that is ‘exclusive’, even when common sense might make 
it seem so. For instance, one case involved a combined bail and plea that was later 
resolved with a detailed bail plan and a type of special supervised order that – if 
completed – would count as diversion. Similarly, there are several types of 
proceedings that must necessarily be combined – the offense types and failure to 
comply charges, in particular. This table mostly serves to provide some context as 
to the types of offenses and their proceeding type. Note that this and subsequent 
sections will only focus on the most significant observations available for the 
admittedly small table.  
 Firstly, remands and similar results – despite being condensed due to 
coding peculiarities – make up the vast majority of proceedings at 376 cases to 
370 (the rest of the cases combined). Second, about 1/3 of all diversions had 
unknown charges – this was partially the result of their omission from the docket 
and the fact that Crown prosecutors never detailed their specific charges. Third, 
property crimes applied to roughly half of all non-remanded cases. Fourth, about 
1/3 of bails and ½ of pleas involved a Failure to Comply (FTC) offense. The 
discrepancy between the two is likely the result of accused persons with FTC 
offenses recognizing their slim chances of winning the bail case and therefore 
declining to attempt. 
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 The data demonstrates that the vast majority of cases are remanded over 
the course of the day, and that the most common offenses seen in the court were 
property and FTC offenses.  Notably, violent offenses were somewhat common, 
with drug offenses as unlikely as the ‘miscellaneous’ offenses (a general catch-all 
for offenses that were difficult to classify into the above groups
5
). Additionally, 
bails are only slightly less common than pleas, followed by diversions. The main 
conclusion to be drawn from this is that Aboriginal people before the court are 
infrequently charged with drug offenses, and are predominantly subject to 
property and FTC offenses. This speaks to the offender/accused persons generally 
not following court orders as well as addictions to alcohol or other non-controlled 
substances. Furthermore, we can see that some of them decide to not attempt bail 
– either due to the low chances of getting it, or because they seek to begin their 
custodial sentence as early as possible. In light of the Indigenous justice literature 
and comments by Judges and defense counsels, this trend is common for 
Aboriginal peoples living in urban environments due to a lack of family or 
community ties that would meet judicial standards for supervision or surety 
positions. In addition, this is also compounded due to socio-economic factors such 
as homelessness/poverty (a lack of contact information for bail officers or funds 
to pay a deposit) and the racist colonial framework that brands them as 
                                                 
5
 See Appendix A1 for an exhaustive listing 
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intrinsically separate and unable to rehabilitate/assimilate themselves into the 
colonial Canadian society. 
Table 2 :  Treatment/Punishment Location by Proceeding Type 
The primary purpose of table 2 is to see what relationship, if any, is 
present between the type of proceeding and the location of the 
punishment/supervision/release as referred to in the judge’s disposition (that is, if 
the offender/accused person is more likely to be sent to prison/pre-trial detention 
for particular types of offenses or cases). Furthermore, it should be noted that the 
length of custody was coded into 2 different sections – custody lengths of 1 day 
and/or time served, or lengths greater than that. Those sentences that entailed 
short custodial sentences were coded as both types. To briefly summarize these 
major elements of this table, we can see that community release/supervision was 
more common for cases involving drug offenses and least common for violent 
offenses. Similarly, only 13% of bail hearings resulted in the bail being denied. In 
addition, treatment centre-based releases were always combined with other forms 
of custody/supervision, and were the most likely to involve failure to comply 
offenses (such as a breach of court orders or recognizance). Lastly, diversion 
orders (to the Community Council Program or otherwise) were never combined 
with other treatment locations and were the least likely to involve failure to 
comply offenses.  
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Anchorage 
(Case-
Wide)
Prison/ 
Custody 
(Case-Wide)
1 Day and/or 
Time served 
(Case-Wide)
Community 
(Case-
Wide)
Treatment-
Centre (Case-
Wide)
Diversion/Com
munity Council 
of Toronto 
(Case-Wide)
Intermittent 
(Case-Wide)
Anchorage 
(Case-Wide) 6 0 0 2 1 0 0
Prison/Custody 
(Case-Wide) 0 83 17 17 10 0 1
1 Day and/or 
Time served 
(Case-Wide) 0 17 17 12 1 0 0
Community 
(Case-Wide) 2 17 12 168 39 0 1
Treatment-
Centre (Case-
Wide) 1 10 1 39 51 0 1
Diversion/Com
munity Council 
of Toronto 
(Case-Wide) 0 0 0 0 0 54 0
Intermittent 
(Case-Wide) 0 1 0 1 1 0 5  
(Figure 2 – Table 2a :Treatment/Punishment Location by Proceeding type, part 1) 
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Anchorage 
(Case-
Wide)
Prison/ 
Custody 
(Case-Wide)
1 Day and/or 
Time served 
(Case-Wide)
Community 
(Case-
Wide)
Treatment-
Centre (Case-
Wide)
Diversion/Com
munity Council 
of Toronto 
(Case-Wide)
Intermittent 
(Case-
Wide)
Drug 0 2 2 27 5 2 1
Property 2 49 9 72 25 25 1
Violent 3 30 4 39 14 12 1
Bail 3 14 2 77 21 0 0
Plea 1 72 17 81 23 2 5
Diversion 0 0 0 0 0 53 0
FTC Offenses 
Confirmed 2 41 6 63 26 10 1
Misc. Offenses 2 10 4 19 9 1 1
Odd Resolutions 2 3 0 16 8 1 0
Unknown 
Charges 0 14 1 44 6 20 3
Incomplete 
Observation 0 1 0 3 1 0 0
Not Gladue 0 1 0 11 3 0 2
(Figure 3 – Table 2b : Treatment/Punishment Location by Proceeding Type, part 2)
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The main analytical conclusion to draw from this data set is that the 
offense/proceeding type serves a communicative function that makes concerns 
about public safety and supervision manifest. For instance, drug offenses are 
primarily addiction-based, so it is interpreted by the court as a problem that will 
harm the offender/accused person themselves (hence, the lack of prison and 
preference for community release). In contrast, violent offenses (even if they 
overlap somewhat with drug offenses) are interpreted in a much more potentially 
dangerous light (hence their preference for prison/custody). Offenses that involve 
FTC issues similarly communicate a need for intensive supervision or control via 
treatment centres or long-term rehab work (or, if such controls are unavailable, 
the court interprets this offense as necessitating custody instead).  Additionally, 
when FTC offenses are rare, then a more lenient or less supervised disposition is 
allowed instead – such as diversion and intermittent sentences. 
 In this sense, offense and proceeding type frames the offender/accused 
person and the court’s perception of his actions and potential as either a persistent 
offender or potentially able to be rehabilitated. Notably, some combinations of 
offenses can lead to either intensely controlled or relatively open rehabilitative 
regimes. The final punishment location (in prison, the community, or treatment-
centres, to name the most common) is therefore primarily determined not on the 
basis of ‘punishment’ but rather on the basis of whether or not it serves as an 
adequate fit for the offender/accused person and the necessary sentence (either for 
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promoting rehabilitation or preventing reoffending).  These punishment locations 
are therefore ‘scaled’ in the minds of court actors (that is, Crown prosecutors and 
judges) and are considered either ‘lenient’ or ‘harsh’ with some level of 
granularity between them via supervision, probation, or other applicable orders. 
These applications of discourse (in a functional sense) are also related to other 
discourses in causal relationship such that, when custody is mentioned, it requires 
other discourses to be mentioned to both legitimate the sentence and to facilitate 
its implementation. This makes the punishment locations both functional 
discourses as well as discursively abstract/malleable in the minds of the actors 
present; in other words, they are both discourses and physical 
constructs/structures. 
Table 3 : Sentencing Principles and Bail Concerns by Proceeding Type 
Like table 2, certain causal relationships and discursive forms and 
applications begin to take form at this point of the analysis. Note that table 3 
focuses on the discourses used in particular types of cases and their relationship to 
formal sentencing principles and concerns. Thus, it is primarily concerned with 
how certain sentencing/bail principles may be more or less common in certain 
case types or may be linked to other discourses/sentencing/bail principles in a 
relationship of mutual reinforcement or interaction. The major findings to discern 
from this table involve the highly diverse application of the formal sentencing 
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Denunciation
General 
Deterrence
Specific 
Deterrence
Prot. Of 
Public Rehab.
Mitigating 
Factors
Aggravating 
Factors
Other 
(Plea)
Denunciation 38 26 27 5 6 5 1 5
General Deterrence 26 48 44 4 10 7 1 6
Specific Deterrence 27 44 64 5 9 9 7 6
Prot. of Public 5 4 5 19 1 2 4 2
Rehab. 6 10 9 1 424 86 18 21
Mitigating Factors 5 7 9 2 86 469 16 11
Aggravating Factors 1 1 7 4 18 16 313 7
Other (Plea) 5 6 6 2 21 11 7 192
Primary Grounds 0 0 0 0 5 0 2 0
Secondary Grounds 0 0 0 1 7 0 6 1
Tertiary Grounds 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Past Failures 0 0 0 0 16 2 18 1
Surety Viability 0 0 0 1 9 1 1 2
Bail Program 0 0 0 0 9 3 2 1
Other (Bail) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Bail 3 3 3 5 59 53 40 25
Plea 30 41 52 10 96 117 106 78
Diversion 0 0 0 0 6 2 3 5
Odd Res. 1 2 2 1 14 6 4 15
Cases - Rehab. 27 36 44 12 195 139 113 88
All Cases 30 42 53 16 195 196 157 123
Note : Bail total = 115, Plea Total = 147, Diversion Total = 53, Odd Total = 27, All Cases =  851, Rehab. = 198
(Figure 4 – Table 3a : Sentencing Principles and Bail Concerns by Proceeding Type, part 1)
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Primary 
Grounds
Secondary 
Grounds
Tertiary 
Grounds
Past 
Failures
Surety 
Viability
Bail 
Program
Denunciation 0 0 1 0 0 0
General 
Deterrence 0 0 0 0 0 0
Specific 
Deterrence 0 0 0 0 0 0
Prot. of  Public 0 1 1 0 1 0
Rehabilitation 5 7 0 16 9 9
Mitigating 
Factors 0 0 0 2 1 3
Aggravating 
Factors 2 6 0 18 1 2
Other (Plea) 0 1 0 1 2 1
Primary 
Grounds 35 27 0 2 1 1
Secondary 
Grounds 27 87 1 11 11 2
Tertiary 
Grounds 0 1 2 0 0 0
Past Failures 2 11 0 65 5 4
Surety Viability 1 11 0 5 63 0
Bail Program 1 2 0 4 0 35
Bail 19 34 1 21 31 22
Plea 0 5 1 14 5 2
Diversion 0 0 0 0 0 0
Odd Resolutions 1 1 0 2 0 1
Cases - 
Rehabilitation 18 29 2 29 21 16
All Cases 23 46 2 32 35 26  
(Figure 5 – Table 3b : Sentencing Principles and Bail Concerns by 
Proceeding Type, part 2) 
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principles – notably, denunciation, general deterrence, and specific deterrence 
were often mentioned directly alongside one another and were incredibly rarely 
mentioned during a bail hearing. Protection of the public, in contrast, was rarely 
mentioned whereas rehabilitation was the most frequently mentioned. With 
regards to bail hearings, the most common bail concern was the secondary 
grounds whereas the second most-common concerns related to possible 
reoffending (past treatment history and surety viability, mainly). Note, however, 
that rehabilitation was mentioned frequently during bail hearings despite not 
being an express consideration of such cases. 
 This set of observations are primarily focused on how certain types of 
sentencing principles are linked to certain case types and are also discursively 
linked to one another in certain circumstances and locations. Notably, diversion 
was unique in that few sentencing principles (or sentencing elements beyond 
rehabilitation) were ever mentioned. Additionally, these few sentencing principles 
are the ones most common to defense counsels and the offender/accused person’s 
supports. This relationship is rather unexpected, as the entire diversion proceeding 
is organized by both the Crown prosecutor and defense counsel and it is only 
brought up in court in order to get approval from the judge themselves. 
Rehabilitation, in contrast, is the most common sentencing principle referenced 
and is commonly directly mentioned alongside other sentencing principles, 
including punitive ones. In fact, rehabilitation is so commonly cited that it can be 
105 
 
considered the ‘starting point’ of any Gladue case (or at least the 
discourse/principle that must be considered no matter the circumstances). When 
rehabilitation is also brought up, Crown prosecutors must necessarily reference 
counter-discourses related to it such as deterrence, denunciation, and aggravating 
factors. This counter-discourse is both rhetorically-based (Crown prosecutors 
contest rehabilitative discourses with ones that impugn on its applicability to the 
offender/accused person or case) as well as institutionally required (those 
sentencing principles are formally considered the primary means by which judges 
can decide upon a particular punishment). When defense counsels bring up 
rehabilitation, they implicitly reference problematic racial discursive frames that 
make addiction, trauma and victimization seem intrinsic to Aboriginal peoples. 
This discursive framework is, despite its inaccuracy and objectifying effects, 
presented and understood as a sort of historically-situated or otherwise 
temporally-based discourse.  
Therefore, rehabilitation is, in addition to being the ‘starting point’, also 
utilized and interpreted in two different forms – a temporally assessed form based 
on history and potential future prospects, and a second form wherein it is utilized 
as the required/necessary opposite to any punitive sentencing principles. 
Aggravating and mitigating factors are similarly utilized in this manner, though 
their repetition is a sign that such discourses are being considered and countered 
directly rather than inciting a direct counter-discourse as 
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rehabilitation/punitiveness does. It is through these sentencing 
principles/discourses that much of the debate and rhetoric relating to rehabilitation 
as a sentencing goal is made manifest. The predominant pattern was that 
rehabilitation itself is never really argued against as an appropriate sentencing 
principle and at most is only considered inappropriate for the circumstances 
specific to the offender/accused person or case in question. Rehabilitation is 
therefore not ignored, but rather inapplicable for the current case and left aside 
until the next case (where it again becomes the ‘starting point’). This pattern 
applies to bail as well, except that release is the default (even in reverse onus) and 
discourses relating to past treatment failures and surety viability replace many 
conventional aggravating factors with the primary and secondary grounds 
replacing the punitive sentencing principles. In bails that are Crown-onus, this 
trend of rehabilitative ‘starts’ is further accelerated, since in those instances bail is 
explicitly supposed to be allowed unless the Crown prosecutor can convince the 
judge otherwise. This process of interpretation and application of the formal 
sentencing principles – and how they actually manifest – will be examined in the 
Discussion and Conclusion sections, below. 
 This analysis, coupled with the information drawn from Table 2, provide 
an overview of how judges sentence certain offenses and the express Criminal 
Code principles they view as relevant. In light of this, we can see that the primary 
focus – in Gladue courts – is on protection of the public and rehabilitation. These 
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two principles are presented by judges as being somewhat dualistic, but they have 
made some comments regarding the utility of rehabilitation as a tool for 
protecting the public from further crime (this type of statement was rare, but the 
concept remains a possibility in some instances). Despite this, most often these 
two sentencing principles relate to the chance that prison/custody will be the 
sentence, and they work on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis of the possible 
sentence In this respect, they echo Dugas’ (2013) observations of modern penal 
rationality (MPR) in a Gladue context. The main element of MPR in this instance 
is the focus on utilitarian (practical) aims that view incarceration as the primary 
(but not sole) means of public protection with rehabilitation entailing wholesale 
exclusion from the penal system itself (p. 55, 59-62). The general evaluation 
process is based around similarly ‘clinical’ and cost-benefit interpretive schemes, 
and these elements are the primary means by which Aboriginal over-
representation in the criminal justice system continue to climb.  
Table 4 : Treatment/Punishment Location by Sentencing Principles and Bail 
Concerns 
 Whereas the previous table and set of observations looked at how the 
sentencing principles may be influenced/related to certain case types, table 4 is 
concerned with which sentencing principles may influence the final sentence and 
whether certain sentences require/necessitate certain sentencing principles in order 
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Cases - 
Rehabilita 
tion
Prison/
Custody 
(Case-
Wide)
1 Day and/or 
Time served 
(Case-Wide)
Community 
(Case-
Wide)
Treatment-
Centre 
(Case-
Wide)
Diversion/
CCT (Case-
Wide)
Intermittent 
(Case-
Wide)
Cases - Rehabilitation 198 58 10 95 40 6 2
Prison/Custody (Case-
Wide) 58 83 17 17 10 0 1
1 Day and/or Time served 
(Case-Wide) 10 17 17 12 1 0 0
Community (Case-Wide) 95 17 12 168 39 0 1
Treatment-Centre (Case-
Wide) 40 10 1 39 51 0 1
Diversion/Community 
Council of Toronto (Case-
Wide) 6 0 0 0 0 54 0
Intermittent (Case-Wide) 2 1 0 1 1 0 5  
(Figure 6 – Table 4a : Treatment/Punishment Location by Sentencing Principles and Bail Concerns, part 1) 
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Cases - 
Rehabilita
tion
Prison/
Custody 
(Case-
Wide)
1 Day and/or 
Time served 
(Case-Wide)
Community 
(Case-
Wide)
Treatment-
Centre 
(Case-
Wide)
Diversion/
CCT 
(Case-
Wide)
Intermittent 
(Case-
Wide)
Denunciation 27
19 
(23%) 4 (24%) 15 (9%) 7 (14%) 0 0
General Deterrence 36
24 
(29%) 4 (24%) 20 (12%) 7 (14%) 0 1
Specific Deterrence 44
34 
(41%) 4 (24%) 21 (13%) 6 (12%) 0 1
Protection of the Public 12
11 
(13%) 1 (6%) 3 (2%) 1 0 0
Rehabilitation 196
59 
(71%) 11 (65%) 101 (60%) 43 (84%) 6 2
Mitigating Factors 139
68 
(82%) 15 (88%) 96 (57%) 29 (57%) 2 5
Aggravating Factors 113
66 
(80%) 15 (88%) 83 (49%) 25 (49%) 3 4
Other (Plea) 88 45 10 64 18 5 2
Primary Grounds 18 2 0 10 4 0 0
Tertiary Grounds 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
Past Treatment Failures 29 12 1 14 6 0 0
Surety Viability 21 7 1 19 5 0 0
Bail Program 16 3 0 14 2 0 0
Other (Bail) 5 3 1 5 3 0 0
(Figure 7 – Table 4b : Treatment/Punishment Location by Sentencing Principles and Bail Concerns, part 2)
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to be considered appropriate. Note that this table looks at the final locations of the 
punishment (such as prison/custody, the community, diversion options, or 
treatment-centres) rather than who ‘won’ the case – for that data, see tables 5 and 
6, below.  To briefly summarize the significant findings from this table, cases that 
resulted in prison/custodial sentences involved the most sentencing principles 
and/or bail concerns out of any location, and were the only one that mentioned the 
protection of the public in significant amounts. Cases involving community 
release/supervision had fewer principles in comparison, and very few punitive 
principles. Finally, cases that resulted in a treatment-centre release (either alone or 
in concert with other sanctions) were relatively similar to community 
release/supervision but reference rehabilitation the most out of any 
sanction/location. 
 The main conclusions to be drawn here are based on both interpretive and 
functional discourse analysis, though the implications of them for the entire thesis 
will be discussed later in the discussion and conclusion sections. First, we can 
conclude that the more ‘contested’ the case, the more likely that prison/custody 
will be applied, though it is also possible that when prison/custody is the expected 
result, then the defense counsels/Crown prosecutors will utilize as many 
discourses as they can in order to rhetorically influence the proceedings. The most 
rhetorically powerful discourses that push for imprisonment are protection of the 
public, followed by specific deterrence. These discourses are, notably, the ones 
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most focused on the offender/accused person themselves rather than the larger 
public as well as the ones that imply that further crimes are likely to occur were 
imprisonment not applied.  Thus, sentencing principles are primarily functional 
(metaphorically linked to other discourses) when they reference these types of 
reoffending concerns.  
In contrast, sentencing principles are rhetorical (persuasive in intent) and 
interactionist (created via shared interactions and practices) discourses when this 
ties the Aboriginal offender/accused person to problematic frameworks of 
victimization that present them to be a persistent offender (partially othering the 
Aboriginal person further). Specifically, none of the sentencing principle 
discourses and frameworks observed during the research ever presented 
Aboriginal peoples (offenders/accused persons or not) as possessing some 
measure or agency or being anything other than a historical account consisting 
solely of tragic past events. As a note, for those prison/custody sentences 
involving  short ‘1 day’ and/or time served orders, there is a desire to allow for an 
easier release and less paperwork rather than pure punishment/incarceration. 
These sentences often involve additional community sentences or attendance at a 
treatment centre, so it should be noted that prison/custody can in these cases be 
interpreted as a rehabilitative and self-critical discourse. In these particular 
instances the rhetorical and functional aspects of the discourse are present but 
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their influence/incidence is limited, particularly with regards to the most powerful 
punitive discourses of specific deterrence and protection of the public. 
Furthermore, mitigating factors serve as a sort of counter-discourse to the 
punitive ones noted above since they are rhetorically utilized and interpreted in 
such a way that the use of custody is not warranted, or that the time spent in 
custody should be reduced due to offender-specific factors. This is mostly a 
storytelling application of discourse, but it is still couched in rhetorical 
applications of discourse as they do admit that the failures/crimes occurred but 
that the moral blameworthiness is reduced. The main point to make via such 
appeals and factors is that the Aboriginal person in question is not a persistent 
offender; rather, they seek to frame them in an equally problematic and colonial 
manner of objectifying Aboriginal-specific discursive frameworks of intrinsic 
victimization. In this manner, they have unduly articulated colonial discourses and 
interpretive frameworks in an attempt to bring to mind the implications and 
perceptions such histories have in a Gladue context. 
Much like what was discussed in the previous table, rehabilitation remains 
the ‘default’ in the eyes of the judges and Crown prosecutors; it is rehabilitation 
that all other discourses must orient themselves towards and it can be considered 
the primary ‘structure’ of the Gladue court. It is only when the discourses of pro-
rehabilitation (mitigating factors) or anti-rehabilitation (protection of the public) 
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reach a discursive breaking-point that the result is decided.  Because of this 
rehabilitative ‘base’, the onus is on the Crown prosecutor even when a guilty plea 
is entered. For bail cases, bail program support or a surety serves as additional 
pro-rehabilitation discourses. In these instances, concerns are interpreted and 
framed as practical in orientation. For instance, the offender/accused person could 
be implied to need support or coercion to prevent bail failures. Thus, bail hearings 
look to outside factors for rehabilitative (or MPR-based ‘risk’) prospects, whereas 
guilty pleas look to the specific offender’s record as the basis for both factors. 
Notably, both look to reoffending as the main concern, and though bails do 
implicitly reference a criminal record via the primary and secondary grounds they 
are not named directly and are presented/metaphorically stated via aggravating or 
treatment factors. 
Treatment centres are much like community release/supervision, but they 
have both a greater emphasis on rehabilitation and (in the case of bails) a greater 
emphasis on possible failures of rehabilitation. Therefore, treatment centre 
releases are considered a more rehabilitative and restrictive form of release. It is 
applied in order to allow for rehabilitation while taking into consideration the past 
failures of more open rehabilitation plans. Thus, while treatment centres are not 
discursively framed as a type of punishment/control location, they are still applied 
in much the same manner. In this sense, treatment centres are both the midpoint 
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and extreme-end of disposition/punishment locations – they are both rehabilitative 
and controlling.  
Diversions are unique in that they are discussed and implemented off the 
record and only mentioned briefly in the court. As such, they have very few 
sentencing principles overall and can be considered the primary exception to the 
above conclusions and even the antithesis of normal court procedure. That said, as 
will be described later on in the Discussion and Conclusion sections, they still are 
somewhat limited by neo-liberal elements. 
Continuing the application of modern penal rationality from Table 4 
above, we can confirm that protection of the public is intrinsically linked to the 
conception of prison/custody as a deterrent/secure holding spot. However, there 
were some instances where protection of the public only merited a prison length 
of 1 day and/or time served, as well as some treatment-centre and community 
releases (possibly in concert with a prison/custody sentence). As such, we can see 
that the MPR focus on punishment (to deter, separate, and enact retribution) are 
slightly overestimated, as 1 day custody sentences are still lenient yet to not 
entirely meet primary ideological prerogatives that advocate for incarceration 
(Dugas, 2013, p. 60-61). Conversely, 1 day stays are discursively related to the 
protection of the public through their past effects and deterrent elements (specific 
deterrence). As a result, the presumed leniency of the sentence is masked by an 
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overarching ideology that makes prison a legitimate sentence and possible long-
term threat. On a similar note, the rehabilitative perspective of MPR is based 
around an emphasis on “social inclusion”, to which we can add a caveat on the 
basis of diversion assessments (ibid., p. 55). In this case, diversions are 
specifically designed to rehabilitate an offender/accused person from a position of 
inclusion in their Aboriginal community and an exclusion from the criminal 
justice system. While this is not always the case (the Aboriginal community in 
question was described as fragmented by the judges, and the final decision is still 
made by a colonial/judicial authority) MPR in the Gladue context is further 
altered in its conventional definition in that it identifies exclusion from the 
criminal justice system as necessary for full inclusion to be enacted. Those who 
require both orientations are given an in-depth rehabilitation regime that 
simultaneously excludes the Aboriginal person while attempting to induce them 
into a position where they can later be allowed inclusion. As such, Gladue courts’ 
end up reinterpreting penal modernity in such a way that both ideological poles 
are included rather than treated as mutually exclusive. 
Tables 5 & 6 : Sentencing Principles and Bail Concerns by Sentence/Decision 
This table set was split into two sets of tables (one of which was further 
split into 2) simply for greater readability and it otherwise follows the same 
format and presentation as the previous sets. Whereas table 4 looked to the  
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Denun. G. 
Deter.
S. 
Deter.
Prot. Rehab. Mit. 
Fac.
Agg. 
Fac.
All 
Cases
Joint 
Submission
8 (Seen in 
8% of all 
joint 
sentencing 
rationales
11 
(11%)
10 
(10%)
0 36 
(36%)
35 
(35%)
16 
(16%)
99
Joint 
Submission 
(C)
13 (Seen in 
12% of all 
joint 
submission 
cases)
16 
(15%)
16 
(15%)
1 
(1%)
69 
(64%)
70 
(65%)
61 
(57%)
107
Prob. 6 (8%) 9 
(13%)
10 
(14%)
3 
(4%)
35 
(49%)
43 
(61%)
27 
(38%)
71
Prob. (C) 14 (20%) 21 
(27%)
25 
(34%)
4 
(5%)
58 
(75%)
65 
(84%)
60 
(78%)
77
Other O. 7 (9%) 8 
(11%)
10 
(13%)
2 
(3%)
38 
(51%)
36 
(48%)
25 
(33%)
75
Other O. 
(C)
14 (17%) 18 
(22%)
19 
(23%)
4 
(5%)
64 
(79%)
64 
(79%)
60 
(74%)
81
Cond. 1 0 0 1 3 8 5 10
Cond. (C) 1 3 3 1 7 11 8 12
Interm. 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 5
Interm. (C) 0 1 1 0 2 4 4 5
Susp. 4 (17%) 4 
(17%)
4 (17%) 0 18 
(75%)
17 
(71%)
9 
(38%)
24
Susp. (C) 4 (16%) 6 
(24%)
5 (20%) 0 23 
(92%)
23 
(92%)
21 
(84%)
25
Fines. 5 (29%) 5 
(29%)
5 (29%) 1 
(6%)
8 
(47%)
9 
(53%)
5 
(29%)
16
Fines. (C) 6 (33%) 7 
(39%)
8 (44%) 1 
(6%)
11 
(61%)
15 
(83%)
16 
(89%)
18
(Figure 8 – Table 5a : Sentencing Principles by Sentence/Decision, part 1) 
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Denun. G. 
Deter.
S. 
Deter.
Prot. Rehab. Mit. 
Fac.
Agg. 
Fac.
All 
Cases
Crown 0 0 1 (8%) 2 
(15%)
4 (31%) 8 
(62%)
7 
(54%)
13
Crown 
(C)
2 (14%) 2 (7%) 5 
(36%)
4 
(29%)
10 
(71%)
13 
(93%)
9 
(64%)
14
Defense 2 (6%) 2 (6%) 4 
(13%)
1 (3%) 17 
(55%)
20 
(65%)
12 
(39%)
31
Defense 
(C)
4 (11%) 8 
(22%)
9 
(25%)
2 (6%) 29 
(81%)
31 
(86%)
29 
(81%)
36
Compr. 4 (12%) 5 
(15%)
9 
(26%)
4 
(12%)
20 
(59%)
25 
(74%)
19 
(56%)
34
Compr. 
(C)
11 
(30%)
13 
(35%)
20 
(54%)
7 
(19%)
32 
(86%)
35 
(95%)
31 
(84%)
37
Unkn. 1 (4%) 3 
(12%)
3 
(12%)
2 (8%) 7 (27%) 8 
(31%)
7 
(27%)
26
Unkn. 
(C)
2 (7%) 5 
(19%)
5 
(19%)
2 (7%) 10 
(37%)
17 
(63%)
14 
(52%)
27
(Figure 9 – Table 5b : Sentencing Principles by Sentence/Decision, part 2) 
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Prim. G. Sec. 
G.
Tert. G. Past 
Treat.
Surety 
Viability
Bail 
Prog.
Bail 
Cases
Joint 
Submission
4 (Seen in 
8% of 
consent 
release case 
rationales)
6 
(12%)
0 2 (4%) 7 (14%) 3 (6%) 51
Joint 
Submission 
(C)
8 (Seen in 
15% of 
consent 
release bail 
cases)
14 
(26%)
0 6 (11%) 17 (32%) 12 
(23%)
53
Prob. 0 1(14%
)
0 2 (29%) 0 0 7
Prob. (C) 1 (13%) 5 
(63%)
0 6 (75%) 1 (13%) 1 
(13%)
8
Other 4 (14%) 4 
(14%)
0 4 (14%) 6 (21%) 1 (3%) 29
Other (C) 9 (45%) 15 
(48%)
0 13 
(42%)
11 (35%) 5 
(16%)
31
Crown 2 (33%) 5 
(83%)
1 (17%) 4 (67%) 2 (33%) 0 6
Crown (C) 2 (29%) 7 
(100%
)
1 (14%) 6 (86%) 4 (57%) 2 
(29%)
7
Defense 2 (22%) 2 
(22%)
0 3 (33%) 1 (11%) 0 9
Defense (C) 6 (50%) 7 
(58%)
0 8 (67%) 2 (17%) 3 
(25%)
12
Comp. 0 0 1 4 2 0 3
Comp. (C) 1 2 1 7 3 2 4
Unkn. 0 0 0 1 0 0 4
Unkn. (C) 0 2 0 2 0 0 5
Note : Fines, Intermittant, Suspended, and Conditional Sentences omitted  
(Figure 10 – Table 6 : Bail Concerns by Sentence/Decision) 
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punishment/treatment location, this set – tables 5 and 6 – looks at who ‘won’ the 
case, unusual sanctions, and related sentence concerns. Note additionally that the 
different sentence/decision sections are split into two – one refers to just the 
judge’s sentencing speech/rationale, while the other refers to all statements made 
during the case. This was done to allow for a greater understanding of what 
statements/principles are stated and which ones are actually considered important 
enough for the judge to repeat them during the rationale. Furthermore, the 
previous table was mostly concerned with how such sentencing principles may 
influence the final punishment/treatment location. While this may appear similar, 
the two tables discussed here are focusing on different applications of the formal 
sentencing principles and their influences. 
The most notable findings to be gleaned from this set of tables concern the 
distribution of certain sentencing principles. Firstly, cases that were a compromise 
between the Crown Prosecutor and defense counsel positions were the most 
common result, and cases that ended with the judge accepting a joint submission 
had few references to any sentencing principle, excepting rehabilitation. Cases 
that involved a probation order had the highest rates of punitive sentencing 
principles with the exception of protection of the public (more formally based on 
the separation of the offender from society). This sentencing principle, in contrast, 
was often mentioned in cases that were decided in favour of the Crown 
prosecutor. For cases that were resolved in favour of the defense counsel, 
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sentencing principle rates were between a compromise and joint submission and 
had only slightly high rates of the primary grounds. 
The main conclusions to draw from these tables are based around how 
sentencing principles are applied to certain case types as well as their influence on 
the proceedings (that is, their functional and interpretive discursive aspects). To 
begin with, joint submissions are rather similar to diversions, as the majority of 
their discourses and interactions are performed outside of the court setting; albeit 
not to the same degree as diversions. Regardless, when joint submissions are 
brought up in court, we can observe that they are ‘muted’ with regards to all 
sentencing principles, not just punitive-based ones. Note that joint submissions 
are not necessarily rehabilitative or punitive; rather, they are simply agreeable to 
all the parties and subject to their own preconceptions of what an appropriate 
sentence is and isn’t. What is notable is that punitive principles, when present, are 
often repeated by the judge during the sentencing at a rate slightly higher than in 
other cases. It can be concluded that, because joint submissions must be justified 
before the judge rather than resolved solely by the Crown prosecutor, then they 
are interpreted as a mid-point between diversion and a contested plea and 
therefore utilize sentencing principle discourses as functional tools to a 
proportional degree. In effect, the rhetorical element is lessened and is replaced 
with a more metaphorical use of the sentencing principles in their form of the 
procedural requirements to state them. Their reduced number of total references is 
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simply a sign that these references/statements are the bare minimum number 
needed to satisfy the perceived requirements. For pleas/bails these discourses are 
actually used in a rhetorical manner and thus are utilized as often as is needed, 
whereas diversions are done outside of the court system and therefore have no 
‘minimum standard’ of sentencing principle discourses. 
Probation, in contrast, is not its own type of case or resolution method and 
can be combined with other punishments. However, it has some similarity to 
those cases decided in favour of the Crown prosecutor’s disposition and is 
different only with respect to mitigating factors and concerns regarding the 
protection of the public. Probation itself tends to take the form of a regimented or 
supervised treatment order done outside of court and with conditions extending 
past rehabilitative programs. For instance, the most common probation 
requirements are to not reoffend, to follow the orders of the probation officer 
(with regards to treatment), to avoid contact with the victim, and to avoid the 
location where the crime was committed. Thus, probation is interpreted and 
applied in instances where the Crown prosecutor’s case is perceived and 
interpreted as ‘strong’ and the main concern is that reoffending will reoccur 
unless some level of control is exerted upon the offender/accused person. 
Rehabilitation remains a goal in the minds and interpretations of the court, but it is 
limited by strong concerns that the offender/accused person will reoffend despite 
mitigating factors; the absence of concerns about the protection of the public is 
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likely a sign that the offenses in question are likely non-violent. Again, the 
modern penal rationality and its concern with risk/need evaluations (also a part of 
government requirements and criminological theories) is exemplified in probation 
orders. It should be noted that, from the standpoint of some Indigenous justice 
theorists (McCaslin, Proulx, and Green) the culturally inappropriate elements of 
government-designed probation orders (ostensibly for treatment) is only 
marginally mitigated by orders that they attempt to utilize ‘culturally appropriate’ 
resources. This contravenes cultural prerogatives for “holistic and integrative” 
justice by wholly subordinating Aboriginal peoples to a colonial authority and 
emphasizing even further control over their presumably rehabilitative sentence 
(Green, 1998, p. 37-38).  As such, these orders (which are outside the purview of 
the Gladue decision) are also the ones that fall back upon non-Gladue frameworks 
and interpretations and lead to further marginalization of Aboriginal peoples.  
Cases that were contested but ended with the judge agreeing with the 
Crown prosecutor’s disposition (termed ‘Crown-won cases’) are predominantly 
different from other cases in that the references to the protection of the public are 
at their strongest and most influential. Despite this link, this sentencing principle 
is not the main rhetorical discourse at the disposal of the Crown prosecutor. 
Aggravating factors, as well as past treatment failures, as similarly utilized; there 
is also a surprisingly small amount of references to other punitive sentencing 
principles. Therefore, we can conclude that the rhetorical strength of their case is 
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dependent upon how judges interpret the offender/accused person’s chances of 
reoffending on the basis of both the likelihood of success and the threat such 
reoffending would pose to the public. Similarly, the low rates of mitigating factors 
and rehabilitation would also imply that this rhetoric is strengthened by the 
absence/weakness of such discourses on the part of the defense counsel. Dugas’ 
(2013) work, mentioned previously, supports this interpretation. In his eyes “The 
protection of the public is the main sentencing objective. This public protection 
rhetoric has a most limiting effect on the application of section 718.2 (e)” (p. 103-
104). This is due to the emphasis on exclusionary punishment which is the default 
in a modern penal system and which is consequently made stronger when public 
protection is mentioned (ibid., p. 106). Note that defense counsels and Crown 
prosecutors  are not working on the basis of simple rote memorization/application 
of discourses and sentencing principles, though their interpretative schemes may 
be (through MPR ideologies, for instance). Both parties are engaging with one 
another’s rhetoric and interpretations and will tailor their responses on the basis of 
each others’ submissions. For instance, if the defense counsel realizes that their 
client is indeed likely to reoffend, he will not appeal to rehabilitative grounds and 
instead reference mitigating grounds in order to reduce the overall severity of the 
sentence. This interpretive schema is understood by Crown prosecutors, defense 
counsels, and judges and is made manifest by their individual reluctance to utilize 
rhetoric that is understood to be ‘weak’. 
124 
 
The analysis of cases that were contested but ended with the judge 
agreeing with the defense counsel’s disposition (called ‘defense-won cases’) 
support this conclusion, as they had some instances of basic punitive discourses, 
but significantly less instances of protection of the public appeals. They did have 
somewhat high rates of aggravating factors, though these were outnumbered by 
mitigating factors and rehabilitative concerns. Evidently, judges were cognizant of 
this counter-discourse role, as they were mentioned by the judge at higher rates 
than in other case types. Judges therefore use these rhetorical discourses as well, 
primarily to legitimate the sentence to themselves, the norms of the court, and the 
Crown prosecutor. In this case, judges are also engaged in a constant self-
reflection and interpretation of the discourses presented to them, all to ensure that 
the sentence complies with the narratives and frames of the Crown prosecutor and 
their own idea of what makes an offender/accused person or their requested 
sentence appropriate. 
Bails follow a similar pattern, with the secondary grounds, past treatment 
failures, and surety concerns taking the place of protection of the public 
discourses. The primary grounds are therefore interpreted and applied as the 
weakest possible bail concern, typically because it is a less severe manifestation 
of the same elements behind the secondary grounds (complying with the law). 
Again, reoffending is the main concern in the eyes of the court, and bails are 
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interpreted and understood by judges to need to meet the same set of demands and 
concerns as in guilty pleas. 
Compromise cases are, from the standpoint of sentencing and bail 
principles, much like a midpoint between sentencing hearings that followed the 
recommendations of the defense counsel and Crown prosecutor. Furthermore, the 
interpretation and application of such discourses – from a functional level – also 
seem to be the ‘midpoint’ between the two. Though they seem to lack protection 
of the public discourses to the same degree as ‘Crown-won’ cases, they also 
include smaller numbers of aggravating factors. High rates of past treatment 
failures are unable to push for this type of sentencing results unless combined 
with concerns about the protection of the public. If such concerns are not present, 
then the result is likely to be a compromise since there likely remain legitimate 
concerns and a need for control/supervision/support, albeit with no clear risk to 
the public. The offender/accused person is still interpreted and framed by this 
rhetoric as being in need of some disciplinary regime, though they are not 
necessarily a threat to the public without it. The reference of mitigating factors 
and rehabilitation can also serve as rhetorical discourses that are interpreted as 
possible reasons for a compromise position to be created. Notably, these are the 
cases where both rehabilitation and incarceration are implemented alongside one 
another, thereby refuting the dualistic perception of justice embodied in MPR. In 
this respect, judges indirectly criticize and subvert the implicit interpretive 
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schemes of MPR when they are forced into cases where there are strong demands 
for both principles and the dualistic conception of justice is subsequently 
challenged. 
Again, rehabilitation is interpreted/understood by the judges as being the 
‘basic’ sentence that is modified and shifted in response to defense counsel 
submissions and the way such submissions frame the offender/accused person, 
reference the norms of the court/legal system, and are constructed in a communal 
manner on the basis of all court actors present. Whereas some of these 
interpretations are unique to the specific case, many of them become standardized 
over time as a result of simple routine, judicial precedence, and the overarching 
ideology of modern penal rationality and its own evaluation scheme. Concerns 
about protection of the public are the primary way to shift the discourse towards 
imprisonment/punitiveness as it speaks directly to what judges feel is the most 
important reason to keep an individual imprisoned; again, based around MPR’s 
cost-benefit analysis and the need to maintain imprisonment as a sanction 
regardless of its appropriateness to the case. In effect, prison is pre-emptively 
considered a valid sentence in MPR and must be considered an option in any 
sentence. If public protection concerns are not present, but failed rehabilitation 
patterns/histories are, then a treatment-centre or compromise sentence can be 
applied instead in order to allow for some manner of control – prison/custody, in 
contrast, is primarily utilized to enforce denunciation and deterrence in addition to 
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incapacitation (Dugas, 2013, p. 112). As such, treatment-centre sentences are a 
valid part of MPR on the basis of its incapacitating effects. Compromise positions 
– bail or otherwise – are therefore not understood as their own specific type of 
case as much as they are ‘weaker’ forms of a sentence wholly decided in favour of 
the preferred sentence of the defense counsel or Crown prosecutor.  Note that 
interpretation, in this instance, is of both the submissions entered as well as the 
actual form of the compromise position.  
Table 7 : Victim/Offender/Accused Person Characteristics by 
Sentence/Decision 
 Table 7 looks to see if particular mitigating or aggravating factors are 
relevant to the final decision. Primarily, it looks to confirm the previous 
conclusions regarding rehabilitation, reoffending, and treatment priorities and 
their interpretation and application to the final sentence by the judge and Crown 
prosecutor. It should be noted that, while this section applies to both victims and 
offenders/accused persons, it was very rare for any victim information to be 
disclosed by the Crown prosecutor and, when it was considered relevant, it 
primarily dealt with physical and mental trauma. Therefore, for all code-sets 
besides these two, one should work with the understanding that they apply to 
offenders/accused persons rather than victims. In fact, the original research plan 
was to split the characteristic code sets between the two, but the small number of 
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Paren. 
Dis.
Paren. 
Ad.
Interg. 
Trau. Abuse Addic. Drugs Alco.
Foster 
Care Home.
Crim. 
Hist.
Recent 
Hist.
Succ. 
Hist.
Fail. 
Hist.
All 
Cases
Paren. 
Dis. 4 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4
Paren. 
Ad. 2 13 2 1 0 0 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 12
Interg. 
Trau. 2 2 11 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 9
Abuse 0 1 1 16 2 3 0 4 2 2 0 0 0 16
Addic. 0 0 1 2 47 3 4 0 5 9 3 3 1 42
Drugs 1 0 1 3 3 47 5 0 6 5 0 0 1 37
Alco. 0 6 2 0 4 5 72 2 1 3 0 1 1 47
Foster 
Care 0 2 0 4 0 0 2 15 1 0 0 0 0 14
Home. 1 0 1 2 5 6 1 1 126 10 2 3 0 84
Crim. 
Hist. 0 0 0 2 9 5 3 0 10 326 9 5 15 200
Recent 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 9 30 7 8 25
Succ. 
Hist. 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 3 5 7 55 1 46
Fail. 
Hist. 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 15 8 1 114 66
All 
Cases 4 12 9 16 42 37 47 14 84 200 25 46 66 851
(Figure 11 – Table 7a : Victim/Offender/Accused Person Characteristics by Sentence/Decision, part 1) 
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Paren. 
Dis.
Paren. 
Ad.
Interg. 
Trau. Abuse Addic. Drugs Alco.
Foster 
Care Home.
Crim. 
Hist.
Rec. 
Hist.
Succ. 
Hist.
Fail. 
Hist.
All 
Cases
Joint 
Submission 0 0 2 1 3 2 5 0 6 16 2 3 7 99
Joint 
Submission (C) 1 3 3 6 17 8 15 7 27 68 5 14 15 107
Crown 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 4 0 0 3 13
Crown (C) 0 1 0 0 2 5 3 0 7 11 3 1 8 14
Defense 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 4 7 2 0 8 31
Defense (C) 0 2 1 4 10 8 8 2 16 27 6 7 16 36
Compromise 0 0 0 2 4 2 4 0 1 17 1 1 10 34
Compromise 
(C) 1 3 3 6 7 12 15 5 20 33 3 10 15 37
Probation 1 1 3 3 3 3 6 0 6 21 4 2 8 71
Probation (C) 3 6 6 7 16 15 20 10 38 59 11 20 16 77
All Cases 4 12 9 16 42 37 47 14 84 200 25 46 66 851  
(Figure 12 – Table 7b : Victim/Offender/Accused Person Characteristics by Sentence/Decision, part 2)
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Trau.
Phys. 
Trau.
Ment. 
Trau.
Other/ 
Unsure
Fam. 
Issues
Comm. 
Fact. Rem.
Men. 
Ill.
All 
Cases
Trau. 29 4 4 1 0 0 1 7 27
Phys. Trau. 4 29 13 2 0 0 0 1 21
Ment. Trau. 4 13 32 1 4 0 0 3 18
Other/ Unsure 1 2 1 303 5 0 6 3 171
Fam. Issues 0 0 4 5 80 2 4 0 58
Comm. Fact. 0 0 0 0 2 43 2 0 34
Remorse 1 0 0 6 4 2 152 2 99
Men. Ill. 7 1 3 3 0 0 2 52 39
Joint 
Submission 3 3 3 22 1 3 12 2 99
Joint 
Submission 
(C) 5 5 6 58 19 11 31 10 107
Crown 0 0 0 4 0 1 3 0 13
Crown (C) 1 0 0 12 6 2 8 3 14
Defense 0 0 1 14 3 1 7 2 31
Defense (C) 3 5 5 30 13 7 18 10 36
Compromise 0 1 1 12 1 3 10 0 34
Compromise 
(C) 1 3 3 32 13 8 24 4 37
Probation 1 2 2 28 1 4 15 2 71
Probation (C) 5 6 8 63 23 13 40 12 77
All Cases 27 21 18 171 58 34 99 39 851
(Figure 13 – Table 7c : Victim/Offender/Accused Person Characteristics by 
Sentence/ Decision, part 3) 
victim disclosures rendered this decision moot. Additionally, some background 
information was not disclosed to the public since the general format in the courts 
was for such information to be submitted in a written form to the judge and 
Crown prosecutor (as a Gladue or background report) with them or the defense 
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counsel mentioning particularly notable aspects of it as they pertain to the 
sentence.  
Note that, as with the previous sections, only the most significant 
observations and correlations will be discussed. To summarize the particularly 
interesting data and relationships from the table, we can start by noting that 
characteristics relating to the upbringing of the offender/accused person are very 
infrequently cited, and this is likely because they are rarely disclosed verbally and 
are left in the background report submitted to the judge. Conversely, alcohol 
addictions were the most common addiction, but had fewer direct references 
alongside other victim/offender characteristics in comparison to drug addictions. 
Drug additions, as well, were most common in cases where the judge went with 
the Crown prosecutor’s disposition. Homelessness/poverty references were the 
second most common characteristic, and often had a joint submission or 
compromise position given by the judge. Criminal/treatment histories were the 
most common characteristic cited, and frequently entailed the Crown prosecutor 
alleging a criminal record or referencing concerns about reoffending. Treatment 
histories, failed or otherwise, were also rarely mentioned directly during the 
sentencing rationale except when they referred to failed or incomplete treatment 
orders. Lastly, expressions of remorse/desires to change were the third largest 
group and were primarily directly referenced alongside criminal/treatment history 
– despite this, they had little correlation with the final sentence/sanction received. 
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 First, discourses that directly referenced abuse, foster care, or topics that 
are otherwise related to difficult upbringings are interpreted and applied as the 
strongest mitigating factors and were subsequently likely to lead to decisions that 
were joint submissions, compromises, or otherwise not in favour of the Crown 
prosecutor’s preferred sentence. This is a strong indicator that the primary basis of 
the Gladue principles – interpreted as a racist and colonial discursive framework 
of Aboriginal peoples as intrinsically victimized – are at least given token 
influence and applied in a somewhat distorted manner.  However, when 
discussing the background reports that make up the problematic colonial 
frameworks there are some references to victimization that is either systemic or 
not the product of expressly designed government policies. Even these issues are 
interpreted by judges as being worthy of some leniency. In effect, these 
characteristics are not this effective at eliciting more lenient sentences because 
they reference Gladue, but because the judges in question already perceive and 
apply them as particularly strong mitigating circumstances. This raises questions 
about whether or not the problematic discursive framework of Aboriginal peoples 
is actually the result of the court’s misinterpretation/application of the Gladue 
principles or is a pre-existing problem in the court system already. In either case, 
the result is the previously described assumption that all Aboriginal peoples are 
victims and without agency, as well as a subsequent objectification of Aboriginal 
peoples themselves.  
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Addictions are similarly relational in their influence on the proceedings 
and the court’s interpretation of the Gladue principles. Addictions are implicitly 
referencing the problematic discursive framework described above through a 
metaphorical and symbolic link between Aboriginality and criminality, supported 
by racist and colonial assumptions and the presence of victimization discourses. 
Other strong mitigating circumstances as well as rehabilitation are directly 
referenced alongside it in order to collectively strengthen the overall rhetoric of 
‘leniency’ and (paternalistic) treatment. In some instances, addiction may be the 
discourse that is related to others – in this case, addiction is interpreted/utilized as 
an amplifier of certain background events/circumstances related to the 
problematic discursive framework of Aboriginal peoples, again implementing the 
aforementioned colonial and racist assumptions. Drug addictions referred to 
controlled substances and narcotics such as cocaine, methamphetamine, and other 
‘hard’ substances, and are more likely to result in sentences that followed the 
Crown prosecutor’s preferences due to their perception that drug addictions are 
harder to rehabilitate/treat than other addictions. As such, drug offenders are 
perceived as more likely to reoffend/fail treatment programs and this necessitates 
a more controlling/harsh sentence on the grounds of both rehabilitation and 
protection of the public (likely within a controlled treatment centre). Note that, as 
Table 2 indicated, drug charges are more likely to result in a community 
release/supervision of some type. Though not all addicts are charged with drug 
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offenses, the pattern presented remains consistent provided that the Crown 
prosecutor’s position is lenient and already includes some level of rehabilitation in 
the community. This community rehabilitation may be with or without prior 
custody, and may also require subversions of recent mandatory minimum 
sentencing legislation. As for homelessness/poverty, there were some cases where 
they were interpreted in a ‘practical’ manner and were used to reduce monetary 
punishments, but in general they were implicitly part of both problematic 
discursive frameworks and support their resultant interpretive frame of 
victimization and objectification. In general, we find that homelessness/poverty 
has both metaphorical and rhetorical aspects. 
Trauma is also relational and has links to the previous characteristics in an 
overarching framework of intrinsic victimization, though it also has links to the 
victim as well. Another characteristic involved family issues, which generally 
referred to recent family deaths/health issues, interfamilial problems, conflicts, or 
supports, concerns about the children of the offender/accused person, and the 
current domestic situation of them and/or victim. In all instances, they were again 
presented as part of the objectifying colonial discursive framework through their 
racist assumptions that such elements are intrinsic to Aboriginal peoples. This 
problematic discursive framework is typically presented without much reflection 
or criticism, leading to the assumptions and histories being interpreted as 
mitigating factors that are rhetorically weak or possibly counter-productive in that 
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they may make it seem that the offender/accused person has fewer controls and 
supports available to them in the community (and thus, fewer people to supervise 
or enforce a community-based treatment regime). As such, these issues speak 
most clearly to the criminological research described previously, specifically with 
regards to the background elements Gladue courts view as relevant. Latimer & 
Foss noted that Aboriginal youth are given longer sentences than non-Aboriginal 
peoples likely due to their perceived higher “risk/need levels” (Latimer & Foss, 
2005, p. 496). This conclusion was further supported by Yessine & Bonta’s 
analysis which echoed similar conclusions on the basis of backgrounds of poverty 
(Yessine & Bonta, 2009, p. 460). What is interesting is that the way these 
elements were presented in the court was as an overarching framework of intrinsic 
victimization. This framework was one in which Aboriginal peoples were nearly 
always presented as suffering from near-constant issues and problems due to 
racist/colonial policies. Modern penal thought in Gladue courts is based around 
historical events and long-term problems that require intervention (for their own 
benefit). Again, this is part of the reason why such characteristics are emphasized 
and explains how they contribute to the problematic narrative.  As such, many of 
these historical characteristics result in a framework that can be counter-
productive to avoiding incarceration as they indirectly create frameworks that 
advocate paternalistic orientations.  
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The problematic discursive framework can be examined in comparison to 
the recognition of ‘collective trauma’ as both a contributor to the problematic 
discursive framework as well as a critical component of agency-building 
initiatives. Collective trauma is expressly recognized as a key element of the 
Gladue decision and, as stated before, must be acknowledged in order to ensure 
that the racist and colonial context behind the lives of Aboriginal peoples is 
recognized and understood fully (Usher & Lawrence, 2011, p. 91-92, 94). Within 
the courts studied here, there was recognition of collective trauma that was 
sometimes used to explain and legitimate restorative and similar sentences, 
primarily in the context of diversion agreements (ibid., p. 95-96). Not all histories 
would lead to the identification and promulgation of problematic racist and 
colonialist orientations that deemed aboriginal peoples intrinsically victimized 
and in need of government intervention; some few judges would recognize the 
long-term harm caused by government interference and assimilation policies and 
would respond with a sentence that avoided direct government 
interference/supervision. However, in most instances these possibilities were 
overshadowed by the ideological orientation of modern penal rationality which 
would reinterpret such elements as being key ‘risk-factors’ endemic to Aboriginal 
peoples.  
This reductive process is part of how collective trauma is reinterpreted and 
transformed into a fundamentally harmful and counter-productive interpretive 
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framework that views aboriginal peoples as requiring intensive (government-
supervised) treatment regimes in order for them to be adequately rehabilitated. 
Rather than viewing the recognition of collective trauma as a way to understand 
and help rebuild Aboriginal communities, the detached viewpoint of MPR applies 
such historical and theoretical elements in a manner that makes them out to be 
‘problems’ to be solved or which necessitate intervention. In this misapplication, 
collective trauma is used to further dominate and control Aboriginal peoples 
rather than allow for the recognition, prevention, and healing of past injustices. 
Because modern penal rationality is only capable of thinking in terms of ‘risk’ or 
‘need’ or other cost-benefit utilitarian ideologies it necessarily colours other 
processes within the court in such a way that they are framed as problems to be 
solved as well as the sole focus of the court. By emphasizing these elements 
above all else during histories and background discussions, the Gladue courts 
have created narratives that only present Aboriginal peoples as being intrinsically 
victimized and without their own agency; a perspective that underlies the MPR 
ideologies at the heart of modern criminal justice systems. 
Some characteristics are broad in that they can be both strongly mitigating 
and aggravating in their interpretations and applications. General 
criminal/treatment history is one such characteristic, as it directly references the 
possibility of both reoffending and rehabilitation. In general, however, it is almost 
always initially presented/interpreted as an aggravating factor as the Crown 
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prosecutor brings up a criminal record as part of the arraignment process. The 
data from table 7 corroborate this conclusion, as it is primarily mentioned during 
sentences that are far away from the ‘lenient’ side of the spectrum. The repetition 
inherent to this discourse is based on this reinforcement (from the judge) or 
counter-argument (from the defense counsel). This second repetition is what 
determines the discourses’ interpretation and its final influence on the sentence. 
Thus, when it is brought up during the sentence it is much more likely to be used 
to support a punitive measure rather than not. This interaction is also present for 
the offender/accused person’s discourses of remorse, where the majority of such 
speech is based around reoffending and their potential rehabilitation. They are 
only allowed to express remorse in the context of their record and the criminal 
justice system rather than their family, personality, or otherwise non-criminal 
relations. This trend was by far the most common, but there were a handful of 
times when remorse was based around non-criminal matters.  
Recent history is similar yet the opposite of general criminal/treatment 
history as it is repeated by judges during a sentence when it is used to encourage 
rehabilitation, and it is not mentioned during the sentencing speech/rationale when 
it does not (in these instances, the general criminal/treatment history is mentioned 
instead). It is likely for this reason – along with the importance of recent treatment 
as a sign of rehabilitative prospects – that makes this discourse seemingly more 
punitive than others, though keep in mind that this discourse is still more likely to 
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be correlated with cases that ended with the defense counsel’s recommended 
sentence being followed than not. Therefore, the general interpretation and 
application of recent criminal histories and their relevant information is utilized as 
an ‘amplifier’ of the general criminal/treatment histories. Successful treatment 
histories are best understood as the most mitigating form of criminal/treatment 
history and, in some instances, it can even counteract concerns related to the 
protection of the public and shift the sentence towards a compromise position. 
Judges, in this respect, interpret/value rehabilitation higher than potential concerns 
for the public provided that the offender/accused person has shown at least some 
movement towards it. Remorse, when coupled with this discourse, can reinforce 
this perspective and orientation by promoting the idea that the offender/accused 
person seeks to further escalate his rehabilitative regime. On the other side, failed 
treatment histories reinforce this trend with the caveat that failed treatment alone 
is not enough to create a punitive sentence. Histories of failed treatment require 
other punitive-focused discourses in order to adequately work as a punitive-based 
discourse, notably mention of protection of the public. By itself, failed treatment 
histories lead to a more controlled rehabilitative regime rather than a wholly 
individualized/open treatment program. It is because of this that failed treatment 
histories are referenced during the sentencing speech/rationale more frequently 
than successful treatment histories. Specifically, they are used to support the 
interpretation that the offender/accused person is likely to reoffend and thus a 
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sentence that is not purely rehabilitative is needed. Rehabilitative sentences, due 
to their shared interpretation as the ‘starting point’ of a sentence, need no further 
rationalization or support and only require an absence of dissenting/punitive 
submissions. 
The main conclusion to draw from this analysis set and the related 
observations is that the overall sentence-making process is not solely based on 
rhetoric and the frame of the offender/accused person, but also on how such 
arguments can be symbolic of other sentencing principles, court preconceptions, 
or shared interpretive schemes regarding the role and orientation of the entire 
criminal justice system. As detailed in Dugas’ (2013) work, these elements are 
part of the modern penal rationality and its preoccupation with both incapacitation 
and practical/utilitarian risk assessments (p 113 -114). In either instance, the 
utility of Gladue as a tool for healing and restoration is stymied by pre-existing 
interpretive schemes rather than the new punitive movement. Put more simply, the 
ability of Gladue to be of benefit to Aboriginal Peoples is limited through internal, 
not external, discursive forms. In addition, the presentation of these discourses are 
done in such a way that a new discursive scheme (such as the problematic 
framework of Aboriginal peoples) is created out of this blending of the two 
ideologies, simply replacing one colonial and racist bias with another. In either 
instance, the overall process works on the basis of a sliding scale of punishment 
wherein the default plan is based on a generally neo-liberal perception of 
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rehabilitation and the judges shift towards paternalistic treatment regimes or 
completely restrictive custodial dispositions as submissions are presented.  
Table 8 : Informal Processes by Sentence/Decision, Proceeding Type, and 
Victim/Offender/Accused Person Characteristics 
 For this observation, the ‘Aboriginal Court Worker workarounds’ 
passages/code-set will be ignored as there was only one passage noted as such. 
Though it will be repeated later, it is necessary to state here that this is a gross 
under-representation of the work done by Aboriginal Court Worker. As the 
majority of their work is done out of court, in private conversation with defense 
counsels and/or offenders/accused persons, or with treatment agencies, the 
researcher was unable to observe any of this and thus many of the observations 
did not include these references even when their influence was present and a 
significant effect on the proceedings. Table 8 looked to many of the previous 
discourses as well as informal processes and expressly functional discourses. The 
informal processes studied here include both discourses meant as tools as well as 
discourses that aimed to replace the formal court procedure for some reason or 
another. As such, the primary concern is on how some of these informal protocols 
influence/are influenced by the major elements of the case (the offender/accused 
person and the crimes) as well as the final sentence itself. 
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Def.-
Crown 
Neg.
Crown 
Disc.
Fines/ 
VFS
Mand. 
Min. New Leg.
Impact 
Vict./ 
Comm. All Cases
Def.-Crown Neg. 249 39 2 2 0 5 216
Crown Disc. 39 165 1 4 0 4 156
Fines/VFS 2 1 44 7 8 0 36
Mand. Min. 2 4 7 81 6 1 58
New Leg. 0 0 8 6 13 0 7
Impact Vic./ Comm. 5 4 0 1 0 98 63
Recon. Off./Acc. 10 7 0 2 2 6 174
Off./Acc. - Def. Neg. 13 2 0 0 0 1 74
Impact Off./Acc. 1 2 0 0 0 12 57
Personal Resp. 3 4 0 0 0 5 151
Threats 3 0 0 3 0 2 170
Informal Back. 0 0 0 3 0 3 146
Proof 7 8 0 1 0 0 131
Drug 12 17 2 9 2 0 36
Property 54 55 17 31 5 20 160
Violent 25 35 9 13 2 28 96
Bail 30 29 3 8 0 15 105
Plea 50 40 33 46 7 35 148
Diversion 19 48 0 1 0 2 54
All Cases 216 156 36 58 7 63 851  
(Figure 14-Table 8a : Informal Processes by Sentence/Decision, Proceeding Type, and Characteristics, part 1) 
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Recon. 
Off./ 
Acc.
Off./ Acc. -
Def. Neg.
Impact 
Off./ 
Acc.
Personal 
Resp. Threats
Informal 
Back. Proof All Cases
Def.-Crown Neg. 10 13 1 3 3 0 7 216
Crown Disc. 7 2 2 4 0 0 8 156
Fines/VFS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36
Mand. Min. 2 0 0 0 3 3 1 58
New Leg. 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Imp. Vic. 6 1 12 5 2 3 0 63
Recon. Off./Acc. 229 6 6 47 17 22 24 174
Off./Acc. - Def. Neg. 6 77 1 5 35 1 0 74
Impact Off./Acc. 6 1 77 9 7 14 0 57
Personal Resp. 47 5 9 290 96 20 14 151
Threats 17 35 7 96 257 8 6 170
Informal Back. 22 1 14 20 8 202 22 146
Proof 24 0 0 14 6 22 159 131
Drug 7 6 4 9 10 12 7 36
Property 51 24 22 75 77 66 32 160
Violent 26 8 13 44 49 40 17 96
Bail 25 4 19 43 30 44 16 105
Plea 62 39 36 94 112 97 34 148
Diversion 7 0 2 6 8 2 4 54
All Cases 174 74 57 151 170 146 131 851  
(Figure 15-Table 8b : Informal Processes by Sentence/Decision, Proceeding Type, and Characteristics, part 2)  
144 
 
Def. - Crown 
Neg.
Crown 
Disc. Fines/VFS
Mand. 
Min.
New 
Leg.
Impact Vict./ 
Comm.
All 
Cases
Joint Sub. 26 15 15 10 2 4 99
Joint Sub. (C) 61 42 19 18 4 17 107
Crown 0 2 0 5 0 1 13
Crown (C) 1 2 1 7 0 3 14
Defense 0 4 3 6 0 4 31
Defense (C) 5 6 3 6 0 10 36
Comp. 1 5 9 12 3 8 34
Comp. (C) 6 7 9 19 3 13 37
Prob. 15 12 17 15 2 11 71
Prob. (C) 33 23 20 22 3 22 77
Susp. 8 5 6 3 1 4 24
Susp. (C) 12 9 6 5 1 7 25
Addiction 2 1 0 0 0 0 42
Drugs 0 0 0 0 0 1 37
Alcohol 1 0 0 0 0 4 47
Homeless. 0 0 3 3 1 3 84
Crim.History 8 7 1 2 0 5 200
Recent His. 1 1 0 0 0 0 25
Successful 0 1 0 0 0 0 46
Failure 0 0 0 0 0 1 66
Remorse 2 4 0 1 0 2 99  
(Figure 16-Table 8c : Informal Processes by Sentence/Decision, Proceeding Type, and Characteristics, Part 3) 
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Recon. 
Off./ Acc.
Off./ Acc. - 
Def. Neg.
Impact 
Off./Acc.
Personal 
Resp. Threats
Informal 
Back. Proof
All 
Cases
Joint Sub. 4 1 5 31 30 12 5 99
Joint Sub. (C) 29 23 21 45 57 50 20 107
Crown 3 0 2 5 5 2 1 13
Crown (C) 8 1 7 10 10 13 5 14
Defense 3 0 2 13 13 3 4 31
Defense (C) 19 4 8 30 25 32 11 36
Comp. 5 1 1 14 17 6 2 34
Comp. (C) 16 12 11 28 31 31 10 37
Prob. 3 1 4 23 31 12 4 71
Prob. (C) 33 25 23 47 61 58 19 77
Susp. 2 0 0 9 12 4 1 24
Susp. (C) 9 9 7 20 22 20 6 25
Addiction 8 1 0 2 3 21 6 42
Drugs 1 0 1 4 4 23 1 37
Alcohol 4 1 4 9 4 24 3 47
Homeless. 24 0 9 9 2 58 4 84
Crim.History 17 0 3 15 18 42 38 200
Recent His. 4 0 1 2 1 8 9 25
Successful 5 0 1 4 0 20 35 46
Failure 1 0 0 26 14 13 12 66
Remorse 51 1 0 93 15 20 14 99  
(Figure 17-Table 8d : Informal Processes by Sentence/Decision, Proceeding Type, and Characteristics, Part 4)
146 
 
To again briefly cover some of the most relevant findings from this table, 
we can start by noting that Crown discretion was primarily mentioned alongside 
defense counsel-Crown prosecutor negotiations, for the most part reflecting the 
discussions related to diversion proceedings. Fines/VFS (victim fine surcharges) 
were primarily discussed directly alongside reactions to new legislation and 
mandatory minimums – reflecting the recent changes that made such fines unable 
to be waived by judges. Discourses that referenced reconciling the 
offender/accused person’s desires were relatively common and primarily 
concerned the final statement made by them prior to the judge pronouncing their 
sentence – often, this involved them referencing personal responsibility discourses 
such as desires that the offender/accused person take some responsibility, act on 
their own accord, or accept some blame for the crime. These personal 
responsibility discourses were the most common informal process discourse, and 
included the plea inquiry at the start of the proceedings. Threats/warnings/appeals 
tracked closely to these personal responsibility discourses, but were repeated less 
often and primarily occurred in joint submission or compromise cases. Lastly, 
implied threats/commands were made up of directed discourses and half of them 
were deliberately put on the record. These recorded discourses predominantly 
involved the judge and/or the offender/accused person. 
Negotiated discourses are a significant part of the Gladue court process, 
even outside of joint submissions. Admittedly, such submissions seem to be the 
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most fortuitous examples of such negotiations, and an absence of violent offenses 
seems to be most likely to encourage such processes due to concerns regarding the 
protection of the public. Even when a complete joint submission is not enacted, 
the mere presence of negotiations is able to shape the rhetoric and interpersonal 
aspects of the case such that the defense counsel’s recommended sentence and 
compromise sentences are more likely to be followed (or, alternately, this trend is 
due to the proportionally lower number of violent offenses). These negotiations 
are developed by Crown prosecutors in order to engage in mutually beneficial 
plea deals wherein they save time, and the offender gets a slightly more lenient 
sentence. In order to justify the plea to the judge, Crown prosecutors are required 
to utilize Crown discretion as well as their own rhetoric in order to convince the 
judge that the offender/accused person is an appropriate candidate for such 
leniency, typically via references to criminal/treatment history and their own 
personal remorse. As such, the rhetorical power of such discourses is increased 
when they are spoken by a Crown prosecutor rather than the defense counsel or 
offender/ accused person. These cooperative elements and actions best exemplify 
the overall interaction process of modern penal rationality, particularly the 
emphasis on practical concerns and maintaining the bureaucratic/procedural order 
of the court system. Joint submissions, as well as negotiations, therefore represent 
the point where penal rationality is concerned with what Garland defined as the 
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redefinition of judicial success (on the basis of “efficient  and cost-effective 
[justice]” (Garland, 1996, p. 459)). 
With respect to diversions, this aspect of Crown discretion and out of court 
negotiation is even more relevant and significant to the overall process. In 
diversions, the Crown prosecutor is given the ability to determine the form of the 
release and recommend a staying of the charges rather than the judge. In these 
cases, the judge’s discretion to determine the sentence is still present, though it is 
now limited to agreeing or disagreeing with the Crown prosecutor’s 
recommendations (in all observed diversions, never once was a diversion request 
denied). If a judge were to disagree with a recommendation for diversion, then he 
would either alter the agreement to be amenable to all parties or tell the accused 
person to schedule a plea or trial date. In normal circumstances, these speculative 
diversion agreements presented by the Crown prosecutor are expected to have 
already considered the Gladue principles, and the defense counsel and offender/ 
accused person have had their say as well. Because of this, these negotiations are 
interpreted as being less controversial and adversarial than conventional court 
cases/arguments and further emphasize an ‘efficient’ judiciary – particularly since 
they allow for treatment to be performed and organized outside the criminal 
justice system itself. Therefore, despite never being privy to the actual 
negotiations the judge is still interpreting and applying the statutes and 
submissions in a way that favours the Crown prosecutor. The overall effect is that 
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their submissions and claims are given a higher weight when supported by the 
defense counsel. A defense counsel who presents these negotiations imbues them 
with less rhetorical strength than if a Crown prosecutor were to do so, even if the 
Crown prosecutor later supports them in turn, and this reflects the adversarial and 
practical elements still embedded in the cooperative framework of Gladue and 
joint submissions.  Regardless of the speaker, diversions all involved Crown 
discretion discourses being expressly used and interpreted in a way that subverted 
conventional punitive policy and disciplinary penology. Even when the case did 
not involve a diversion, the enactment of Crown discretion was needed in order to 
avoid mandatory minimum sentences. An examination of these passages showed 
that judges questioned this application of the discourse, but nevertheless agreed 
with such results for reasons they did not disclose vocally. Crown discretion is, 
primarily, used in concert with defense counsel discourse with respect to the 
offender/accused person’s criminal/treatment/personal history and chances of 
reoffending. In this sense, it is implicitly an embodied metaphor that expresses an 
overall assessment of the mitigating and aggravating factors present in the current 
case. Negotiations between the offender/accused persons and defense counsels are 
difficult to conceptualize as they often occur off the record or in private. In many 
cases, this discourse is primarily only seen during the plea inquiry and it can 
inadvertently be used to expose addictions or frustrations otherwise hidden by the 
offender/accused persons (such as in statements that they want to plea ‘now, not 
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later’ or ‘to get it over with’). In these instances, the discourse is criticized by the 
judge even when the defense counsel is the actor applying it, though the plea is 
entered regardless.  
Fines/VFS were both informal processes and punishments due to their 
peculiar position within the Gladue context and the drastic changes in their use 
during the research period. These drastic changes were what changed their 
classification from being purely a sanction to also being an informal process that 
has importance beyond conventional punishment. Specifically, fines were 
considered nearly a non-issue in most instances due to the shared group 
understanding that Aboriginal people put before the court were unable to afford 
the fines due to endemic poverty. In many instances, this claim/interpretation was 
backed by the individual offender/accused person providing direct evidence of 
such. However, once the October 2013 changes to the VFS were enacted each 
judge was directly challenged to reconcile these past assumptions with new 
regulations; the results varied. Some judges followed the regulations, others 
directly ignored them, while still others gave tacit assistance to defense counsels 
seeking to subvert the changes. Though the observation period ended 2 weeks 
after the change, some later observations showed that this ad-hoc resistance 
eventually became more organized, pre-planned, and ‘hidden’ from the observers. 
For instance, some directly mentioned VFS whereas others subtly changed the use 
of reparations and fines such that the overall effect of the new law was reduced.  
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Effectively, each actor went from independently interpreting and 
challenging the changes to participating in a shared, group-based consensual 
discourse of what the VFS should accomplish. This new discourse was based on 
functional discourses and metaphors that were already present in courts but 
utilized differently prior to the new guidelines. In this instance, the adaptations 
and changes to the past metaphors/meanings were done in a seamless manner that 
made the new processes seem as routine as the old ones. Put more simply, a new 
shared discourse and structure emerged and changed in light of the norms and pre-
existing metaphors of the court, eventually becoming so routine and normal that it 
effectively became the new norm of the court. An important caveat to this process 
is that, when VFS were directly waived (prior the October 2013), there was no 
hesitation on the part of the judge or defense counsel to mention that the reason 
for such alterations was due to the presence of addictions or mental illness. In 
contrast to other discourses, a direct application of this informal process/sentence 
necessitated a direct practical reason to be stated or was mentioned directly by 
defense counsels in order to increase the rhetorical strength of their appeal (such 
requests were made after the final sentence, thus there was no risk of framing their 
client as a threat to the public or a repeat offender). 
Mandatory minimums primarily dealt with the changes to fines/VFS noted 
above, as well as changes to drug offenses. These drug changes seemed to have 
turned the overall trend in final sentence towards the Crown prosecutor’s 
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recommendation, and this is likely because such offenses have yet to be subjected 
to the same group-wide adaptation strategies as with fines/VFS, above. The 
reasons for this lack of adaptation is unknown, though the smaller number of such 
offenses, the link to public protection, and the poor record of such 
offender/accused persons may be some explanations as to why this discourse is 
applied and interpreted in such a divergent manner. Alternately, Crown 
prosecutors’ offices may be attempting to create a standardized, formal 
interpretive scheme behind the scenes that will guide their own application of 
Crown discretion in these situations. With regards to many of the drug offenses, 
transcript and observation notes show that Crown prosecutors are also interpreting 
their Crown discretion such a way that they can choose to ignore/subvert certain 
legislation if it is appropriate in the circumstances – in these cases, their positions 
may already be interpreted as lenient by the judge and thus such cases are not as 
punitive as popular preconceptions may make them seem.  
The above adaptations to new punitive legislation represent the bulk of the 
changes and effects on Gladue courts as well as one of the main differences 
between Gladue courts and others. Specifically, Gladue courts identified the new 
legislation and its stated goals of punishing individuals ever further while making 
prison and custodial sentences express tools for reasserting state power, express 
public frustrations with criminals, and counter therapeutic justice advocacy 
(Garland, 1996, p. 460). That said, they have expressly reacted against this 
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process on a two-fold basis – appeals to efficient modern penal rationality and an 
overarching discursive framework of Aboriginal peoples. Specifically, changes to 
the VFS were criticized because the court views nearly all Aboriginal peoples as 
intrinsically victimized and poor, and this problematic racist and colonial 
viewpoint leads judges to view them as being incapable of paying the fines and 
any attempts to enforce their collection as a waste of time. Similarly, mandatory 
minimum sentences were subverted through a preference for bureaucratic 
processes as well as positivistic interpretations that made penal rationality and its 
concern for rehabilitative “social inclusion” congruent with a non-custodial 
alternative sentence (Dugas, 2013, p. 55). 
The impact of the crime on the victim/community is an informal process 
designed to expressly gather and communicate information relating to aggravating 
and mitigating factors. In many instances, this discourse is made up of vague or 
undisclosed statements from the Victim Impact Statement (VIS), and in this 
respect it is expressly relational in that it directly calls to mind concerns regarding 
the protection of the public as well as related sentencing principles and schemes 
(such as domestic allegations, for instance). Note that some VIS directly 
mentioned a desire from the victim that rehabilitation be considered a major 
principle, and this was mostly done in cases involving alcohol addictions. What is 
also notable about VIS is that they are mandatory for any diversion  and therefore, 
coupled with the large number of diversions, we can give credence to the idea that 
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VIS are not necessarily neo-punitive and, if not pro-rehabilitation, can at least be 
functionally used to legitimate the restorative justice discourses within the Gladue 
decision. Therefore, the content of the VIS and the way it is interpreted by the 
judge and Crown prosecutor can serve to promote a lenient or custodial sentence 
(again, on either rehabilitative or punitive grounds), and this is reliant on both the 
content of the statements as well as their interpretation on the part of the court 
actors. Prior discourses – such as those that allege difficult domestic 
circumstances – are the critical element that determines how the information is 
interpreted and perceived as being symbolic of other related problems by the 
court.  
The informal process concerned with reconciling the offender/accused 
person’s desires is primarily communicated via formal/required processes that 
mandate that they be allowed to speak and plea on their own volition. In effect, 
they are used rhetorically (for the offender/accused person’s final statement) and 
to functionally frame the individual in question; in these instances, there is both 
an acknowledgment and reinforcement of neo-liberal discourses alongside a 
counter-argument of the Crown prosecutor’s pro-custody discourses. In this 
counter-discourse mode the offender/accused person will directly mention 
practical considerations (homelessness/poverty and addictions) as well as direct 
appeals to Gladue principles via long-term histories. In this combination, these 
desires can be interpreted as a rhetorical discourse that directly calls to mind 
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mitigating factors and the practical/cost-benefit analysis of the modern penal 
rationality embedded in Gladue courts. Personal responsibility discourses are also 
embedded in this process and its interaction with the Crown prosecutor, primarily 
when the offender/accused person recognizes (or is told to recognize) their role in 
offending or treatment. In the event that the offender/accused person references 
this discourse/process themselves then questions regarding the reasons for doing 
so, and whether this is a genuine instance of their agency and personal initiative 
may be raised. That is, Aboriginal peoples brought before the court already have 
their agency curtailed through the criminal justice process and colonial processes, 
so there may be pressure to agree with the ideologies of the court and colonial 
society. Conversely, the opportunity to speak freely may allow the 
offender/accused person to speak their mind and act as a small opportunity to 
express their own agency and counteract harmful colonial discursive frameworks. 
In any case, when the Crown prosecutor makes this claim about the 
offender/accused person’s role in rehabilitation, treatment, and/or offending, then 
they are directly promoting related ideologies such as neo-liberalism or the new 
punitiveness promoted by neo-conservatism. However, sometimes this is less 
punitive than it appears as they often state that all they really want is for 
offender/accused persons to begin the rehabilitation process and make a good-
faith effort. Therefore, despite its original conception/design as a neo-liberal 
ideological discourse, this informal process can be interpreted and applied as both 
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punitive and rehabilitative in orientation. In all instances, however, the 
critical/disciplinary elements of such discourses are still implicit, and they 
continue to reflect the modern penal rationality and its focus on how 
“condemnation and the reaffirmation of social norms can only be achieved 
through the punitive and exclusionary sanctions provided through the legal 
system” (Dugas, 2013, p. 58).  
Furthermore, this discourse may be used to communicate a warning to the 
offender/accused person and make it clear to them that neo-liberal ideologies may 
be replaced by neo-punitive ones in the future. Specifically, the warning is that 
Crown prosecutors and judges may not be able to prevent such policies in the 
future and are reflexive in their awareness that they are similarly constrained and 
limited by the ideologies of the criminal justice system as well. Express 
threats/warnings/appeals are related discourses to personal responsibility 
discourses and they are commonly combined in the manner described previously 
and in concert with the plea inquiry. For joint submissions, the expectation and 
assumption from judges is that such warnings (when part of the plea inquiry) are 
unnecessary as the Crown prosecutor has already ‘vetted’ the process. When the 
case is not a joint submission, such informal plea inquiries are viewed with 
skepticism as there are concerns that the offender/accused person may not 
understand the process of a guilty plea. This privileging of the Crown prosecutor’s 
discourses may be due to structural power relations of the court that give the them 
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a privileged position within the court setting, or because they are more 
knowledgeable about the case and can ensure that the offender/accused person is 
aware of all the facts and offenses and their implications in the future (that is, the 
Crown prosecutor provides additional vetting of the defense counsel’s claims and 
argument). The structural power relations of the court are likely a part of 
discourses relating to informal proof of claims made by the offender/accused 
person during their final speech and referenced with respect to treatment agencies. 
In this case, the structural power relations of the court are expressed through the 
privileging of the Crown prosecutor’s discourses and claims rather than those who 
are not; the defense counsel and treatment agencies are viewed as inherently 
biased in favour of the offender/accused person whereas the Crown prosecutor is 
erroneously considered unbiased and accurately gauging all potentialities within 
the Gladue principles and S.718.2 (e). Therefore, the general discursive formation 
and interpretation of these claims seems to be partly based on both the speaker 
and the listener. If a Crown prosecutor is accepting of such claims (or doesn’t 
contest them too strongly) it will make such claims appear more legitimate in the 
eyes of the court and reinforce the rhetoric of rehabilitation. If the claims are 
contested and the counter-rhetoric is strong enough, then their effectiveness would 
be reduced or eliminated. 
In general, informal processes serve as both mediums of communication 
and information conveying speech regardless of the sentencing principle in 
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question. In addition, these processes can often act as embodied metaphors, 
relational discourses, and/or as tools for them to be made manifest. Therefore, 
informal processes are non-sanctioned (due to their informal basis) but are still 
necessary for the court system as a whole to function and are subsequently 
embedded within the principles of modern penal rationality through this 
connection.  While these processes allow for greater fidelity in background 
reports and some level of granularity in sentences and sanctions, they still lead to 
racist/colonial discursive frames, continued objectification of Aboriginal peoples, 
and an overall adversarial interpretation of different court actors. In some of these 
instances the Gladue orientation moderates these effects a small amount, 
particularly when counter-proposals from outside treatment agencies and 
Aboriginal court workers (ACWs) are brought to bear. Similarly, court actors are 
differentially affected by and influenced by these principles and frameworks, with 
external actors being the least influenced by them. One major effect of these 
principles and frameworks is the emphasis on a rehabilitation/custodial 
dichotomy, which is primarily a problem with the Crown prosecutor and judge 
rather than those on the defense counsel’s side. Delimitation between the two 
goals/principles is common, and these actors sometime conflate one or the other 
with harsh or lenient justice due to embedded ideological orientations within the 
modern penal rationality.  
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Table 9 : Discourse Analysis by Actors and Informal Processes 
 For table 9 brief sections of clearly delineated discourses were coded as 
part of the ‘discourse analysis’ code set 6. Additionally, actors were coded as such 
when they were speaking, or if the actor was deliberately being spoken to (i.e., not 
speaking to the court as a whole). Finally, many of the discourse analysis code 
sets were based on the general methods and themes of critical discourse analysis, 
specifically Foucault’s conception of exteriority and hidden truths within 
discourses of possibilities (in this thesis, possible sanctions or criminal events) 
(Foucault, 1981, p. 67). However, these terms and frameworks were later 
modified when certain trends or patterns emerged that necessitated the creation of 
new categories. In addition, some conceptions of neo-liberalism and neo-
punitiveness were included in the code-set; these reflected the definitions made by 
Pratt et al. and Hannah-Moffat and Maurutto from Pratt et al.’s 2005 collection (p. 
xi -1, 85-101). Therefore, the overall theoretical orientation of the discourse 
analysis is rather broad and covers ideological/political discourses as well as some 
physical discourses and body language. Overall, this cross-tabulation was 
designed to specifically analyze whether or not disciplinary (or counter-
disciplinary) discourses were specific to certain actors or were the result of certain 
informal/subversive court processes. As such, it was primarily designed to  
                                                 
6
 See Appendix A for the exhaustive list of such discourses code sets 
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What is 
unsaid
Unstat. 
alter.
Implied 
threats/ 
comm.
Reinfor. 
of legal 
auth./ 
power
Reinfor. 
of New 
Pun.
Subv. 
of 
pun.
All 
Cases
What is unsaid 214 4 10 17 8 25 139
Unstat. alter. 4 203 41 50 16 29 149
Implied threats/ 
comm. 10 41 228 40 11 15 172
Reinfor. of legal 
auth./ power 17 50 40 215 18 38 167
Reinfor. of New 
Pun. 8 16 11 18 83 18 62
Subv. of pun. 25 29 15 38 18 213 173
Restor. Just. 3 1 0 1 0 5 15
Comm. Just. 3 7 4 4 1 7 31
Situat. disc. 41 26 12 20 5 16 194
Neg. disc. 17 17 7 34 0 30 300
Direct disc. 75 88 180 77 33 74 325
Out of court 
disc. 60 45 16 46 5 38 413
Delib. on the 
record disc. 20 25 94 19 7 36 188
Def.-Crown 
Neg. 8 12 10 19 1 26 216
Crown Disc. 8 20 5 47 2 75 156
Fines/VFS 2 1 0 3 3 12 36
Mand. Min. 6 10 2 12 5 16 58
React.New Leg. 1 1 0 4 1 11 7
Imp. Vict./ 
Comm. 21 12 9 11 10 5 63
Pers. Resp. 29 39 78 12 28 30 151
Threats 23 51 139 35 26 28 170
All Cases 139 149 172 167 62 173 851
(Figure 18 – Table 9a : Discourse Analysis by Actors and Informal Processes, 
part 1) 
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Restor. 
Just.
Comm. 
Just.
Situat. 
disc.
Neg. 
disc.
Direct 
disc.
Out of 
court 
disc.
Delib. 
on the 
record 
disc.
What is unsaid 3 3 41 17 75 60 20
Unstat. alter. 1 7 26 17 88 45 25
Implied threats/ 
comm. 0 4 12 7 180 16 94
Reinfor. of legal 
auth./ power 1 4 20 34 77 46 19
Reinfor. of New 
Pun. 0 1 5 0 33 5 7
Subv. of pun. 5 7 16 30 74 38 36
Restor. Just. 19 0 2 1 7 3 1
Comm. Just. 0 46 7 3 18 8 1
Situat. disc. 2 7 273 18 62 112 23
Neg. disc. 1 3 18 352 45 83 12
Direct disc. 7 18 62 45 593 98 222
Out of court 
disc. 3 8 112 83 98 529 23
Delib. on the 
record disc. 1 1 23 12 222 23 266
Def.-Crown 
Neg. 0 0 13 179 45 75 21
Crown Disc. 0 3 12 64 44 43 34
Fines/VFS 0 0 5 5 5 4 1
Mand. Min. 1 0 5 5 20 5 7
React.New Leg. 0 0 1 0 4 1 0
Imp. Vict./ 
Comm. 3 5 36 6 27 36 12
Pers. Resp. 3 5 20 3 183 24 92
Threats 2 6 9 3 200 10 92
All Cases 15 31 194 300 325 413 188
(Figure 19 – Table 9b : Discourse Analysis by Actors and Informal Processes, 
part 2) 
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What is 
unsaid
Unstat. 
alter.
Implied 
threats/ 
comm.
Reinfor. 
of legal 
auth./ 
power
Reinfor. 
of New 
Pun.
Subv. 
of 
pun.
All 
Cases
Judge 63 73 134 86 43 77 429
Crown 61 58 38 100 22 96 374
Federal 2 2 1 0 1 5 18
Counsel 48 35 50 23 10 26 365
Private 16 15 13 9 1 7 114
Duty Counsel 7 5 8 7 1 11 163
Off./Acc. 93 97 124 69 41 99 501
Off./Acc. 
Fam. 39 20 11 5 2 9 118
Surety 11 9 16 5 1 3 47
Victim 23 11 10 10 4 4 59
Public 0 6 2 5 9 5 18
ACW 2 5 0 0 0 3 42
Court Staff 
(Not ACW) 0 1 1 0 0 0 126
CCT 2 11 0 21 0 51 95
Treatment 
Agencies 22 20 9 18 10 40 174
Politicians / 
Gov. 4 3 0 4 0 7 12
Other 1 3 1 6 1 2 24  
(Figure 20 – Table 9c : Discourse Analysis by Actors and Informal Processes, 
part 3) 
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Restor. 
Just.
Comm. 
Just.
Situat. 
disc.
Neg. 
disc.
Direct 
disc.
Out of 
court 
disc.
Delib. 
on the 
record 
disc.
Judge 7 21 74 89 264 86 101
Crown 1 7 66 138 141 131 49
Federal 1 0 4 8 3 5 3
Counsel 6 4 67 131 138 160 46
Private 2 3 15 49 56 68 20
Duty Counsel 0 3 20 40 31 86 14
Off./Acc. 2 9 99 99 378 239 183
Off./Acc. 
Fam. 9 28 44 6 70 78 17
Surety 1 4 11 8 30 18 1
Victim 0 1 42 11 26 42 17
Public 2 2 0 1 6 1 2
ACW 0 0 9 12 4 32 3
Court Staff 
(Not ACW) 0 0 6 6 2 15 2
CCT 1 3 8 43 35 47 32
Treatment 
Agencies 3 4 56 27 55 109 8
Politicians / 
Gov. 1 0 3 1 6 3 2
Other 0 1 10 2 6 6 3
(Figure 21 – Table 9d : Discourse Analysis by Actors and Informal Processes, 
part 4) 
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analyze how Gladue courts are engaging with both the Gladue principles and the 
new punitiveness. 
Again, there are a few small interesting sections that can be highlighted 
prior to starting the discussion and analysis. To begin with, ‘What is left unsaid’ 
(referring to deliberate omissions) primarily directly referred to 
discourses/processes that reference personal responsibility. In contrast, discourses 
that referenced unstated alternatives (such as the possibility that future leniency 
would not be forthcoming) often directly referenced the reinforcement of legal 
authority/power but also subverted punitiveness and referenced the Community 
Council of Toronto. Discourses that reinforced the new punitiveness also had 
similar cross-references to the above two, but never involved treatment centre 
releases. Furthermore, restorative justice discourses were less common than 
communal justice discourses, but both predominantly subverted punitiveness and 
each were preferred by different actors – defense counsels preferred restorative 
justice, and judges and Crown prosecutors preferred communal justice. 
Negotiated discourses were dualistic in nature, as they both reinforce legal 
authority/power but also are the primary means by which diversions are enacted, 
primarily via discussions from outside the courtroom. Lastly, deliberately on the 
record discourses often referred to the plea inquiry (when combined with implied 
threats/commands) and or diversion agreements (when combined with 
subversions of punitiveness). 
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To begin the analysis, Crown prosecutors, judges, and other major court 
actors responsible for enforcing punitive policies are cognizant of the possible 
future sentences that would be applied as a result of reoffending. In this case, 
these actors leave these possibilities unspoken in order to encourage the 
offender/accused person to interpret the discourse and implications in whatever 
way makes the result appear more threatening. When defense counsels utilize this 
discourse, it can be interpretive in orientation and used to deliberately avoid 
mentioning possible aggravating circumstances directly. In this sense, they are 
aware of the way their own discourses can be misinterpreted and cause them to be 
perceived as rhetorically weak. In these instances, defense counsels will therefore 
avoid mentioning certain direct mentions for the benefit of their case. Linked 
discourses can assist this process, as personal responsibility discourses and 
appeals are used to communicate this possible result and the rationalizations 
behind it. The unstated alternatives include more lenient and criminal justice 
based concerns, and this discursive interpretation and function is primarily 
utilized by the Crown prosecutor and their discretion in relenting ‘one last time’. 
In this application, discourses linked to this process were more symbolic and 
interactive in that they implied that personal responsibility and changes were 
necessary lest they not be allowed to utilize rehabilitative or diversionary 
processes in the future. Dugas’ (2013) work referenced this possibility in that he 
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hypothesized that court actors are utilizing harsh rhetoric in order to “outsmart” or 
subvert the current modern penal rationality and its focus on deterrence (p. 121). 
Implied threats/commands were primarily issued as part of the plea 
inquiry and as treatment orders from the judge regarding the applied sentence. As 
such, they were often deliberately put on record both due to formal requirements 
as well as to serve as an additional rhetorical discourse and deterrent (primarily 
for the benefit of future Crown prosecutors and their own potential negotiations). 
It should be noted that oftentimes these threats were combined with direct calls or 
actions that subverted the presumed penality of the contemporary criminal justice 
system. This combination can act to reinforce these claims of leniency or could 
possibly be counter-productive to them, though the main determinant of this result 
is based on the offender/accused person’s individual interpretation. For instance, 
the threats/commands can be combined with appeals to make it clear that they 
must rehabilitate themselves lest they be refused that opportunity in the future. 
Alternately, warnings that punitive sentences would result may seem dubious if 
the court seems to go out of its way to avoid them at the present time. This 
discourse is therefore both functional and rhetorical, with the rhetorical 
strength/weakness being unpredictable and impossible to observe in this thesis. 
There is also the possibility that these warnings and concerns are made with the 
understanding by Crown prosecutors and judges that this leniency is not present 
and that these sentences/policies are in fact the ‘standard’ ones. If this is the case, 
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then implied threats/commands and related discourses are used to create a highly 
specialized form of specific deterrence. In such a case, these actors are not 
subverting punitiveness as much as they are altering its application and form into 
a more neo-liberal and individualized form. When the data analyses regarding the 
reinforcement of legal authority/power are taken into account, we can see that 
similar discourses (ones that reference the influence, discretion and control of 
Crown prosecutors and judges) are oftentimes used to subvert punitiveness rather 
than to reinforce it. Therefore, in line with Dugas’ previous hypotheses, there is 
an overarching recognition of MPR and deterrent prerogatives, and a push against 
it via the associated rehabilitative and utilitarian counter-principles. 
Unfortunately, this process also involves a misapplication of Gladue principles 
such that discourses relating to background characteristics that support a 
rehabilitative mindset are sublimated into MPR, altering them into interpretive 
schemes that focus entirely upon elements that necessitate more government 
intervention and thus which frame Aboriginal peoples in colonial and racist ways.  
The new punitive discourse, when interpreted in its neo-liberal form, is 
echoed and supported by the offender/accused person. In this application, they are 
primarily utilizing and embodying personal responsibility discourses/rhetoric and 
accepting such ideologies as being part of their rehabilitative regime. Therefore, 
in addition to the arguments by criminologists noted above, the neo-liberal 
ideology is partly consensual and primarily enforced via the same disciplinary 
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methods detailed by Foucault and other critical theorists, most notably the 
limitation of disciplines. Specifically, this is caused by their placement within a 
court setting where speakers are necessarily constrained by discursive procedures 
that “permits construction, but within narrow confines” (Foucault, 1981, p. 59). 
This also applies to judges and Crown prosecutors, and is part of the reason why 
the resistance and counter-discourses mentioned by Dugas are still using the 
terminology of MPR; such beliefs are embedded within the actual area in which 
one can speak of justice itself.  
Communal and restorative justice discourses were defined differently in 
the analysis. Communal justice referred to supports in the vaguely termed 
‘community’, community work or volunteering, community resources and 
assistance, community service orders, and community-based counselling or 
treatment. In all instances, the diversion program (the Community Council of 
Toronto) was only tangentially mentioned and not directly stated alongside such 
references. Therefore, diversion and related resources were implied to be a part of 
such orientations rather than stated outright. Additionally, all of the communities 
in question were urban or suburban rather than rural or located directly in 
reserves, and the emphasis was on locations and communities close to where the 
offender/accused person lived and not necessarily those they felt close to. In 
general, communal justice was primarily utilized by judges and Crown 
prosecutors to refer to treatments, programs, and supports outside of the criminal 
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justice system and which were primarily referenced within the plan of care and/or 
Aboriginal Legal Services-led programs – they were infrequently named directly 
and usually listed in supplemental materials provided to the court/judge itself.  
Restorative justice referred to direct mentions of such a term, as well as 
direct desires/references to initiatives that seek to reintegrate the offender/accused 
person back into their community, utilize traditional or culturally appropriate 
treatment plans, include familial and community-wide rehabilitation orders, or 
which directly seek to directly remedy the long-term effects of colonial policies 
and injustices. Like communal justice, diversion orders and the Community 
Council of Toronto were only mentioned tangentially but considered relevant to 
such rehabilitative orientations. In both instances, they are explicitly rehabilitative 
ideologies and discourses that are nonetheless utilized and interpreted differently 
by the court actors in question. Specifically, court agents and the offender/accused 
person predominantly prefer communal justice discourses/references whereas 
defense counsels prefer restorative justice discourses/references. Though they are 
different ideologies in practice, they can both be subsumed under the aegis of 
rehabilitation.  
Communal justice discourses are referenced and applied with reluctance 
by Crown prosecutors and judges, primarily because such sentences and orders 
lack outside influence and control. When communal justice is mentioned or 
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applied the discourses mentioned are related to unstated alternatives in an explicit 
mention and warning that such policies and orders would not be allowed in the 
future. Both sides of the court are working towards the same general 
rehabilitation-focused framework, but what they understand as the main concerns 
of such policies (reoffending versus social justice) are what changes their 
interpretation and application of their discourses vis-à-vis restoration or 
community. Similarly, these groups are working with the context of 
urban/suburban Aboriginal peoples/communities rather than reserve or rural 
contexts. This approach leads to unique problems and perspectives, as well as the 
perception (in the eyes of the court) that such community ties are limited in 
Toronto and must be created in order for long-term rehabilitative prospects to 
develop. In effect, these Indigenous justice initiatives were emphasized as a result 
of specific perceived problems (due to the urban context) and a desire/need to 
solve them in order for the courts’ rehabilitative mandate to be effective. 
Negotiated discourses have primarily been covered in informal 
processes/table 8, above. That said, as noted above and corroborated by the 
current table, negotiated discourses are implemented and understood by court 
actors in a dualistic manner whereby they reinforce/reference legal authority while 
simultaneously rescinding such power via a conciliatory negotiation with their 
counterpart (in a manner not legally required). This negotiation seems a manifest 
instance of embodied legal authority were one not aware of contextual pressures 
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and group norms that make this subordination a regular expectation due to both 
practical and utilitarian concerns; specifically, a prioritization of ‘efficient’ justice 
in line with MPR as described previously. Diversions and joint submissions are 
both similar sentences/proceedings in this respect, though joint submissions 
oftentimes involve far too many or severe offenses for a diversion to occur. 
Therefore, it is perhaps better to say that diversions are on the extreme end of this 
dualistic nature (they express large amounts of the Crown prosecutor’s power then 
later eliminates such influence entirely) whereas joint submissions are ‘muted’ yet 
still more empowering than a straight contested plea (Crown prosecutors give up 
some of their power, judges nominally limit their power, and offenders/accused 
persons and their defense counsels engage in a mutually beneficial negotiation to 
gain some margin of control over their adversaries). 
Discourses of any kind levelled against minor court actors (the 
offender/accused person’s family, treatment agencies, sureties, etc.) take the form 
of directed questions and references from the judge, Crown prosecutor, defense 
counsel, and the offender/accused person. In these instances, they take the form of 
questions regarding the suitability of any court orders or sanctions. When the 
offender/accused person is involved in this directed discourse, it can involve the 
plea inquiry as well as direct admonitions/appeals. These admonitions often 
involve subversions of punitiveness, but they can also reinforce personal 
responsibility discourses on the part of the offender/accused person as well. 
172 
 
Regardless, nearly all of the conversations are managed and controlled by the 
judge, as they decide who gets to speak, and why. In a reversal of the expectation 
in a disciplinary/punitive system, his management is somewhat curtailed. The 
presumed leniency of Gladue courts is masked under procedural rules and norms 
that limit the ability of non-court actors to speak. However, the controlling actors 
are often limiting their own power over these subjects and grant some level of 
control over the proceedings to them when these breaches would serve the 
primary goals of the court; for Gladue courts, the primary goal is both the 
protection of the public and rehabilitation of Aboriginal peoples in conflict with 
colonial laws. In all these instances, however, judges make it a point to make sure 
that all discourse is authentic to the speaker and not the result of undue pressure. 
In some instances, judges have been observed breaking procedural rules/norms 
when it is clear that the speaker is incapable of articulating their point and, in 
some instances, they would even subvert punitiveness directly even when it seems 
inimical to their presumed role. This is the main divergence between this thesis 
work and Dugas’ analysis of Gladue decisions. Dugas’ work did not encounter 
any of these procedural changes, and these subversions are the main point in 
which MPR is indirectly challenged and related problematic frames are ignored in 
favour of personal statements and acts of agency. This subversion is still based 
around their perceptions of the main goals of the court, and as such is 
implementing MPR in an indirect manner which may come into conflict with 
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other court actors and the public. It should be noted that the overall use of court 
power is one where the worst excesses of the punitive/disciplinary state are 
avoided.  
Aboriginal court workers are unique in that their passage and coding 
numbers are not accurate representations of their actual role in court proceedings. 
This discrepancy is due to their actions taking place outside of the court and in 
private confidential conversations with other actors. Their primary goal seemed to 
be predominantly based around rehabilitation and getting offender/accused 
persons the appropriate treatment and they rarely, if ever, advocated or supported 
custodial sentences. Despite the presumed animosity that an adversarial system 
would encourage, the ACW was often utilized by both Crown prosecutors and 
defense counsels looking for a treatment regime that is effective and meets their 
demands for safety and accountability. In this respect, ACWs and their discourses 
are utilized by defense counsels and Crown prosecutors as rhetoric that is 
expressly and symbolically rehabilitative. ACWs are typically supportive of 
claims of rehabilitative success, and the mere presence of them can be interpreted 
by judges and Crown prosecutors as a sign that all possible treatment options were 
considered and the ones presented are the best available. In the event that the 
options present are not adequate, these same court actors may inadvertently 
interpret a lack of strong treatment options as a sign that the offender/accused 
person cannot be rehabilitated rather than the result of a failure of 
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government/treatment resources. In the case of Gladue courts, the presence of 
ACWs is able to further enhance cooperative and utilitarian concerns while also 
allowing for some measure of authentic rehabilitative and Aboriginal-led justice 
regimes. It is through this informal process and related discourses that the 
problems created by MPR and related discursive frameworks are able to be 
moderated.  
In general, judges and Crown prosecutors are expected to be the primary 
agents of punitiveness, but despite this they approach it cautiously yet do not 
totally accept completely communal or rehabilitative approaches. When they are 
required to communicate these potential ideologies they do so via absent 
discourses and purposeful omissions; specifically, omissions that are 
counterproductive to their current rhetorical goals and which reflect part of 
Foucault’s disciplinary society and related discursive processes of control. In most 
cases, their ideal sentence is one that is rehabilitative and includes a plan of care 
and supervisors scaled to the amount of reoffending risk the offender has. 
Additionally, this silence/omission can also be used as an informal threat or 
deterrent functional discourse in order to attempt to convince the offender that 
they have his best interests at heart and wish to avoid incarcerating him for no 
reason. Therefore, most of the discourses based around the offender are 
interpretive, whereas those directed at the offender are often functional and aim to 
alter his/her interpretive schema. All court discussions are based around potential 
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offending in the future, and as such are always veiled in speech relating to 
possibilities and hypothetical events (albeit based around personal responsibility 
to a greater or lesser extent). This conception of personal responsibility is not a 
purely neo-liberal or punitive conception, as these authorities are somewhat aware 
of institutional pressures placed upon offender/accused persons and can challenge 
these punitive policies. These challenges are where direct conflict with MPR is 
realized and instances of reflexive sentencing and authentic self-actualization (on 
the part of the offender/accused person) can occur. Judges, Crown prosecutors, 
and defense counsels may not always be this reflexive in their self-analysis, and 
this is part of the reason why outside support, alternatives, and advice is sought 
after. The Crown prosecutor’s utilization of formal appeals/threats is not present 
when diversion is implemented, and is reduced during joint submissions. This is 
because such negotiations, warnings, and major decisions and evaluations are 
made outside of the court and the disciplinary context of the court bench/setting.  
In these instances, there is no sign of the disciplinary discourses or rhetoric and 
the process itself often takes substantially less court time to resolve. This seems 
fairly subversive provided one forgets that Crown prosecutors and judges give up 
their power and influence only after they have exercised it outside of the court and 
the eyes of the public.  
With respect to punitive changes and legislation, any changes to 
rehabilitative or punitive ideals are directly altered and/or countered by all court 
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actors in order to try and limit any egregious, impractical, or unacceptable 
forms/changes. In some instances, judges and Crown prosecutors reserve the more 
punitive excesses for particularly problematic or egregious offenders/accused 
persons. In other instances, group cooperation and shared interpretive actions 
create norms and values that make their applicability less valid. In this sense, 
judges do not so much reconcile punitive and rehabilitative discourses as much as 
they choose when to apply them, oftentimes reserving punitive policies for 
particular individuals or when informal workarounds are unavailable. Therefore, 
directed uses of punitive processes are also instances of express applications of 
MPR ideologies – the conventional identification of social exclusion as key to 
justice and order (Dugas, 2013, p. 54). In most cases, these informal workarounds 
involve the court, Crown prosecutor, or judge giving up some of their power to 
enforce the sentence by giving up that responsibility to an outside group such as 
the CCT, treatment agencies, or other rehabilitation-focused programs; an express 
example of MPR subversions and the conventional depiction of the penal turn as a 
response to crises of modernity (Garland, 1996, p. 459-466). This 
preferential/differential application of the main punitive ideologies is a 
multifaceted process, and is detailed in the conclusion, below. 
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Table 10 : Sentencing Principles and Bail Concerns by Informal Processes, 
Victim/Offender/Accused Person Characteristics, and Actors 
 Tables 10 & 11 signal the end of the more exhaustive analyses and marks 
the start of briefer ones. To be specific, this table was only designed and 
conceived in order to analyze certain interesting cross-tabulations rather than to 
insure that all the possible codes had been examined in depth at least once. In this 
case, table 10 looks to analyze how sentencing principles may be directly affected 
by certain characteristics and informal processes, as well as to see whether or not 
certain actors were more or less likely to cite these characteristics and principles 
in comparison to other ones. Additionally, this analysis was not done in a section-
by-section manner as in the other analyses and was primarily concerned with 
interesting cross-tabulations. Though the end result is the same (as far as the 
thesis paper is concerned) this was a different analytical process than in the 
preceding sections.  
For similar reasons, this brief overview of particularly relevant 
relationships found in the table will be similarly truncated. To start, punitive 
sentencing principles (denunciation, general deterrence, specific deterrence, and 
protection of the public) were differently applied to certain informal processes. 
Rehabilitation, conversely, applied to multiple informal processes and 
characteristics as well as both the sentencing rationale and submission stages. 
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Denun.
Gen. 
Det.
Spec. 
Det.
Prot. 
of  
Public Rehab.
Cases - 
Rehab.
Mit. 
Fact.
Agg. 
Fact.
Prim. 
Grou.
Sec. 
Grou.
Ter. 
Grou.
Past 
Treat. 
Fail.
Surety 
Via.
All 
Cases
Mand. Min. 5 3 4 1 6 45 37 16 0 0 0 1 0 58
New Leg. 0 0 0 0 1 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Impact Vic. 2 2 4 12 7 40 13 32 0 4 1 1 3 63
Recon. Off./Acc. 0 0 0 1 66 84 52 5 0 3 0 4 2 175
Impact Off./Acc. 0 0 0 0 14 44 24 6 0 5 0 1 17 57
Personal Resp. 1 3 7 1 94 120 84 27 5 11 0 27 4 158
Threats 1 1 6 1 51 120 20 25 1 1 0 10 6 177
Proof 0 0 1 0 72 69 34 9 0 4 0 9 2 132
Addiction 0 0 0 0 22 34 26 2 0 1 0 1 0 42
Drugs 0 0 0 0 19 33 25 1 0 4 0 4 1 38
Alcohol 0 0 1 1 20 40 39 7 0 3 0 3 1 47
Home. 0 0 0 0 31 70 76 5 1 3 0 2 4 85
Crim. Hist. 0 1 4 1 65 137 71 167 3 8 0 8 1 200
Succ. Hist. 0 0 0 0 36 40 25 2 0 1 0 1 2 46
Fail. Hist. 0 0 0 1 20 50 4 54 3 17 0 40 7 66
Trau. 0 0 0 0 4 13 7 6 0 0 0 0 0 27
Phys. Trau. 0 0 0 0 3 14 7 13 0 0 0 0 0 21
Ment. Trau. 0 0 0 0 7 15 10 14 0 0 0 0 0 18
Remorse 0 2 4 1 72 85 88 7 1 0 0 5 1 99
All Cases 30 42 53 16 195 198 196 157 23 46 2 32 35 851
(Figure 22 – Table 10a : Sentencing Principles and Bail Concerns by Informal Processes, Characteristics, and 
Actors, part 1) 
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Denun.
Gen. 
Det.
Spec. 
Det.
Prot. 
of  
Public Rehab.
Cases - 
Rehab.
Mit. 
Fact.
Agg. 
Fact.
Prim. 
Grou.
Sec. 
Grou.
Ter. 
Grou.
Past 
Treat. 
Fail.
Surety 
Via.
All 
Cases
Judge 14 21 27 9 105 218 119 73 7 14 2 24 13 446
Crown 15 20 27 5 65 164 69 142 24 49 0 20 28 376
Federal 0 1 1 0 4 8 3 6 0 0 0 1 2 20
Counsel 3 5 6 1 85 115 113 20 2 13 0 8 21 369
Private 2 2 2 0 26 36 30 5 1 0 0 0 3 118
Duty Counsel 0 0 1 0 20 28 15 4 0 0 0 0 0 163
Off./Acc. 3 2 5 3 159 189 214 75 4 23 0 27 12 511
Off./Acc. Fam. 0 0 1 0 59 103 116 14 2 10 0 7 19 124
Surety 0 0 0 0 10 23 5 1 2 9 0 4 54 48
Victim 1 2 3 1 4 37 17 36 0 2 0 0 1 60
Public 2 3 4 13 3 14 3 4 0 3 2 1 1 18
ACW 0 0 0 0 7 12 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 42
CCT 0 0 0 0 1 9 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 96
Treatment 
Agencies 0 0 0 0 170 128 40 12 3 2 0 17 3 175
Polit./Gov. 1 0 0 1 2 10 10 0 0 1 2 0 0 12
Court Staff (Not 
ACW) 0 0 0 0 0 80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 125   
(Figure 23 – Table 10b : Sentencing Principles and Bail Concerns by Informal Processes, Characteristics, and 
Actors, part 2)
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Homelessness/poverty, criminal/treatment history, failed treatment, and all forms 
of trauma were mentioned outside of the sentencing speech/rationale in roughly 
half the cases that referenced rehabilitation as a key sentencing principle. Finally, 
aggravating factors were referenced by the Crown prosecutor the most out of any 
actor, and victims had relatively high direct mentions as well.  
Punitive discourses are notable in that they are not exclusive to the new 
punitive turn, as they have existed since the creation of the Criminal Code itself. 
With this in mind, each type of punitive sentencing principles references a 
different informal discursive process or function, and this difference is determined 
by the way the sentencing principle is differentially interpreted by the actors in 
question and their current rhetorical goal. Denunciation, for instance, is only 
mentioned because it is required to do so via formal court protocols and this is 
because the interpretation of the court/actors is that it is ineffective in promoting 
the goals of the court and themselves (in this case, rehabilitative goals). Specific 
deterrence, in contrast, directly utilizes threats/warnings and personal 
responsibility discourses in order to strengthen its rhetoric and because the 
offender/accused person in these circumstances is framed/understood as being 
reluctant to follow through on the court’s rehabilitative ideals and therefore 
requires additional coercion. Protection of the public refers to the impact on the 
victim/community in order to rhetorically promote the potential harm caused by 
any release and to communicate outside interpretations/priorities that state that 
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sanctions are necessary in order to allow the public to feel safe. Finally, general 
deterrence is the exception as there is no informal discursive process mentioned, 
though this absence may be due to its similarity to specific deterrence and 
denunciation in the interpretation of the court. Again, there is a direct similarity 
between this analysis and Dugas’ (2013) work, specifically the emphasis on 
deterrence and denunciation and the possibility that judges pay “lip service” to 
MPR discourses (p. 117,121). Most notably, all of the punitive-based sentencing 
principles are utilized in Gladue courts in a manner consistent with MPR and its 
interpretive schemes. 
What is important about specific deterrence is that it is the only major 
punitive principle that mentions victim/offender/accused person characteristics, 
though these specific characteristics were broadly defined/conceptualized. 
Significantly, these broad characteristics are metaphorical and symbolically linked 
to rehabilitative discourses and orientations. Therefore, we can conclude that 
specific deterrence is interpreted as an aspect of rehabilitative ideals and 
principles; perhaps due to a belief coercion is able to enhance the effectiveness of 
treatment. In this instance, threats are present but are based around warnings 
about future leniency and related policies as well as rhetoric that implores the 
offender/accused person to at least begin the rehabilitative process. It should be 
noted that statements made off the record by judges and Crown prosecutors make 
it clear that, in their minds, the two most important punitive considerations of the 
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court are specific deterrence and the protection of the public. This prioritization is 
in contrast to Dugas (2013), who identified denunciation and deterrence as the 
most significant principles (p. 117). It is possible that he emphasized the number 
of such references rather than their correlation effects, as in this thesis 
denunciation was highly common in all cases regardless of the final sentence, to 
the point where it was deemed inconsequential rather than significant. It is argued 
here that denunciation, and general deterrence to a lesser extent, are only 
mentioned out of protocol as they have no rhetorical strength when it comes to 
deterring the specific offender/accused person or protecting the public in these 
specific instances.  
Rehabilitation, as a sentencing principle, is in utilized much the same way 
as described previously – in concert with interpretation-based frame-shifting  and 
appeals to the perceived ‘goal’ of the court. Those informal processes that are not 
used in this way can be used to reinforce neo-liberal, paternalist, or even punitive 
policies and sentences (for example, personal responsibility discourses that 
promote individual-led rehabilitation efforts). Similarly, other informal discourses 
(such as proof of rehabilitative claims) are used to directly engage with 
rehabilitative ideals in a more direct manner. In some cases these informal 
processes are functionally related to more significant factors and characteristics 
that speak to practical or formal concerns that are directly aimed at the 
rehabilitative orientation of the court and the Gladue principles. Actors, as well, 
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are differentially predisposed to rehabilitative discourses/ideologies in a manner 
similar to that of the punitive sentencing principles, above. Defense counsels, the 
offender/accused person, and their supports prefer rehabilitative discourses for 
obvious reasons. Additionally, they do not speak to ideological concerns or the 
Gladue principles except in a token manner, instead preferring discourses that 
emphasize practicality, need, and the likelihood of success as the main rhetorical 
tools. These cost/benefit and risk-based aspects are directly part of the MPR, and 
speak to adaptation-based strategies of modern states as described previously 
(Garland, 1996, p. 455-456). These processes are not always effective as counter-
discourses that emphasize past failures (spoken by the Crown prosecutor) can be 
interpreted as reasons to promote custody or more controlled/paternalistic 
orientations. In other instances, judges may be under the belief that rehabilitation 
is to be allowed in these contested cases only if there is a new change in the plan 
or if highly intensive (custody-level) supervision is applied.  
Much of the analyses relating to rehabilitative discourses also apply to 
mitigating factors, such as the way that Judges prefer practical concerns and 
court-based discourses over the Gladue principles themselves, and how certain 
characteristics and informal processes are metaphorically and symbolically linked 
to these interpretive schemes and are directly utilized to rhetorically shift their 
interpretation in a direction amenable to their overall goals. About the only new 
information with regards to this code-set is that victim requests for leniency are 
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presented and discussed as mitigating factors that can encourage rehabilitation or 
reduce the offender/accused person’s moral blameworthiness. Additionally, 
mitigating factors in this sense of the term are designed and interpreted as past-
oriented discourses that are based on the offender/accused person and their 
history/context. This rhetoric is designed to directly mention the Gladue principles 
and draw inferences to them prior to mentioning and expressing practical 
concerns. Judges and Crown prosecutors therefore interpret the Gladue principles 
as being expressly concerned with specific historical and background 
circumstances and their implied relationship to criminality. This interpretation 
leads to the presentation of such factors and events in the form of problematic 
discursive frameworks that objectify Aboriginal peoples and make such 
victimization and criminality seem intrinsic to them. This can be contrasted to 
how some judges mention the public perception of Gladue principles is as a 
blanket ‘get out of jail free’ card. This presentation of Gladue principles and the 
court is criticized directly by those judges and may lead to an emphasis on 
historical linkages which unfortunately create the previously discussed 
problematic discursive framework.  Collective trauma is recognized, but is 
required (by the Gladue decision) to be mentioned in relation to specific parts of 
the Aboriginal person’s history in order for courts to recognize how it had 
contributed to the criminal acts in question. Again, the presence of MPR 
orientations is what causes this contextualization process to develop into an 
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encompassing clinically-minded orientation that reframes these elements as 
‘risks’ and ‘needs’ such that it erases the agency of Aboriginal peoples and creates 
the previously discussed problematic discursive framework. 
As for aggravating factors, they are similarly symbolically linked to 
certain characteristics and informal processes, as well as being external in their 
orientation. That is, they are able to reference certain offender/accused person 
characteristics and frames as well as the circumstances surrounding the crime. 
These circumstantial discourses are at their strongest (rhetorically) when they are 
external and victim-based as they are more difficult to dismiss due to a lack of 
concrete or physical actors present. More generally, this discourse can also speak 
to the subject of treatment failures and the offender/accused person’s experience 
with them. These discourses are also rhetorically strong due to their associations 
with practical concerns, links to criminal/background histories, and emphasis on 
rehabilitation (or the lack thereof).  Surprisingly, personal responsibility-based 
discourses are somewhat uncommon here and are still more numerous than direct 
references to treatment failures. The only reason for this that can be discerned is 
that judges/Crown prosecutors either interpret failures and successes as being the 
responsibility of the offender/accused person or they do not blame anyone for 
such failures. That is, personal responsibility is not mentioned alongside this 
because they do not view any party as being responsible for it. In any case, the 
failures are still interpreted as being reasons to keep the offender/accused person 
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in custody unless there are sufficient alterations made to the plan. Again, there are 
disciplinary discourse/ideologies albeit in a more self-conscious or incomplete 
manner. 
Bail-based sentencing discourses follow much of the same conclusions 
regarding pleas and release concerns noted above. To reiterate, they are framed 
and interpreted on the basis of past rehabilitation (and failed rehabilitation) and 
the applicability/presence of personal responsibility discourses and neo-liberal 
disciplinary penology. This reflects conventional MPR ideologies and priorities, 
specifically priorities relating to the potential threat posed by the offender/accused 
person and the potential ‘risk’ and ‘cost’ of custodial and community sentences. 
To briefly summarize this section, one can say that discourse, individuality, and 
historicity are problematized differently in courts depending on the actor 
speaking, hearing, and referenced. These factors in turn alter the interpretation of 
sentencing principles on the basis of group interpretive schemes/norms, subsumed 
under general MPR-based utilitarian/practical concerns. As a result of this 
differential yet collective schema certain appeals or references are given greater or 
lesser rhetorical weight in the mind of the judge and understanding and 
anticipating this action is the primary way for actors to implement their rhetorical 
goals. Some of these discourses are reassembled and repeated to the 
offender/accused person in order to better explain the reasons for the sentence and 
to (hopefully) encourage them to adapt to these standards.  
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Therefore, when judges speak about the need to at least start rehabilitation, 
they are not just communicating (unconsciously or not) a preference for neo-
liberal disciplinary penality but they are also letting the offender/accused person 
know that these discourses and standards are what all future offenses will be 
evaluated and compared with. As part of this communicative and explanatory 
function, they and their supports are the ones who face both the blame and 
responsibility for any crime/treatment, and discourses to the contrary are 
evaluated on the basis of these supports’ access to resources, their characteristics, 
and past treatment histories/patterns. In practice, this system of evaluation is 
predominantly applied to offenders/accused persons in a clinical, ‘rational’ cost-
benefit analysis that looks at how likely a sentence is at reducing future crimes 
committed/suffered by that specific offender/victim. To put this as briefly as 
possible : courts have created an interpretive scheme that primarily concerns itself 
with practical matters first, and in so doing grants those related discourses and 
aspects the greater rhetorical weight. This problem is part of the reason why MPR 
is so strong an interpretive scheme, or it may have emerged due to MPR’s 
strength in the courts prior to this point. In either case, they are mutually 
reinforcing frames and ideologies that cause further escalation and lead courts to 
create problematic discursive frames of Aboriginal peoples. This pattern therefore 
illustrates a twofold process of the Gladue principles being indirectly distorted by 
the realities of the Gladue court setting/situation.   
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Table 11 : Discourse Analysis by Victim/Offender/Accused Person 
Characteristics and Sentence/Decision 
Much of what was said about table 10 applies to this analysis in that it is 
briefer than normal, it covers code-sets already discussed, and it only looks at 
particular cross-tabulations rather than each code individually. As for the intention 
behind table 11 and its analysis, it seeks to understand how certain discursive 
types may directly influence the interpretation and application of certain 
characteristics and their effect on the final sentence. In sum, it is interested in how 
judges reconcile the differing rhetoric and their application/interpretation in light 
of the final sentence. 
There are a small number of interesting sections of the table that should be 
noted prior to beginning the discussion/analysis. To start, the unstated alternatives 
were more likely to involve a joint submission, homelessness/poverty and general 
criminal/treatment history than ‘what is left unsaid’, which had more direct 
references to failed treatments, family issues, and mental illness. Discourses that 
subverted punitiveness had higher rates for joint submissions and lower rates for 
failed treatment history in comparison to discourses that reinforced the new 
punitiveness. Finally, negotiated discourses (in line with the previous analyses) 
were primarily used/referenced alongside joint submissions. 
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What is 
unsaid
Unstat. 
alter.
Implied 
threats/ 
comm.
Reinfor. 
of legal 
auth./ 
power
Reinfor. 
of New 
Pun.
Subv. 
of 
pun.
Restor. 
Just.
Comm. 
Just.
Situat. 
disc.
Neg. 
disc.
Direct 
disc.
Out 
of 
court 
disc.
Delib. 
on the 
record 
disc.
Joint. 17 26 31 22 11 25 2 6 10 38 60 7 16
Joint. (C) 44 43 66 33 12 52 7 8 49 76 89 63 56
Crown 4 3 3 7 2 3 0 0 3 1 7 1 1
Crown (C) 9 9 9 8 5 5 2 2 7 4 15 7 9
Def. 11 10 10 8 5 12 2 5 10 0 21 7 4
Def. (C) 22 24 26 16 9 17 3 7 23 9 37 26 25
Comp. 10 9 11 15 13 16 0 4 7 5 23 4 4
Comp. (C) 20 23 26 24 19 20 2 6 21 10 36 23 30
Prob. 16 22 27 18 17 30 1 8 10 22 38 5 14
Prob. (C) 45 43 59 31 25 44 4 11 43 46 76 56 68
Susp. 6 9 7 10 7 14 1 6 3 9 15 3 4
Susp. (C) 18 16 23 14 10 20 2 6 13 15 25 19 23
Fines  1 7 7 6 4 8 0 1 3 11 11 1 3
Fines (C) 8 9 14 6 6 11 0 2 6 13 17 12 16
Waived 6 2 4 4 5 13 1 2 3 7 7 2 2
Waived (C) 16 16 17 10 6 13 2 4 14 13 23 14 21  
(Figure 24 –Table 11a : Discourse Analysis by Victim/Offender/Accused Person Characteristics and 
Sentence/Decision, part 1)
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What is 
unsaid
Unstat. 
alter.
Implied 
threats/ 
comm.
Reinfor. 
of legal 
auth./ 
power
Reinfor. 
of New 
Pun.
Subv. 
of 
pun.
Restor. 
Just.
Comm. 
Just.
Situat. 
disc.
Neg. 
disc.
Direct 
disc.
Out 
of 
court 
disc.
Delib. 
on the 
record 
disc.
Addic. 5 4 3 1 2 8 0 0 6 4 9 16 1
Drugs 3 5 3 1 1 0 0 1 7 1 15 9 3
Alco. 10 7 2 1 1 4 1 0 5 0 22 13 6
Home. 6 16 4 4 2 8 0 7 19 1 36 30 13
Crim./Treat. 
Hist. 11 25 10 15 12 23 1 4 18 14 48 56 10
Rec. Hist. 2 1 1 2 1 2 0 0 7 4 7 16 0
Succ. Hist. 3 6 0 2 2 4 0 1 9 4 10 19 5
Fail. Hist. 28 18 10 7 13 6 0 0 12 2 36 17 3
Trau. 4 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 13 4 6 16 3
Phys. Trau. 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 3 5 13 1
Ment. Trau. 4 3 1 1 0 0 0 2 10 1 7 11 0
Fam. Issues 12 4 4 2 1 1 4 6 12 0 24 25 7
Comm. Fact. 5 1 2 1 0 5 1 16 5 2 11 20 1
Remorse 12 16 6 5 5 16 2 2 9 9 74 22 45
Men. Illness 15 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 6 1 16 21 2  
(Figure 25 –Table 11b : Discourse Analysis by Victim/Offender/Accused Person Characteristics and 
Sentence/Decision, part 2
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Though discourses that are left unsaid and unstated alternative sentences 
possess a marked similarity to one another with regards to the final 
sentence/winner, they are utilized and applied differently depending on the 
intention and desired goal – either for controlled treatment or neo-liberal 
rehabilitation. Though both of these discourse types and goals are aimed at 
rehabilitation and disciplinary penology, only one (what is left unsaid) seems to 
enact either regularly. The reason for this difference is based on the rhetorical 
power behind the two, and in this instance the rhetorical power is determined by 
the ability to speak to current possibilities rather than future hypothetical events. 
To be specific, ‘what is left unsaid’ has more references and symbolic meanings 
that relate to the current circumstances of the case in comparison to discourses 
relating to the unstated alternatives. This type of discursive application can also be 
partly determined by the current offenders/accused person’s characteristics and 
backgrounds. For example, the absence of particularly strong mitigating 
circumstances can be interpreted by Crown prosecutors and judges as reasons to 
treat the offender/accused person more harshly than otherwise. In this case, they 
prefer to utilize neo-punitive sentencing guidelines rather than paternalistic or 
neo-liberal ones. Therefore, the likelihood that these circumstances will continue 
and lead to future reoffending is what determines how rhetorical discourses 
relating to future offending will be applied. For instance, if there is a likelihood 
that offenders/accused persons will reoffend in the future due to a long-standing 
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drug addiction, than a more lenient (future-based) alternative-based sentence will 
be used rather than a more threatening (present-based) unspoken sentence. In 
addition to this conclusion, those offenders/accused persons who are interpreted 
as having a greater need  for rehabilitation but who are also likely to reoffend will 
receive both rehabilitation-based and controlling discourses (that is, paternalistic 
ones) as their specific circumstances are interpreted as fulfilling both the Gladue 
principles and the stated aims of the court in one fell swoop. Like all other 
discourses relating to background circumstances, these formations of 
rehabilitation, leniency, and unspoken possibilities are again based upon 
discursive frameworks that objectify Aboriginal peoples as being intrinsically 
victimized and without agency. Recognition of collective trauma does not 
necessarily other Aboriginal peoples, but if coupled with MPR ideological 
orientations and a lack of counter-discourses that embody and express its 
restorative aspects (such as the ACW or diversion agencies) then only certain 
objectifying and reductionist elements of Aboriginal peoples’ histories are 
considered, specifically histories that focus on seemingly intrinsic victimization 
and a lack of agency (Usher & Lawrence, 2011, p. 90). As a result, this process 
prioritizes the discourses that create the problematic discursive framework of 
Aboriginal peoples. Though they leave the possibility for positive change open, 
Crown prosecutors and judges are so mired in this racist and colonial framework 
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that the possibility of an Aboriginal person solving his own problems without 
government intervention seems impossible. 
To summarize, future reoffending and related sentences are determined in 
advance of the current sentence/case in question and designed in anticipation of 
potential offending/criminal acts on the basis of what the court interprets as the 
offender/accused person’s specific background circumstances and their likelihood 
for rehabilitation. These evaluation-based factors are called “criminogenic needs” 
by criminologists and government/court workers, but are more accurately 
described as being based on the problematic colonial discursive frameworks 
mentioned previously in the analysis (Hannah-Moffat & Maurutto, 2010, p. 270). 
It is partly because of the melding of MPR thought and the Gladue principles that 
this problematic framework is created; the predication on risk/need (from 
criminological and institutional standpoint) is combined with background 
circumstances relating to government policies (from a Gladue standpoint), leading 
to an overall framework that is only concerned with presenting Aboriginal peoples 
as intrinsically victimized and likely to reoffend due to long-term problems. This 
end result is a paternalist orientation that is just as racist and colonial as the past 
government policies that created it, particularly when implied threats/commands 
are combined in a way that disciplinary ideologies are referenced and neo-
punitive processes are referenced as deterrents and threats. 
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Legal authority/power and the discourses that applied to them were used to 
reinforce and acknowledge similar formal/paternalistic discourses and ideologies. 
When sentences were decided in favour of the Crown prosecutor’s 
recommendations, were effectively a compromise between the two positions, or 
had charges stayed/withdrawn, their legal authority/power was expressed as a 
functional discourse with both lenient and punitive aspects. There is no way for a 
court or Crown prosecutor to express only leniency without disassociating 
themselves from the court system itself. This reflects a fundamental understanding 
of legal authority/power as being always punitive in some way and intrinsically 
linked to discipline and discretion-based concepts and interpretations, and this is a 
side effect of the melding of MPR into presumably rehabilitative courts. Even 
when rehabilitative/lenient discourses are cited directly alongside such 
dichotomous discourses, they are absent any reference to the offender/accused 
person’s history and characteristics. This absence seems to imply that Crown 
prosecutors look to and interpret rehabilitation as a complete absence of future 
offending rather than the progressive, long-term type promoted by defense 
counsels (again, a product of MPR’s emphasis on risk and reoffending-based 
analytic frames). However, judges and Crown prosecutors do not interpret/apply 
punitiveness as in the neo-punitive model. In neo-punitive ideology, prison is a 
place for punishment rather than control or safety. Crown prosecutors and judges, 
as we have analyzed previously, are primarily utilizing prisons for incapacitation 
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and protection rather than to punish and cause suffering. More significantly, they 
are informed on the basis of problematic discursive frameworks (built upon a 
MPR-based reductionist viewpoint of Gladue-mandated recognition of collective 
traumas) that make prison and custody seem likely to exacerbate pre-existing 
problems. Again, this leads to the objectification of Aboriginal peoples and pre-
emptively interpreting them as victimized and without any agency. In short, 
Crown prosecutors interpret the neo-punitive turn as being inimical to their 
current MPR/utilitarian interpretation of custody and completely divorced from 
the rehabilitative ideals of Canadian courts as a whole. When they dismiss 
rehabilitation, it is only in the context of a specific offender/accused person and 
only because rehabilitation is deemed too risky or unlikely to work in the current 
circumstances. 
Though restorative and communal justice are differentially 
interpreted/understood by different court actors, their implementation are highly 
similar and often the result of a joint submission. It is possibly because of an 
ideological belief/support for rehabilitative orientations that makes these specific 
policies only applicable in joint submissions; specifically the lack of concerns 
about reoffending (from the Crown prosecutor) and an appeal to the socially 
inclusive aspects of MPR. In addition to interpretive differences and prerequisites, 
these orientations also require the presence of certain practical concerns such as 
outside organizations/family support, a stable treatment environment, and similar 
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elements. It is only when these practical supports are present that such 
orientations can be supported by the Crown prosecutor. Otherwise, the 
offender/accused person is directed to seek them out on their own. This evaluation 
and negotiation also requires input from the ACW in order for the Crown 
prosecutor to be notified of such resources and for there to be an additional layer 
of rhetorical pressure to pursue such policies.  Therefore restorative justice is not 
ignored by Gladue courts but interpreted and approached in such a way that any 
offender/accused person who does not meet their specific definition of restorative 
justice and who fits its practical and discursive requirements is instead given 
sentences that echo paternalistic or neo-liberal justice depending on the 
‘variables’ at play. This process may be because the Crown prosecutor and judge 
do not make a distinction between the two orientations, though in either case the 
overall goal is still identified as being somewhat rehabilitative. 
As stated previously, all discourse in court is directed to at least one major 
actor and often the judge is either the speaker or listener. What this code-set was 
concerned with was particularly directed discourses such as direct appeals to the 
judge, questions, and negotiations/debates. It is these discourses that can be 
considered the most important speech in court, as they are direct appeals to all of 
the rhetorical, functional, and symbolic elements contained within their discourses 
and ideologies. Those discourses and rhetoric that are not ‘directed’ are therefore 
only marginally related to these elements or are difficult to interpret/understand 
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on a consensual basis. In any case, these discourses are the ones deemed most 
significant and are understood the same way by all the court actors. Those 
victim/offender/accused person characteristics that fulfill these qualifications are 
failed treatment histories, homelessness/poverty, addictions, mental illness, and 
family issues. That these characteristics are primarily concerned with the 
offender/accused person and the colonial/racist discursive framework of 
Aboriginal peoples (that they are intrinsically victimized and without individual 
agency) is a clear indication that the main focus of sentences in a Gladue court is 
how the rehabilitative regime will be reacted to. These discourses/characteristics 
are also rarely debated in their applicability to the sentence, their 
relevance/importance to the Gladue principles, or possess particularly strong 
symbolic/metaphorical elements beyond simple reoffending principles. Taking 
into account the previous analysis with regards to interpretations and applications 
of rehabilitation and punitiveness in an MPR realm, we can argue that this 
rehabilitation-evaluation is partly the result of pre-existing standards with regards 
to how incapacitation is the primary basis of judicial sentences, particularly in 
light of new punitive legislation that reflects what Garland terms “denial-based” 
reactions (Garland, 1996, p. 458) 
To summarize, this final table analysis is primarily concerned with the 
positionality of discourse and how it affects the function, interpretation, and 
rhetorical strength of the court case as well as the likelihood that rehabilitative 
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goals will shift based on these factors and the consensus that emerges. In addition, 
this table also highlighted the encompassing effects of MPR and its unique 
problems when blended with the Gladue principles. There were also some 
problematic discourses (in that they are difficult to analyze) because they were out 
of the court/observation area, were too situated to be discussed except when 
reinterpreted/reiterated as a court submission, or were the result of formal court 
processes and their different conception based on the observers’ familiarity with 
formal court processes. Because of these variables and the inability of the research 
to address or examine them, it is difficult to tell when such common discourses 
are actually important. Despite this issue, this table did confirm much of the 
conclusions from the previous tables regarding the rhetorical strength of 
discourses on the basis of the positionality of the speaker of said discourses. Most 
notably, the most important factor behind the rhetorical strength of these 
discourses is their symbolic link to rehabilitation and their interpretation/framing 
in regards to it. Other related factors/elements to these discourses – such as the 
positionality of the speaker, external supports, and practical considerations – can 
serve to amplify the submissions or symbolize other related factors. Regardless of 
these variables, the overarching prioritization of discourses are based around a 
blending of MPR and Gladue principles; one that leads to problematic discursive 
frameworks of Aboriginal peoples and which seems to oscillate between 
paternalist and neo-liberal disciplinary ideologies due to the distortions it causes. 
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Transcript Analysis 
Preliminary Information 
 As part of the research orientation and protocol, the naturalistic 
observations (coded and presented here as cross-tabulated tables) were combined 
with transcript/discourse analyses of particularly interesting/relevant cases as well 
as interviews. The point of this transcript analysis was to provide greater 
contextualization of the previous observations as well as to mitigate the inability 
of the researcher to exhaustively record all of the speech made in the courtroom. 
Unfortunately, due to circumstances beyond the researcher’s control, not all of the 
transcripts ordered were received prior to the thesis drafting stage. Regardless, a 
total of 17 transcripts were ordered, encompassing 14 different days of 
observations and 11 different offenders/accused persons. However, because of 
delays in completing the order one transcript had the sentencing rationale omitted. 
As a result, only 16 transcripts are available at the time of writing, encompassing 
13 days of observation and 11 different offenders/accused persons. One of the 
cases in question is under a publication ban, so these values are reduced further.  
 Therefore, this section covers 15 transcripts, 12 days of observation, and 
10 different offenders/accused persons. In addition, one of these 
offenders/accused persons was a woman. Women offenders/accused persons were 
stated by judges and defense counsels as being more common in Gladue courts in 
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comparison to all other courtrooms – a finding supported by the Correctional 
Investigator of Canada and his 2013 Annual report, which noted that the 
incarcerated population has grown by 16.5% from 2003-2013, with Aboriginal 
peoples increasing by 46.4% and Aboriginal women increasing by 80% (Office of 
the Correctional Investigator, June 28, 2013). That said, the total numbers of such 
cases observed remained small enough that there were perhaps only a dozen full-
length cases that involved women Aboriginal persons, with perhaps one or two 
involving an active debate or rationale on the part of any court actors. Regardless 
of their sex or gender, the cases studied are a part of public record. However, 
ethical concerns are still present and the locations of such cases will not be 
disclosed and any direct citations will prioritize statements by judges and Crown 
prosecutors (that is, public servants) over other actors. In addition, the reader 
should be assured that the transcripts were ordered such that the final total would 
be proportional to the amount of observation done at each location. For similar 
reasons, this section will not be split amongst the transcripts and will instead list 
all the conclusions and research data as a single unified analysis. The primary 
goal of this section is to confirm the previous conclusions drawn from the 
observation notes/table analyses, as well as to explore any new information and 
conclusions with regards to speech patterns, sentence presentation, and stages of 
rhetorical discourse shifting. Major conclusions and relevant implications will be 
detailed afterwards in the Discussion section. 
201 
 
Surface Observations 
 The description of how transcripts are produced at the beginning of the 
thesis form the backdrop for this transcript analysis. The surface level 
observations mostly illustrated large-scale trends in the formation and 
presentation of discourse in the court context itself. Notably, the way rhetorical 
discourse is presented and issued as well as the ‘flow’ of court discourse and their 
different applications based on the current circumstances of the case.  
 The general conclusions from an initial analysis relate to the formation and 
order of the discourse as well as the general patterns therein. Most obvious is the 
highly regulated nature of court discourses that limit and control all speech – who 
speaks, what is said, and when. These elements must be taken into account when 
applying any discourse analysis theory, though they can also serve as further 
support/data for analyses that concern themselves with the controlling and 
dominating effects of discourse itself. In this instance, the formal processes and 
requirements of a court case manifest in different stages of discourse that alternate 
between long, usually pre-prepared monologues, or short back-and-forth ad-
libbed conversations. These two formats of discourse also have different 
goals/purposes, with one being purely rhetorical and aimed at influencing the 
opinions and interpretations of the judge, whereas the other is designed/intended 
for information-gathering and is metaphorical in its application of the facts of the 
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case. In either case they are both limitations on discourses as well as tools for 
increasing discursive power for some of the actors present, particularly the Crown 
prosecutors, defense counsels, and judges. In some instances the limitations are 
ones that compel the listener to speak, and this is primarily directed at the 
offender/accused person and any witnesses. It should be noted that these 
constraints placed upon speech is, in the context of courts, only liberating for 
those who already possess a privileged position in the eyes of the court. 
 A second conclusion about this initial surface analysis of transcripts/court 
speech is that not all speech is prepared/planned out in advance. Typically, this 
ad-libbed and hesitant speech (both submissions and clarifications) follow the 
definition of “ill-formed” discourse (Stubbs, 1983, p. 129-130). In this case, it 
tends to entail non-sequiturs and hesitant or halting speech patterns rather than 
misinterpretations or misunderstandings. These ad-libbed speeches provide 
unique information about the nature of court sentencing in that they often apply to 
those discourses that are designed to specifically speak to the major sentencing 
principles of the court. In addition, they are often referencing aspects of the case 
and the offender/accused person’s specific history that provide the most rhetorical 
strength to their case and thus reference characteristics or histories that are 
particularly relevant factors to consider. Therefore, the formality or preparedness 
of a discourse has no (direct) influence on the rhetorical strength of a case or 
appeal. The only rhetorical strength available is derived from the discourses 
203 
 
referenced and their interpretation and application to the court. That these 
discourses/conversations are also the most unexpected ones is related to this 
finding, as the questions and statements therein are often prompted by the 
discourses of their opponent or the judge. As such, a convincing 
answer/counterargument can both strengthen one’s rhetoric and weaken their 
adversary’s. Alternately, such counter-discourses may assuage/escalate the 
concerns of the judge and consequently promote community/custodial 
dispositions. 
 A third conclusion concerns the reasons behind a particular 
sentence/disposition. Outside of the conclusions drawn from the previous data 
analyses, the rationale behind a sentence is unique in that the judge will 
oftentimes directly talk to the offender/accused person and issue warnings or 
appeals to them regarding the crimes themselves. Without going into detail, the 
judge will sometimes explain how such a sentence is interpreted by the 
courts/Crown prosecutors, mention any potential harm caused by the crime as 
well as future problems that addictions or other problems would cause, and 
(rarely) explain alternative actions the offender/accused person could have done to 
solve these and other problems/issues. This is unique, as rarely does the judge 
speak directly to offender/accused person except when asking a question to them. 
Not only that, but this speech/discourse is directly intended as an informal social 
control process, the objective of which is to reduce reoffending and facilitate 
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rehabilitation. The judge will attempt to seamlessly fit this directed discourse in 
with a formal repetition of the sentence. No matter what, however, this general 
formation of the discourse is still a long, uninterrupted monologue that makes up 
a substantial portion of the transcript.  
 Lastly, judges make it a point to have a concise, detailed timeline of 
offenses/crimes and, if there are any discrepancies or omissions, judges will not 
hesitate to halt proceedings in order to ensure that all the details are accurate and 
confirmed. The timeline is seemingly significant to judges both for practical 
reasons and for interpretive/narrative purposes. Practical concerns mostly entail 
the judge confirming that the offenses were committed and recorded accurately 
(for breaches of probation/court orders, for instance) and to understand how 
quickly reoffending occurs and the lengthiness of the record. 
Interpretive/narrative purposes take this same data but use it to tie 
recidivism/offending to the possible background information, thereby attempting 
to create a clear pattern of criminality and to focus any rehabilitative 
goals/sentences such that they are able to prevent similar breaches from occurring.  
Detailed Observations 
 This analysis builds upon Stubbs’ (1983) discourse analysis orientation 
and his focus on conversational and narrative analyses. As such, the main 
analytical focus will be on what he terms “exchanges” (p. 29) as well as their 
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related features and structures (p. 131-136). Because this section focuses on the 
transcribed speech from the case itself some discursive shortcuts (on the part of 
the judge, Crown prosecutor, or defense counsel) will not be present or are hidden 
by the format used here. This means that, if not analyzed in concert with the 
previous data analysis, there may appear to be misunderstandings between the 
court actors and the intent behind their speech/actions. Similar misunderstandings 
were noted in the 1995 Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the 
Ontario Criminal Justice System as contributing to feelings of racial exclusion, 
specifically in the example of when a judge locked the doors to the courtroom 
during the jury address by both the defense counsel and Crown prosecutor during 
a publicized case of a police officer accused of shooting a black person. In this 
instance, a lack of explanation by the judge – who saw it as a routine courtesy to 
the counsels – was interpreted by the public as a deliberate exclusion due to a lack 
of proper explanation on his part (Gittens et al., 1995, p. 52-54).In addition, this 
analysis will also attempt to focus on major or unusual exchanges rather than the 
broader analyses described previously. One major type of discursive form noted 
in the observations and transcripts are what Stubbs terms “ill-formed” or 
“deviant” discourses, which involve incorrect or misapplied phonotactics and 
syntax, as well as grossly ungrammatical sentences (ibid., p. 129-130). A key 
element of ill-formed discourses is that they are quite commonly found in 
conversational exchanges and are routinely recognized, repaired, or otherwise 
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reconciled by the speakers/listeners such that the meanings are mutually 
understood. In the context of this research, ill-formedness includes these elements 
as well as speech wherein the speaker’s syntax is stated hesitantly or is otherwise 
needlessly repetitive.  
 Firstly, typical exchanges/conversations often involve ill-formed 
discourses and unprepared speeches that do not necessarily follow the [initiation], 
[response], [feedback] pattern except in certain instances (p. 29-30). This 
determination is based on the initiator’s interpretation of what the purpose of the 
conversation is. While some conversations serve the role of information-
exchange, others follow an adversarial trend where the purpose of the speech is to 
inform only. In these particular conversations, feedbacks or responses are neither 
wanted nor needed.  This formation of discourse runs counter to Stubbs’ 
definition of it, as he posits that the major focus of discourse is the act and 
notification of information-sharing as well as a study of how this information is 
presented/distributed/accessed (p. 30-31). It is possible that, in this instance, the 
person hearing the discourse (the offender/accused person) is not the one who is 
expected to provide verbal feedback, though he may be expected provide a 
different form of feedback via his actions (rather than discourse) or such 
statements may be discourses that are meant for future Crown prosecutors/judges 
to react to in response to the offender/accused person’s failure to act upon the 
information.  
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 A second finding is based on the format of a court case, as it often 
alternates between different stages of discourse based around the formal 
requirements of the court. It is only when the proceedings break with this process 
that the long, often uninterrupted monologues are changed into short, rapid-fire 
conversations/questions that are typically made up of ill-formed discourses. These 
conversations may be conventional exchanges, though this mostly only occurs 
when the interruption does not relate to the rhetorical goals of the speaker (that is, 
they refer to procedural elements or bookkeeping imperatives). At worst, the 
feedback/response is either absent or tepid such as a simple nod followed by the 
speaker continuing the monologue previously. Those formal discourses formatted 
as monologues are usually discourses and exchanges that permit/encourage a 
response/feedback/inform procedure, albeit only to allow for and encourage 
another long monologue. Though they may result in ill-formed or ad-libbed 
conversations, this change is rare and hence the likely reason why the respondent 
is hesitant in their responses or speaks ill-formed discourses. 
 Diversions are unique discourses in this analysis as they can be accurately 
described as an exchange writ large. Unlike contested/joint pleas or bails, 
diversions have little, if any, formal procedural discourses and related stages such 
as the arraignment/facts/submissions. Instead, they seem to represent large scale 
exchanges such that the inform/response/feedback responses track highly to the 
introduction/exchange/dismissal stage of the diversion. As a result, these case 
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types also tend to involve exchanges with ill-formed discourses, albeit to a lesser 
degree than in non-diversions. This is because, as described previously, the main 
factors behind such discourses are a lack of preparedness on the part of one of the 
actors. Diversions, being pre-planned and agreed-upon, are not only prepared in 
advance but also less adversarial, thereby reducing the stress and strain on the 
speakers and providing them with more time to think about their submissions. 
This difference thereby speaks to the differing interpretations and presentations of 
information in court and how an unexpected or unplanned submission/question 
goes against group interpretations of exchange and results in ill-formed 
discourses. 
 Narratives in the court setting generally take the form of the background 
report submission and the facts of the case. In both instances, there are abstracts, 
orientations, narrative clauses, results, and codas. Note, however, that it is rare for 
any evaluations to be expressly mentioned within the facts of the case. Though 
they are often implied via metaphorical or symbolic discourses (with regards to 
the sentencing principles) they are rarely directly mentioned during the narrative. 
In comparison, the following discourses – where the Crown prosecutor begins 
their submissions – do directly state sentencing principles with reference to the 
relevant narratives.  Though Stubbs primarily focuses on fictional/literary 
narratives, the analytical terms and processes he uses are still applicable to court 
narratives as well. In general, the formation of these narratives and their 
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omissions and emphases speak to the interpretive schemas of the speaker and 
colours their information-transmitting and information-gathering processes. In the 
case of the court, different parties focus on particular aspects of their narratives in 
order to create and emphasize rhetorical power via the formal and informal 
interpretive schemes of the court. These interpretive schemes are, in turn, based 
on the sentencing principles of the Criminal Code and Gladue principles. The 
sentencing principles and Gladue principles are, in turn, altered by the 
overarching interpretive scheme of MPR; as the Gladue decision influences the 
court, MPR influences all aspects of judicial decision-making and interaction. 
 The transcription process alters some of the discourses and communication 
present in the court case/analyses. Besides practical concerns regarding the 
possibility of errors and such, there are theoretical objections to the process as 
well. For instance, some entries and speeches made verbally over the court case 
are sometimes omitted from the transcription. In these instances, there are notes 
within the transcript that mark where these omissions occurred and their content. 
Notably, some of these omissions are of exhibits/evidence as well as off-record 
discussions that are audible to the observers but required to be omitted from any 
recording. Stubbs (1983) also notes some concerns relating to the recording 
process altering discourses spoken and the participants altering their actions to 
suit (p. 224-226). For the court setting, such transcriptions/recordings are 
mandatory, and there are often students or members of the public sitting in the 
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court. As such, we can be relatively sure that this effect has been mitigated as 
much as is possible. There are also concerns about the writing process and the 
possibility that certain discourses/speeches may have been transcribed incorrectly 
or had an undue emphasis placed on misspoken discourses or ill-formed 
discourses (ibid., p. 227). This is a problem that cannot be solved, as such 
recordings are not made privy to the public and recording tools are also not 
allowed in the court setting. Despite this issue, these potential theoretical concerns 
seem to support the idea of a pattern relating to the preparedness of the speaker 
and the topic at hand, so it can be affirmed that this factor is a sign of certain 
discursive processes rather than the result of the transcription process. Such 
discourses were also recorded during the observation notes before this analysis 
was done, which further supports this conclusion. In general, then, we can 
conclude that the theoretical and practical methodological concerns relating to the 
transcription process are mitigated as much as is possible in this situation, and 
they illuminate certain metacommunicative rules/norms that are otherwise 
unmentioned over the course of the proceedings. As for the relevance for this 
research, aside from illuminating possible methodological concerns, the 
transcription process itself is a type of information-relaying discourse albeit 
directed at future readers/Crown prosecutors, and actors demand to explicitly put 
certain discourses on the record in order to ensure that information is relayed to 
the appropriate actor. In this case, actors will explicitly utilize the recording 
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process as a type of discourse rather than view it as a constraint or condition that 
raises methodological concerns. 
 One other significant discourse that was not disclosed/included in official 
court transcripts are the off-the record discussions and questions between court 
officials and their peers and/or the public/researchers. Some of these discourses 
were private conversations relating to the case at hand, and their specific 
influence, form, and content were obviously not disclosed to the observer/public. 
In several other instances, the judge would directly ask the researcher – or other 
researchers present – about the nature of their observations and research as well as 
to answer any questions they may have had. These question-and-answer sessions 
were not present in any transcripts but still utilized past court events/cases as 
topics of conversation or to serve as contrasting examples of the issue being 
discussed. These discussions also took quite a bit of time – from 5 minutes to 45, 
with most taking about 10 or so minutes of court time between 
cases/offender/accused persons being brought up and prepared. While this did 
have methodological benefits – allowing the researcher to solve problems relating 
to the informants’ opinion of their discourse and reducing the need for interviews 
– the primary discursive purposes of this discussion was to inform actors not 
involved in the court system about its processes and primary goals. In effect, the 
same actors being studied actively solicited questions and analyses from the 
researcher and helped to alleviate some of the methodological concerns of the 
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research itself. Therefore, one of the discursive aspects of the transcript analysis is 
what it was unable to capture, and how these influences may have been rendered 
invisible to the surface analyses despite their likely influence on the research data 
and final sentence. These ‘invisible’ discourses were still recorded as part of the 
observations and provide valuable information about the discursive and 
interpretive process from the point of view of the informants themselves. 
 As a final point for this section, there are some particularly interesting 
sections and discourses present in the transcripts ordered that cannot be described 
in their entirety yet which should be mentioned in order to better demonstrate the 
inform-response-feedback process as well as the conclusions detailed previously 
in the data analysis. First, one notable case involved a detailed external 
negotiation/joint submission, which was eventually disclosed (partially) to the 
court during the submissions and which culminated with the judge’s agreement 
with the defense counsel and Crown prosecutor that “jail really has a limited 
function on everyone... but sometimes there is no option.” (R. v. Simpson, Aug 28 
2013, p. 17).  A different sentencing speech/rationale echoed many discourses 
made by judges when he stated that “[he] is not being sentenced for his addiction. 
He is being sentenced for the theft, and it should be a sentence that establishes his 
responsibility and deters him from just going out and doing the same thing again” 
(R. v. Livingston, May 15 2013, p. 23).  While this seems somewhat harsh and 
punitive (as it ignores that the addiction precipitated the crime), the same judge 
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later goes on to sentence the offender/accused person to a detailed treatment 
program and diversion while telling him that “[you] will not be judged harshly if 
he misses an appointment. He will be judged harshly if he smashes up car 
windows. So I appreciate that if he does have fetal spectrum disorder and he has 
not been diagnosed or treated then I am just adding to it and it is not the 
intention.” (ibid., p. 26). Another transcript explained that the risk of reoffending 
need not be absent, only that there not be a substantial risk based on their past 
record. This transcript, as well, echoed concerns/discourses that treatment failures 
are not grounds for punishment in and of themselves but that the court system is 
ill-equipped to manage them due to their preconceptions that breaches are serious. 
To quote the case: “No one expects that a program like this is easy or that – he 
may fail along the way [sic]. That is the nature of recovery. Our courts, of course, 
are inadequately equipped to deal with people who fail because we view these 
breaches as serious and have little tolerance for them. But we know, or at least 
hope we know, that recovery in dealing with these problems is a long one and 
there will be relapses along the way” (R. v. R. Sheppard, Jul 18 2013, p. 27).   
Still another sentence involved an incredibly brief sentence and rationale 
(approximately 1 page long) that resulted in a brief eight day stay in custody and 
no probation orders, to whit : “Judge : I am not going to put him on probation; this 
is, you know, just a waste of paper. Mr. Siopis : Fair Enough.” (R. v. J. Norris, Jul 
18 2013, p. 9). In these cases, the judges again echoed the shared perception that 
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some failures are expected and that the main concern was an escalation in 
addictions/offenses. While the first and last example detailed above (R. v. 
Simpson & R. v. Norris) were an express instance of discursive responses and the 
expected inform discourse from the defense counsel, the other examples cited did 
not include a direct discursive response or feedback. However, all these cases did 
engage with such feedbacks and responses via appeals to temporal aspects and 
actions (past records or future offenses) and in this respect they can illuminate 
these alterations to formal discourse analysis methods as well as serve as example 
of the preceding informal processes and subversions of punitive discourses. Most 
notably, these exchanges present significant points where MPR ideologies and 
policies were referenced (the need for custody to protect the public, and emphasis 
on ‘risk’ most notably) but later melded them into an orientation that aims to 
utilize court treatment orders as a way to enforce rehabilitative ideals and goals. 
This melding of punishment and rehabilitation is due to the unique melding of 
modern penal rationality and the distortions caused by its interaction/combination 
with the Gladue principles. 
 Only one of the received transcripts involved a women offender/accused 
person; unfortunately, there were little unique elements to this case barring what 
was described previously. Her status as an Aboriginal woman was not directly 
mentioned during the case nor were concerns or issues relating to the way this or 
related issues may need to be considered during the submission process (notably, 
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when examining any relevant background elements). At most, there was a single 
mention of the death of her daughter several years ago, and mentions of her 
confusing patterns of grief (R. v. Sampson, Sep 5, 2013, p.17, 20). While we can 
perhaps link the judge’s criticism of her behaviour (as a “grieving” parent) to 
social norms relating to gender roles, this was the only time during the 
observation period where these circumstances were present, so it is difficult to 
draw extensive conclusions from it (ibid., p. 20). What is significant, and follows 
with the conclusions reached previously, was in how the sentence was shaped in 
such a way that the long-term effects of incarceration were reduced as much as 
was possible; in this case, making the sentence short enough that she did not lose 
her housing and not restricting her movement in the community even though it 
may put her in contact with the victim/complainant (ibid., p. 22-23). Additionally, 
this lenient outlook was combined with indirect threats/warnings/appeals which 
stated that, were she to reoffend in a similar manner, she would face “a significant 
period of custody” and her housing would not be a concern of the court (ibid., p. 
23). It is possible that Aboriginal women are subject to the same clinical/practical 
MPR-based assessment as are Aboriginal men, and this leads to the perception of 
higher ‘risk’ that makes them receive longer/more custodial sentences than non-
Aboriginal persons. If so, then this is another recreation of colonial and 
Eurocentric conceptions of justice; in this case ignoring the differential treatment 
and harm received by different Aboriginal peoples and focusing only on past 
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historical instances of racism (in the form of government policy) rather than 
contemporary systemic patterns of discrimination. 
Finally, some particular transcript sections were made more interesting 
due to the fact that they involved an offender/accused person who was 
observed/recorded multiple times. In this instance, these repeat offenders had 
transcripts of their cases ordered because of a desire for the research to see if the 
conversations and discourses changed over time (in respect to the past 
discourses). Though the general trends tracked to the patterns and conclusions 
mentioned previously, there were some transcript sections that are particularly 
relevant in the way they utilize exchanges with respect to past actions/discourses.  
Unfortunately, not all of these repeat incidents had transcripts ordered/received, 
so these analyses should be understood with this in mind. The first noticeable 
trend was that certain offender/accused persons maintained similar sets of desires 
and priorities in their interactions with the court – one was eager to move back to 
his hometown (R. v. McTaggart, Jul 25 2013 and Aug 8 2013), and the other 
sought to get out of court/jail as fast as possible – even to the point of pleading 
without defense counsel assistance, twice (R. v. Hogue, Jun 14 2013, Jun 19 2013, 
Aug 8 2013, and Aug 28 2013). Though they each had some practical reasons for 
these desires, both made it a point to inform the judge about these as early in the 
proceedings as possible. Similarly, the judge did respond to and provide feedback 
with respect to these earlier appeals and thus subsequently built upon the pre-
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existing discourses. What is significant is that the judge’s response was in turn 
coloured by his own interpretive schema and positionality within the court setting 
rather than a simple response of ‘yes’ or ‘no’. For instance, he would re-
contextualize such discourses taking into account sentencing principles, formal 
requirements, and practical concerns in order to present new information or 
challenge the discourses presented by the offender/accused person. The judge 
could respond to a notification about housing concerns by claiming that such 
concerns are outweighed by the threat the offender/accused person poses to the 
public, and that it could only be dismissed if he were presented with a clear, 
supervised, plan of care. This would, in turn, necessitate a new response/inform 
statement from the offender/accused person or his defense counsel.  
This process repeated over many of the court cases over time, even when 
the defense counsel and judge were different. One of these offender/accused 
persons had five transcripts detailing progressive offenses, and the proceedings 
eventually culminated with an exchange where he appealed for leniency due to 
severe personal problems and incredibly harsh prison conditions, which was 
eventually countered by the judge and Crown prosecutor accepting such appeals 
while engaging in a new exchange – namely one wherein they asserted that 
specific deterrence and rehabilitation was no longer a consideration based on his 
long record and they consequently preferred denunciation, general deterrence, and 
the protection of the public. The specific exchange : “At a certain point specific 
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deterrence is just no longer a principle that can really be considered, but it is more 
sort of denunciation and general deterrence, as well as just protecting the public. 
Like, the community needs some reprieve from Mr. Hogue’s actions considering 
that in the past different types of sentences, be it rehabilitative, have just had no 
impact whatsoever on him. And at this point there really are no viable options, in 
the Crown’s submission, for anything like that.” (R. v. Hogue, Aug 28 2013, p. 8). 
As such, we can posit that this re-contextualization of responses is based upon 
shared interpretive schemas on the part of judges rather than individual concerns; 
specifically, shared interpretive schemes based on MPR and its predication on 
utilitarian and dehumanizing cost/benefit analyses. Furthermore, this process of 
reinterpretation is not present on the part of offenders/accused persons (or if may 
only be applied when the listener/judge has heard it before) due to their focus on 
practical concerns or a lack of discursive challenges to their interpretations. That 
is, offender/accused persons are the only ones who engage with these concerns (as 
they are specific to them) and thus have no outside interpretations of them to 
challenge/reconcile. The closest they get to this challenge is when judges respond 
to their desires in a negative fashion, but that too is based on the judges’ specific 
interpretations and concerns (predicated upon the submissions in question) rather 
than appeals made by the offender/accused person on their own basis.  
Therefore, we can conclude that the general exchange structure is still 
present within specific discourses and speeches – even across multiple 
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transcripts/observations – but that this process is informed and altered by rival 
interpretive schema and priorities. For judges/courts, this interpretive schema is 
based upon the rehabilitative ideal and concerns about the protection of the public 
and treatment successes. Offenders/accused persons, on the other hand, have little 
shared interpretive schemes and prefer to focus on their practical concerns instead 
(possibly because of unfamiliarity with the court setting) and this also indirectly 
leads to their echoing of the clinical and dehumanizing ideologies implicit in the 
MPR and an unfortunate reinforcement of discourses that may be contrary to their 
own desired sentence. 
General Discussion 
 Research relating to the punitive turn, both inside and outside Canada, 
have reached different conclusions and arguments than what was seen in this 
thesis. Of the theories discussed earlier in the paper, the ones that fit best with the 
conclusions found here are Moore & Hannah-Moffat’s neo-liberal punitive turn 
theory and Meyer & O’Malley’s theories. In this thesis, I found that the neo-
liberal discourse and ideology is present albeit still marked by a seeming 
reluctance to utilize associated policies (or at least an aversion to purely self-
directed treatment/punishment orders). Crown prosecutors and judges can and 
will order neo-liberal sentences/treatment orders wherein the offender/accused 
person is ordered to complete treatment under their own power and where any 
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blame for failures (past or present) is predicated upon their actions. This is only 
ordered when the need for rehabilitation is present but there are low reoffending 
risks and no outside controls/supervisors to monitor and assist the 
offender/accused person. The individual-based assessment is seemingly 
insignificant as these same judges will then go on to explain how these elements 
are due to circumstances out of the offender/accused person’s control, will listen 
to relevant mitigating circumstances and reduce sentences accordingly, and (most 
importantly) do not demand a complete or flawless rehabilitation and seek 
incremental improvements over time. In both applications and interpretative 
processes, the primary factor in the rationalization and sentencing process is how 
all Aboriginal peoples are framed and presented through a problematic discursive 
framework that makes them appear to be intrinsically victimized and without 
agency. This framework and sentencing process, rather than being an attempt to 
remedy the injustices of the colonial era, instead repeat the colonial and racist 
beliefs of the past (specifically, Eurocentric paternalism). As Green (1998) noted, 
much of the colonial era was concerned with labelling Indigenous peoples as 
potential threats to the colonial state while also replacing Aboriginal people’s 
cultural order and beliefs with those of the colonizer (p. 139-140). In this case, 
both the concept of justice and the erasure of Aboriginal people’s self-
determination are current colonial policies that are being repeated within Gladue 
courts. 
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More significantly, judges and Crown prosecutors across the research area 
are directly critical of the punitive turn and any legislation that seeks to promote 
neo-punitive policies. In effect, this research has uncovered a strange blending of 
neo-liberal and paternalist policies combined with a strong refutation of any 
further restrictions or amendments that make rehabilitation no longer a significant 
sentencing principle. The ‘balanced approach’ (according to Meyer and 
O’Malley) is what Gladue court judges want to enact, but due to strong punitive 
pressures and MPR priorities (notably on protecting the public) the actual results 
reflect the neo-liberal orientation identified by Hannah-Moffat & Maurutto (Pratt 
et al. eds., 2005, p. 85, 201).  Gladue courts are supposed to attempt to blend 
Indigenous concerns with colonial systems such that they remedy past injustices. 
However, due to the pervasive influence of modern penal rationality, and ongoing 
punitive shifts, there remains a preoccupation with objectifying discursive 
frameworks and a repetition of past interpretive schemes that continue to brand 
Aboriginal peoples as intrinsically in need of government control. Though Gladue 
court judges attempt to limit this pattern, the key elements of modern penal 
rationality remain embedded in the overall process such that all that results is a 
framework that prefers to implement a more ‘lenient’ version of existing 
processes that lead to much the same problems as before, particularly when there 
remains strong rhetorical links to concerns about the public. Many of the same 
problems detailed by Dickson-Gilmore and La Prairie (2005) mentioned earlier in 
222 
 
the thesis continue to apply, notably that “since judges are required to consider the 
nature and gravity of the offence, prior offense histories, and risk/need levels, the 
gravity of these factors may in some cases outweigh the influences on sentence of 
Aboriginality or any disadvantages associated with this” (p. 230).  These 
processes and the actual ideology behind the courts’ positions are left invisible to 
the offender/accused person themselves, and when they are brought up directly 
during the sentencing speech/rationale it can seem like the court has no clear 
ideology or motive behind its past decisions.  
It is only when we examine discourses and submissions involving the 
Aboriginal court workers and their discussions outside the court setting, as well as 
the differential treatment of the same offenders/accused persons over time, that 
we can begin to see the long-term interpretive and rehabilitative schemes that the 
court utilizes and how it is a melding of the rehabilitative ideals of Gladue, the 
past paternalist era, and modern penal rationality’s interpretive schemes and 
priorities. Far from being uncritical public servants, Gladue court actors attempt to 
implement their own rehabilitative regime that seeks to balance 
support/supervision with freedom/liberalism, all while following a clear-cut 
evaluation scheme to determine when rehabilitation is too risky or impossible to 
implement. This evaluation and prioritization is done on a case-by-case basis that 
is in line with pre-existing standards and concerns. This ideological orientation 
can be roughly described as ‘situated neo-punitiveness’, defined here as an 
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orientation where neo-liberal or neo-punitive policies are utilized only when 
specific circumstances or characteristics warrant it, with somewhat welfarist or 
wholly communal justice being selected to ‘fill in the gaps’ where the current 
mainstream policies are found lacking or have no ideological application to the 
case. Judges and Crown prosecutors attempt to utilize a rehabilitative, communal 
format whenever the risks and case specifics warrant it. If the specifics do not 
warrant it, then the sentence is ‘scaled up’ in proportion to the relevant 
court/Crown prosecutor submissions and ‘risks’. Particularly egregious neo-
liberal or neo-punitive forms are applied only in the most extreme of 
circumstances, and are otherwise subverted via the previously described informal 
techniques and formal procedures. Though modern penal rationality nominally 
assumes a dualism between rehabilitation and incarceration, Gladue courts’ access 
to alternative punishments and additional resources allows them to meld both 
types into a form that can both punish and heal, or which can rehabilitate while 
still keeping the offender/accused person excluded from the public/society 
(Dugas, 2013, p. 54-55) 
As part of this, we can also consider whether classical critical discourse 
analysis is still a relevant theoretical orientation in the context of this research 
thesis. Court actors of all roles are cognizant of their speech and its effects on the 
actions of the offender/accused person and their colleagues. More significantly, 
they are not uncritical enforcers of the disciplinary penology espoused by neo-
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punitive politicians and remain somewhat committed to a conception of past 
society that is wedded to rehabilitative ideals. In the Canadian context, past 
systems of penal or criminal policy were simultaneously disciplinary and 
liberating such that the final effect was one wherein arbitrary punishments and 
differential applications of discipline were enacted and used to support one 
another. The new form of punishment detailed in this thesis on Gladue courts is 
much more of a refinement of such past systems, with a focus on 
allowing/promoting the self-determination of Aboriginals and with a reluctance to 
enact any more supervision/control than is necessary. We conclude that, if utilized 
in a direct macro-level and adversarial manner, then classical critical discourse 
analysis is inappropriate and should only be applied to the general 
political/legislative trends rather than the actual application of them in specialized 
treatment courts such as Gladue courts. In contrast, modern penal rationality, as a 
derivative of disciplinary elements and thought, remains a valid area in which 
classical critical discourse analysis can be utilized to succinctly analyze and 
examine the problems and issues in the court system as a whole. Most notably, the 
way incarceration remains an express element of public protection, the overall 
focus on utilitarian/objectifying risk analyses, and the reduced (but not completely 
absent) support for alternative sanctions beyond simple incarceration or release 
(Dugas, 2013, p. 54, 103, 108-112, 133). This implicit and unconscious 
interpretive frame is what allows neo-liberal and punitive elements to remain 
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possible in Gladue courts and which later results in problematic interpretive 
frames of Aboriginal peoples that serve to repeat past colonial/racist injustices. 
Part of the research goals of the thesis was to uncover how certain 
legislative or normative influences can distort the fundamental application of 
justice, and how these influences can be indicative of neo-punitive or 
rehabilitative ideologies. In light of the data analysis and the preceding 
discussions, we can argue that these distortions and ideologies are linked such that 
legislative influences are viewed/enacted as primarily neo-punitive whereas 
normative/institutional influences are rehabilitative and disciplinary (to the point 
where paternalist might be a more accurate term). Judges and Crown prosecutors 
are predisposed to use their discretion and informal procedural processes to 
subvert legislation they feel is not amenable to their goals – primarily 
rehabilitation followed by protection of the public – and legislative changes are 
resisted on the basis that they would force them to follow punitive processes 
inimical to this ideology. Therefore, in contrast to the original thesis, distortions 
are not one-way (legislation-caused) but can cut across institutions and ideologies 
and can lead to rehabilitative, neo-liberal, paternalistic, and even neo-punitive 
sentencing rationales and guidelines. Significantly, these same judges also make 
little distinction between restorative and colonial justice and promote 
rehabilitation through non-Aboriginal sources as well as through Aboriginal-led 
programs. What is unique is that Aboriginal-led processes are often viewed as 
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nearly exclusively restorative whereas neo-punitive processes are exclusive to 
colonial/Canadian authority. In this manner, judges and Crown prosecutors are 
able to interpret the neo-punitive legislation and orders as being contrary to the 
overall goals and directives of the Gladue court and the guidelines within R. v. 
Gladue. This orientation can, in the future, provide potential support for both 
utilitarian-based crime reduction strategies and Aboriginal-based restorative 
justice regimes, potentially serving as a way to avoid current and future punitive 
trends through aboriginal-led sentencing alternatives. To quote Green (1998) 
again :  “Most would agree that the ultimate goal of any criminal justice system is 
protection of the public. Given the obvious over-incarceration of Aboriginal 
people, even the possibility of [sentencing alternatives] succeeding, by changing 
offender behaviour and deterring crime, makes their continued development 
important, if not crucial” (p. 163). 
 The actual effect of new legislation, overall, is likely to slightly increase 
imprisonment rates. In many instances, this increase will be applied to 
offenders/accused persons who would normally be subject to non-judicial 
sanctions and treatment regimes due to their drug crimes. However, in line with 
the previous conclusions, judges and Crown prosecutors will implement/develop 
new ways to avoid these restrictions or mitigate their power as much as is 
possible. This process of subversion is likely to raise its own problems and 
criticisms. Firstly, there are political problems relating to this subversion of 
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parliamentary powers and the use of informal and non-sanctioned methods to 
avoid such influences. Unless these informal applications are derived/based on 
judicial precedents from a higher court (such as the Gladue decision itself), or 
frame the new legislation as being inimical to pre-existing criminal 
legislation/sentencing principles and/or the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(Constitution Act, 1982), then these subversions can be seen as non-democratic in 
their methods. A second problem relates to the differential application of these 
subversive processes. Not all courts will develop the same methods and 
interpretations of the new legislation, so it is possible that some courts utilize the 
subversions as often as is applicable whereas other courts apply it rarely. The 
result, of course, is a Canada-wide increase in imprisonment rates and a 
differential application of justice based on the location of the court.  
Though Aboriginal offenders/accused persons are likely to still be affected 
by geographic considerations (due to community support or access to treatment 
centres/groups), this can further compound the court’s perceptions and reinforce 
the problematic discursive framework. This specific aspect of the framework is 
based on racist and colonial beliefs that reserves or rural areas are devoid of any 
supports or resources, and this again leads to an overarching racist identification 
of all Aboriginal peoples as intrinsically victimized and without any agency or 
ability to rehabilitate themselves.  In other instances, there is the possibility that 
courts will apply the punitive turn differently to certain offenders/accused persons 
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and reserve the most punitive sentences for them and for reasons that can be 
considered arbitrary when general sentencing trends are taken into account. As 
such, even courts that have created a shared interpretive schema regarding the 
applicability of the new punitive turn can still utilize it as a way to legitimate 
harsh sentences and orders that would otherwise be considered inappropriate. As a 
result, punitiveness would still be present, albeit reserved for only certain 
individuals.   
 Aboriginal offenders/accused persons are likely to maintain similar 
treatment/recidivism rates over time, excepting any new legislation or Supreme 
Court decisions. This research was not concerned with the effectiveness of the 
treatment orders and sentences of the Gladue court primarily because there was no 
time to do so, any reoffending was not divulged, and the ethical issues would be 
beyond the scope of a single-person MA thesis. As a result, the main focus was on 
the rationalizations and reasons for certain sentences and court orders. Those 
offenders/accused persons in a Gladue court who are not subject to geographical-
based racist/colonial discursive frameworks or are not regarded as particularly 
deserving of the punitive minimums will likely receive the same sanctions now as 
they did then since this legislation did not affect the resources allocated to 
treatment centres, and Crown prosecutors/judges still identify certain problematic 
individuals as being similar to offenders who cannot be rehabilitated. Therefore, 
those who will not be given access to treatment policies under the new punitive 
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regime are likely the same offender/accused persons who would be denied such 
sentences prior to the changes. 
 The overall effect of the new punitive legislation is to complicate current 
sentencing trends and principles in the short term and likely create more 
institutionalized offenders in the long term. This is dependent on all courts having 
implemented the rehabilitative regime in the same manner and their gradual 
development of similar subversive informal processes. If the new punitive 
legislation continues to accelerate, then these informal processes may no longer 
be enough to subvert the mandatory requirements and may lead to constitutional 
challenges from the Supreme Court. If the new punitive trends are developed in 
such a way that they cannot be subverted, then it is possible that a massive influx 
of offenders/accused persons will need to be sent to custody as these changes may 
prevent previous informal subversive processes from being applied in their own 
specific circumstances. That is, by preventing Crown prosecutors from subverting 
one mandatory minimum sentence (MMS) parliament may prevent them from 
subverting all mandatory minimum sentences (as they are all based on the same 
rationalizations and informal processes). Therefore, even minor legislative 
changes may have effects on sentencing trends and imprisonment rates beyond the 
specific offense in question. 
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 The main point to be made here is that this was primarily explanatory 
research and concerned with answering both ‘why’ and ‘how’, specifically with 
regards to criminal sentences and their rationalizations. The main new knowledge 
gleaned from this research was the way courts begin their 
rationalization/evaluation process and how certain discourses, arguments, and 
factors have more or less rhetorical power and shift sentences towards certain 
locations/orders. Even if this was already known, the Aboriginal-specific elements 
and the recent adaptations/subversions of criminal legislation have no real 
presence in criminological/sociological literature (or are so new that no 
observations have been done yet). These conclusions are of critical importance 
since they explain how the fundamental rules and regulations of justice are 
actually interpreted and applied ‘on the ground’ and, more significantly, how 
judges are reconciling competing demands from the judicial and legislative 
branches vis-à-vis rehabilitation and punitive sentencing principles. Research 
analyses of new legislation are useless without actually analyzing their effects on 
the imprisonment/crime rate. Similarly, purely statistical analyses of the crime 
rate are disingenuous if they do not look at the way new legislation is interpreted, 
applied, and enacted. This research is therefore an attempt to see how changes 
have influenced the actual application of the law and, in so doing, create a 
generalized theory of sentencing speeches/rationales and court 
perceptions/interpretations. While there are some ways to improve this research, 
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the conclusions here are still significant given the role and importance of the court 
in actually enforcing and facilitating the fundamental principles of justice.  
 Additionally, now that much of the problems of Gladue courts have been 
explored and their origins determined, we can begin to discuss whether or not 
Gladue courts are actually ‘helpful’ or a beneficial element of the currently 
existing criminal justice system. To put it briefly, Gladue courts have both 
positive and negative effects for the Aboriginal peoples who are subject to them, 
though we can say that the current form is more beneficial than not and has the 
potential to develop into something that is predominantly helpful and able to solve 
the problems outlined in the Literature Survey/Theoretical Framework. 
Though Gladue courts create objectifying and racist discursive frameworks, and 
they may indirectly develop orders/sentences that are more concerned with 
control rather than rehabilitation, they still strive to avoid the most excessive 
elements of the punitive turn and define-down ‘risks’ such that treatment-centre or 
intensive community-based sentences are preferred when incarceration would be 
counter-productive and exacerbate the problems already present. This process 
even applies in the context of bail proceedings, and can help remedy some of the 
problems Aboriginal peoples experienced in such cases prior to the Gladue 
decision. According to one of the judges observed “the Toronto Gladue Court 
addresses the particular circumstances of Aboriginal offenders at the bail hearing 
as an important part of considering ‘all available sanctions other than 
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imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances’ as s.718.2 (e) requires” 
(Knazan, 2003, p. 11).  Part of this process involves a recognition of “historical 
facts” and judicial “biases” alongside a concerted effort to grant bail even when 
other courts would refuse due to poor records, a lack of resources, or the 
perception of transiency(ibid., p. 12–14). These problems/concerns are sometimes 
remedied via the plans of care written by the Aboriginal court worker or the 
support networks they have connections to. 
Outside of the bail context, diversion orders and ACW designed plans can 
meet some of the requirements for truly restorative justice while also creating the 
conditions that can prevent Aboriginal peoples from being subject to the criminal 
justice system in the first place. Net-widening effects will remain a worrisome 
element even if these developments were to occur, though a continued emphasis 
on diversion can help to prevent the problems associated with it and create an 
even stronger sense of community and cooperation between Aboriginal peoples 
and Crown prosecutor or defense counsels. In time, hopefully these external 
elements and cooperative processes can help to reduce the objectifying elements 
of the court system and the discursive framework of Aboriginal peoples, thereby 
transforming Gladue courts into a system wherein pre-existing aboriginal-led 
resources and programs are utilized and strengthened while the Gladue principles 
are followed. Neo-punitive legislation would also remain similarly subverted, 
though potential refinements could emerge due to potential challenges from the 
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Supreme Court for much the same reasons as those behind the original Gladue 
decision. 
Future Research 
 Further research in this subject area is likely to emerge in the near future. 
At least two days of observation involved other student researchers attending at 
the court. Unfortunately, they only observed for a week or two rather than the 
lengthy observations made in this thesis. However, at least one of researchers had 
done observations at another court elsewhere in the country. In any case, there 
was a marked increase in Gladue court interest over the course of the research and 
it is expected to increase as academic literature on the topic begins to grow and 
criminological literature begins to focus on rehabilitative ideals in contrast to new 
punitive legislation. More importantly, as discussed previously there have been 
recent news articles and public concern about recent punitive legislation, thus 
making this study potentially more important in the long term. 
 Improvements to the research thesis would likely necessitate greater 
financial support inasmuch as it related to an expansion of the research area; 
specifically, through a blend of quantitative and qualitative analyses. Though a 
quantitative analysis can attempt to find correlations between the court orders and 
sentencing principles, they lack a clear relationship or interaction process without 
such qualitative aspects. This is partially the reason why the data analysis in this 
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paper made it a point to analyze the correlations/relationships and then examine 
these correlations from the standpoint of the observation notes (with all of the 
contextual variables they entail). Put simply, this paper sought to use the 
correlations/relationships between the codes/variables as a means to guide an in 
depth discourse analysis rather than replace it. With access to more financial 
support, an in-depth quantitative analysis could be performed alongside the 
qualitative analysis here. This would replace the current hybrid data analysis and 
allow the qualitative analysis to examine/reflect more wide-ranging trends within 
the sentencing process. This quantitative analysis could also incorporate trends 
outside of Gladue courts, thereby allowing for a more valid comparison between 
the two court orientations and allowing for a larger sample size overall.  
 Less financially onerous but still difficult to implement improvements 
could involve an examination of the more isolated and confidential elements of 
the informal processes studied here. Parts of the research – most prominently the 
creation of the Gladue report and confidential negotiations between the defense 
counsel, Crown prosecutor, and offender/accused person – were not disclosed 
directly to the researcher despite their obvious significance to the analysis. With 
greater accessibility, these elements could be explored in an ethical manner while 
also revealing the processes, meanings, and interpretations behind the more 
informal aspects of the court system.  
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 A comparison/companion analysis that looked at the same topic in the 
context of other specialized treatment courts, or even the general guilty plea court 
setting, would also be a massive boon to future analyses of this type. By 
comparing the different principles, interpretive schemas, and rhetorical bases 
between different court types we can better analyze the entire sentence 
rationalization process alongside the general reaction/integration of new punitive 
criminal legislation. Different courts are not guaranteed to react to these changes 
the same way, and may not even have the same views and formal priorities as 
Gladue courts. As such, this expansion of the research area can allow for the 
creation of a general sociological/criminological theory about court interpretation, 
discussion, and application of sentencing principles and the way new legislation 
(of any ideology) is interpreted and applied by courts on the basis of multiple 
geographic or sociological factors. 
 Finally, an ambitious or well-connected researcher can further improve the 
research by performing research/interviews with bureaucrats, department officials, 
or even politicians themselves. In this instance, the main point of this research 
would be to look at the creation of the new legislation and the main purposes 
behind it. This could be used to analyze the political perspectives of the judicial 
branch, how they expect legislation to be interpreted, and what forms of 
subversion are considered legitimate. While this would likely be polemical where 
any politician is involved, bureaucratic officials can provide an interesting amount 
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of information with regards to how the legislation was originally planned and 
designed – its main goals – and how it was altered through the writing/political 
process. In this case, the additional stages would serve to see how the application 
of the legislation differed from its original/current intentions.  
Conclusions 
 The main conclusions to be made are based on the data analysis and how it 
coincided with the research question and contemporary theories about the new 
punitiveness. For the most part, the main ‘extremes’ of discourse and sentencing 
in Gladue courts are diversions and protection of the public. Diversion is uniquely 
situated as a privileged discourse that requires court authority to be enacted but 
which, simultaneously, later rescinds this power and influence. Diversions also 
involve out of court controls and a focus on willing participation with treatment 
orders. In this sense, diversions are perhaps the greatest example of the shared 
communicative function of courts as well as the limitations of the critical 
discourse analysis paradigm. They are the primary sign that discourses in courts 
are not monolithic and judges/Crown prosecutors are amenable with limiting their 
power over individuals provided they are given some control over the initial 
formation; notably, they are also willing to counteract the disciplinary orientation 
of classical Foucauldian conceptions of justice. Most significantly, diversions and 
similar community-based treatment orders are expressly designed to create an 
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Aboriginal community and similar resources out of the disparate population in 
Toronto. In fact, one judge referred to the Aboriginal community in Toronto as a 
‘diaspora’, and wanted to utilize diversion programs as a tool for community-
building. In so doing, he directly referenced the problematic discursive framework 
of Aboriginal peoples and the objectifying colonial/racial perceptions that 
Aboriginal peoples in an urban setting are intrinsically alienated and need 
government support in order to create their own communities since they are 
without their own agency. Again, this framework is just recreating past racist and 
colonial policies under the guise of rehabilitation and restoration.  
This effect is also amplified by criminological studies which do not 
objectify Aboriginal peoples as much but still utilize the same terminology and 
present solutions to urban Aboriginal issues that are predicated upon hierarchal or 
government-led intervention and programs (Corrado & Cohen, 2011, p. 158, 169-
170). Protection of the public is the other extreme discourse and it advocates 
custodial sentences and needs little other supporting punitive concerns. Protection 
is expressly mentioned as one of the main sentencing principles of the courts, 
beyond the formal requirements of the Criminal Code. Other punitive principles 
are not mentioned alongside protection of the public because it alone is usually 
sufficient reason for a custodial sentence and, excepting specific deterrence, are 
usually stated only out of an obligation to include such concerns in the 
submissions. Sentencing alternatives outside of the formal court system, except 
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diversion, are ignored in Gladue courts and are only beginning to be addressed 
despite their ability to utilize stronger community ties to reduce reoffending and 
crime over the long term, thus meeting both concerns about public protection and 
calls for restorative and effective justice (Green, 1998, p. 162). 
 Diversions are also unique in their formation and descriptions within 
Indigenous justice literature. As noted earlier in the thesis, one of the most 
promising elements of diversion programs (specifically, the CCP) is in its ability 
to create community bonds that can prevent recidivism and create communities 
where Aboriginal peoples can directly connect and support one another, ideally 
remedying some of the problems that urban Aboriginal peoples deal with (Proulx, 
2003, p. 192). The main issue, from a theoretical standpoint, was in their ability to 
maintain distance from the Canadian criminal justice system such that the 
program would not be subordinated to them and indirectly echo the same 
discourses, ideologies, and injustices (Dickson-Gilmore & La Prairie, 2005, p. 95-
96). In this respect, diversion programs within the Gladue context are able to meet 
these demands quite frequently since they are as separate from judicial input as 
possible and are expressly presented and enacted in a cooperative and non-
adversarial manner. In addition, judges and Crown prosecutors do have similar 
goals to the CCP (creating/strengthening communities, providing local support, 
and keeping Aboriginal peoples out of the purview of the criminal justice system 
if possible) but this is the result of the court mirroring their concerns rather than 
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the diversion project being subordinated to them. The problematic discursive 
framework of Aboriginal peoples is also limited somewhat by diversion programs 
as they do not require such information to be presented or submitted in a public 
manner, if at all. In some instances, a brief conversation about past actions in the 
court system is enough to convince a Crown prosecutor to allow for a diversion 
attempt. In any case, the general intentions still mirror colonial/racist biases of 
inherent Aboriginal instability, though in this case this concern is noted by 
Indigenous theorists such as Craig Proulx and his identification that “racist 
interpretive repertories deriving from the colonial period and continuing today 
through policies, laws and legal practices” (Proulx, 2003, p. 187). Though these 
racist interpretations are supposed to be avoided via the CCP/diversion, they are 
still present and embedded in the court processes that allow for such diversion 
sentences. Regardless, diversion procedures and their integration with formal 
court actors and activities are one of the major differences between Gladue courts 
and other court types, and they are capable of limiting the problems of 
mainstream court processes while also rectifying issues of 
punitiveness/rehabilitation (through the side-stepping of the sentencing and trial 
process altogether). 
 Both diversions and protection-based custodial conditions reflect modern 
penal rationality in an unconscious manner, particularly from its utilitarian/cost-
benefit standpoint and risk-based assessments (Dugas, 2013, p. 59-61). The 
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Gladue court has therefore followed what Garland terms “adaptation” strategies 
insomuch as they have redefined the effectiveness of the law from the standpoint 
of reducing the burden on the system in all but extreme instances (Garland, 1996, 
p. 450, 458). It is because of these interpretive frames that the colonial and racist 
discursive framework of Aboriginal peoples is formed, and is further reinforced 
by a misinterpretation of the Gladue principles. This combination thus results in a 
framework of Aboriginal peoples being intrinsically victimized and in need of 
further government intervention, hence leading to paternalist orientations 
identified in the paper. To be specific, through MPR-based interpretive schemes 
of risk and Gladue-based priorities to avoid prison, Gladue courts have created a 
system where Aboriginal peoples are automatically considered in need of 
intensive supervision and rehabilitation when they would otherwise be given short 
custodial sentences only. This system thus leads to these persons being placed in 
both in the control of the criminal justice system yet inside a rehabilitative 
framework. As a result, we can conclude that the stated purpose of Gladue 
principles is being undermined by modern penal rationality and distortions created 
by it. These distortions limit the ability of Gladue courts to actually implement 
restorative justice, though some sentences and cases do create something that is 
akin to the overall Gladue goals, albeit coloured by colonial discourses and 
frameworks and only when MPR-based concerns are not present or are limited to 
weaker punitive sentencing principles (general deterrence and denunciation, 
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primarily). Neo-punitive legislation is mitigated in its effects due to Gladue 
court’s focus on MPR and rehabilitation, and mandatory minimum sentences are 
avoided through informal processes or only applied to those offenders/accused 
persons who would’ve received similar sentences prior to the changes. Therefore, 
the MPR-based frameworks that distort the Gladue principles and their stated 
aims are also the ones that lead Gladue courts to resist neo-punitive principles; the 
same utilitarian and risk-based analyses that lead to the objectification of 
Aboriginal peoples and which encourages paternalist and neo-liberal sentences are 
the same ones which are used to counter the predominance of custodial sentences 
and mandatory fines that are considered impractical or otherwise a waste of 
resources. 
 Rehabilitative and punitive discourses are used as rhetorical tools to shift 
the final sentence towards or away from the rehabilitative ‘starting point’. When 
sentencing principles are expressly mentioned, it is to shape the way other 
submissions are interpreted by all court actors. When rehabilitation is 
enacted/allowed, then the discourses/sentences involved tend to give some of their 
control/power over to other outside organizations with veto power given to the 
court (though never once utilized). Similarly, when rehabilitation/diversion is 
allowed then the court proceeding becomes less controlling and formal in order to 
encourage the offender/accused person. In contrast, protection of the public is 
such a strong punitive discourse as it speaks to the most severe consequences of 
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failure as well as the most practical concerns of safety and ‘risk’. As far as court 
actors are concerned, the main role of courts is congruent with these perspectives; 
courts are to protect society without reference to other external demands.  
Analyses of cases where the judge agrees with the Crown prosecutor’s 
disposition/preferred sentence support these conclusions, as they have high levels 
of all sentencing principles but fewer references to general deterrence or 
denunciation than other results. Those cases that involve many instances of all 
sentencing principles (punitive or not) can be considered rhetorically ‘close-
fought’. General deterrence and denunciation can be therefore considered weak 
punitive factors that are not mentioned when stronger punitive factors are 
available (specific deterrence, aggravating factors, and most significantly, 
protection of the public). If a case only involves weak punitive principles 
(denunciation and general deterrence) then the defense counsel is likely to ‘win’. 
However, if the case involves some of the stronger punitive factors as well as 
some rehabilitative factors, then a compromise sentence will likely be applied. If 
the case involves the strong punitive factors and is ‘close-fought’, then the 
sentence is likely to be the one requested by the Crown prosecutor. Therefore, 
references to the protection of the public alone is often enough to overwhelm 
rehabilitation-focused rhetoric; again, this is supported by Dugas’ (2013) analysis 
of Gladue decisions, specifically his analysis that “the need to protect the public 
above all has a strong neutralizing effect on section 718.2 (e)’s directive to utilize 
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alternatives to imprisonment (p. 105).  Conversely, cases that resolved with a joint 
submission and/or diversion had incredibly few references to any sentencing 
principle, and these cooperative elements are also somewhat practical in that they 
reflect a desire for a quick or efficient court system (rather than one focused on a 
few narrow sentencing principles). 
 With regard to victim/offender/accused person characteristics, as well as 
criminal/treatment history, these elements are generally the main methods by 
which the problematic discursive framework of Aboriginal peoples is created and 
are based around background histories and government-designed analyses of 
‘risk/need’. In both instances, the victim’s characteristics are rarely disclosed or 
mentioned. These clinical and historical events/descriptions are used to provide 
legitimacy to the idea that the sentence is actually taking the systemic and overt 
colonial policies of the past into account but are, in reality, just recreating them in 
a different context. Similarly, criminal/treatment history is clinical in orientation 
and used to identify their chances of reoffending. More local personal histories 
may even be counter-productive if a non-custodial sentence is sought, as 
references to urban life and developments may implicitly lead the court to become 
concerned with fears of ‘control’ or employment and hence prefer to contain 
Aboriginal peoples rather than risk releasing them back to the public (Dickson-
Gilmore & La Prairie, 2005, p.32-34). Regardless of their ideological origins and 
discursive formation, these elements tend to be the basis of all offender/accused 
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person characteristics and are primarily relational/metaphorically linked to one 
another. This is the primary means by which the problematic discursive 
framework of Aboriginal peoples is created and reinforced, as well as the means 
by which racist and colonial biases are embedded into the court sentencing and 
rationalization process. This framework is therefore able to connect multiple 
aspects together such that historical and background elements that relate to 
Gladue-based issues of collective trauma are reinterpreted through MPR processes 
into narratives that objectify Aboriginal peoples as a whole. The application is 
such that mention of any trait or history can, when linked to Aboriginal peoples, 
lead listeners to automatically apply/consider other histories and events via the 
creation of embodied metaphors between the different discourses. This is because 
the primary interpretation of Aboriginal history and peoples in the court is based 
upon government policies and procedures, and as such the same interpretive 
frameworks (where Aboriginals are objectified and without agency) are mirrored 
and altered in a paternalist fashion.  
In the court context, these histories and elements can also be considered 
the discursive category of ‘mitigating factors’, though not all mitigating factors 
are considered part of the framework. For instance, references to stolen objects 
being recovered/surrendered or a decrease in offending severity can be part of 
mitigating factors without necessarily being linked to the framework. Some 
characteristics/events are barely mentioned during a sentencing despite their 
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correlation with the final result, and these characteristics are the ones with the 
most links/relations to other characteristics (which are stated explicitly, instead). 
This trend is possibly unconscious and judges don’t realize they are only speaking 
of certain characteristics because the discourse pattern and interpretive schemes of 
the court makes these characteristics the ones considered most relevant. 
Alternately, they may be deliberate omissions due to rhetorical desires and 
prerogatives such as an explicit desire to mention particular characteristics as they 
are interpreted as having particular relevance to the Gladue principles. These 
‘particularly relevant’ characteristics/events are part and parcel of MPR’s 
practical outlook and are clinical and objectifying in orientation, thus 
recontextualizing genuine recognition of collective traumas into harmful 
objectifying and racist discursive frameworks. 
 Subversions and reactions to new punitive legislation, particularly changes 
to the VFS and drug charges, highlight both the primary goals and sentencing 
principles of the Gladue court as well as the creation of shared interpretive 
schemes and actions. This change and subsequent adaptation was nearly invisible 
and the actions themselves were seamlessly integrated into the actual proceedings. 
For example, minor fines would be surreptitiously applied to cases where before 
they were waived, payment dates would be extended pre-emptively by the judge, 
and Crown prosecutors would reference their discretion in prosecution prior to 
stating their preferred sentence. In all instances, this shared discourse and 
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ideology emerged almost immediately and was nearly invisible to any observer 
unfamiliar with past methods or the recent policy changes. Even outside of this 
context, off-the record discourses and questions with the judges confirmed that 
many felt that the primary reason for these changes to be resisted was for 
practical/utilitarian reasons rather than due to a preference for rehabilitation. The 
phrase ‘like drawing blood from stone’ was made by one judge off the record in 
reference to the VFS, and even the most frequent repeat offender would have the 
fine waived if he was likely incapable of paying. Despite these concerns, those 
offender/accused persons who would have received similar sanctions or 
punishments prior to the changes would not be subject to such subversions. For 
instance, an offender already subject to a long custodial sentence, or one who 
would be expected/able to pay reparations, would not receive such leniency. 
 These findings must be taken into account when we consider the role of 
the disciplinary society in the research and settings. For judges and Crown 
prosecutors, the disciplinary system is not consciously accepted but is actively 
challenged when the new punitiveness (or retributive) ideologies are encountered, 
whereas any unconscious disciplinary elements are accepted but limited by the 
more overt Gladue principles. In this sense, the sentencing is in itself a sign of 
discursive conflict between the judiciary and legislative realm. In the context of 
the Gladue court, only public safety/tertiary grounds are able to invite this sort of 
debate, as well as the offenders/accused person’s acceptance of disciplinary and 
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neo-liberal/conservative ideologies. However, when punitiveness is 
reinforced/supported by neo-liberal discourses it is also sometimes subverted via 
Crown discretion and negotiations/joint submission. Subversion and resistance is 
therefore also the purview of defense counsels as well as Crown prosecutors and 
judges, who sometimes base such resistance on personal responsibility discourses 
that are emblematic of neo-liberal policies. With regards to these specific 
discourses, a closer look shows these discourses to be appeals to put forth a bare 
minimum of effort and the ultimate goal is to get them back into public life. The 
neo-liberal policy is also rarely enacted or applied in a ‘pure’ manner – Crown 
prosecutors and judges do not expect a complete rehabilitation, and are eager to 
have outside, meaningful, support for the offender/accused person. Though these 
alterations are partly the result of practical concerns due to addictions, judges and 
Crown prosecutors are still reluctant to order an offender/accused person to 
engage in any treatment order without some outside support. In this sense, the 
neo-liberalism and retribution are countered by a paternalistic ideological 
orientation and a utilitarian interpretive scheme derivative of modern penal 
rationality. Diversion is a disposition that represents this sort of combination, and 
it can be considered the first stage of punitive subversions. Diversions aim to 
place a treatment-centric sentence outside the purview of the criminal justice 
system itself while still allowing for some measure of accountability if there are 
failures. Diversions are also individualized and designed specifically for each 
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offender/accused person, ideally in such a way that the problematic discursive 
framework of Aboriginal peoples is limited and the Aboriginal person in question 
retains their individuality, self-determination, and individual values and beliefs.  
 A key point to be made here and across the entire thesis research paper is 
that judges and Crown prosecutors interpret rehabilitation and punitiveness in 
different ways based on the rhetoric and characteristics of the offender/accused 
person as they relate to potential threats to the public. However, they are always 
against neo-punitive trends unless there is absolutely no chance of rehabilitation. 
This interpretation and understanding of rehabilitation directly echoes past 
paternalistic and neo-liberal policies as a result of modern penal rationality and its 
melding/interaction with the Gladue principles. Though there is still some validity 
to critical discourse analyses, the overall trend here is that custody (the most 
intensive disciplinary sentence) is only applied when there are no other 
alternatives or there are risks to the public. In this sense, disciplinary discourses 
are elements that judges and Crown prosecutors are cognizant of and are only 
implemented as a last resort, instead utilizing more liberal discourses and controls. 
The most common disciplinary elements in the final assessment are the overall 
interpretive schemes of MPR and the way that problematic discursive frameworks 
emerge from their interaction with the Gladue principles. Sureties, family 
members, and other related supporting actors are partly referenced and utilized as 
part of the more disciplinary elements/sentences, and they also help to assuage 
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concerns about reoffending. In effect, the disciplinary state can enlist members of 
the public in order to avoid applying state actors or resources. In this manner, both 
the rehabilitative and controlling aspects of a sentence are enhanced.  
Punitiveness, as a concept, is also approached differently depending on the 
actors involved. Judges/Crown prosecutors see it as an external element that 
should be utilized as a last resort, but can sometimes use it as a part of deterrent 
rhetoric. Offenders/accused persons, on the other hand, see it as an internal court 
factor that is partially acknowledged by them but which can only be discussed in 
respect to outside actors and incidents such as their own background or treatment 
histories. Both groups, therefore, seek to create/allow for a rehabilitative sentence. 
These rehabilitative sentences require the withdrawing of legal power and control, 
as well as a distancing of such influences from the treatment regime itself even 
when there is a possibility for recidivism. This perspective was sometime voiced 
directly by judges who felt that prison/custody would hamstring rehabilitative 
attempts – in one instance, saying that “the only tools that the court really has is to 
basically incapacitate you, put you in jail, because otherwise you just do not listen 
to courts...I think everybody has really been trying to be really creative with 
dealing with your matters but yet you keep breaching court orders” (R. v. 
McTaggart, Jul 25 2013, p. 14-15). From a discursive standpoint, rehabilitation is 
more than a continuum of possible sanctions; it is also a discourse that can be 
communicated by multiple actors each with their own formal and interpersonal 
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requirements for punitiveness. As part of this friction between rehabilitation and 
punitiveness, judges and Crown prosecutors have instead applied/created their 
own ideologies and interpretive schemes to create a system that is most amenable 
to their perceived goals. These new creations/adaptations can be generally 
subsumed under the same analytical frameworks that support MPR and its 
utilitarian orientation. Therefore, judges do not reconcile the new punitive and 
rehabilitative discourses as much as they choose when to wholly apply one or the 
other. In this case, reserving punitiveness for specific problematic offenders or 
when a formal alternative is unavailable. In practice, this leads to a process 
whereby the punitive turn has simultaneously given Crown prosecutor and judges 
less power by removing their ability for discretion while also forcing any attempts 
at rehabilitative sentences to require a direct subversion of punitive legislation 
altogether. The overall effect is that sentences are being drawn towards far 
extremes of leniency and harshness rather than creating a blanket increase in 
punishment as it was originally designed to do. 
 To summarize the entire thesis analysis, there are 4 main elements unique 
to Gladue courts and which emerge as a result of the Gladue decision and the neo-
punitive turn. Firstly, there is an implicit focus on modern penal rationality and its 
interpretive schemes which causes unique distortions with regards to both Gladue 
priorities and neo-punitive processes. Primarily, MPR in Gladue courts takes the 
form of an overarching framework concerned with practical/clinical 
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interpretations and concerns and an emphasis on risk and the importance of public 
safety. This interacts with the Gladue principles to create a framework that 
emphasises rehabilitation as a ‘default’ sentence which is scaled in proportion to 
the perceived ‘risk’ the offender/accused person poses to the public.  
Secondly, when the background circumstances of an Aboriginal person is 
brought up in court, the MPR terminology and process creates/presents a 
problematic discursive framework of Aboriginal peoples wherein they are only 
presented as being a series of past injustices and misfortunes, thereby framing 
them as intrinsically victimized. This problematic discursive framework serves to 
promote colonial/racist sentences wherein an Aboriginal person is perceived to 
‘require’ government intervention in order to help them be rehabilitated and avoid 
reoffending, ignoring the possibility for restorative justice and emphasizing a 
paternalist ideological orientation reminiscent of the past colonial era.  
Third, the Aboriginal court worker is uniquely situated within the Gladue 
context and has an overall ‘invisible’ effect on the proceedings due to their work 
occurring behind the scenes or in forms not disclosed to the public. Even in these 
circumstances, they are able to present counter-discourses to punitive sentencing 
principles and MPR-based concerns that help to mitigate some of the above 
problems/distortions through uniquely Aboriginal-designed programs and 
perspectives.   
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Finally, and related to the first point, Gladue courts are actively resisting 
the punitive turn on the basis of both practical concerns and rehabilitative ideals; 
primarily MPR-based redefinitions of court sentencing principles (protecting the 
public and cost-effective positivistic justice) and the Gladue emphasis on 
explicitly avoiding custody whenever it is reasonable. In either instance, neo-
punitiveness is subverted through informal protocols and procedures that adhere 
to the letter of the law/court but which are used to avoid the most contentious 
changes and developments. These adaptations are created in a cooperative fashion 
with all court actors and are gradually integrated seamlessly into the overall court 
interaction process. 
 The key premise behind all of these elements and themes is the way both 
MPR and the Gladue principles act as overarching interpretive schemes that 
encourage rehabilitation in a controlled setting and only when it is ‘reasonable’. 
This orientation is in conflict with neo-punitive legislation/changes since such 
policies do not allow for any evaluations of ‘reasonableness’ and are ideologically 
opposed to rehabilitation. Because of the demands of such policies, Gladue courts 
are doubly opposed to the new changes and primarily resist them on grounds of 
practicality and simple utilitarianism, followed by more historical and restorative 
factors promoted by the Gladue principles. As a result of this preference and 
historical sentencing trends, Gladue courts inadvertently focus on characteristics 
and histories that are predominantly based around victimization and a lack of 
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agency on the part of the Aboriginal person in question. Collectively, this focus 
overwhelms other background elements and can misinterpret otherwise 
humanizing and restorative processes since such narratives and factors speak most 
strongly to the practical and risk-based concerns of MPR, eventually subsuming 
all other background elements into the overall scheme. This leads to the 
problematic colonial discursive framework of Aboriginal helplessness and 
intrinsic criminality being created and supported while neo-punitive policies are 
refuted and counteracted. The main benefit of Gladue courts is that some actors, 
notably the Aboriginal court worker and the support workers they can ‘enlist’, can 
not only build/support Aboriginal communities in order to prevent such histories 
and crime from occurring but can also counteract these objectifying narratives, 
refute the misinterpretation of otherwise empowering histories, empower the 
Aboriginal person in question, and inject more humanizing or personal 
background circumstances into the court and criminal justice system overall.   
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Appendix A : Code-Sets Used (Comments in Brackets) 
I. Court Location 
o 1000 Finch (Covered the entirety of each document) 
 By Case (Each case/change of court focus was coded 
individually) 
o College Park 
 By Case 
o Old City Hall 
 By Case 
o All Cases (All three of the above ‘by case’ code-sets, combined 
into one code-set) 
II. Location of treatment/punishment (Sentencing speech/rationale only) 
o Anchorage Treatment Facility 
o Prison/Custody 
o Community 
o Treatment Centre 
o Diversion/Community Council of Toronto 
o Intermittent 
o Case-Wide (The above codes, applied to the entirety of the case 
rather than just the judges’ sentencing speech/rationale) 
 Anchorage Treatment Facility(Case-Wide) 
 Prison/Custody (Case-Wide) 
 Community (Case-Wide) 
 Treatment Centre (Case-Wide) 
 Diversion/Community Council of Toronto (Case-Wide) 
 Intermittent (Case-Wide) 
III. Type of Proceeding/crime (Coded entire ‘cases’) 
o Drug 
o Property 
o Violent 
o Bail (Includes Consent Releases) 
o Plea 
o Diversion 
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o Remand, Check-Up, or partial plea (Includes Discretionary Bench 
Warrants; did not mark offense type for these cases as they were 
unnecessary and would skew the data) 
o Other 
 Fail to Comply Offenses  
 Miscellaneous Offenses ( Offenses that do not fit into other 
categories and are too small for their own category ( See 
Appendix A1 for details)) 
 Odd resolutions (Resolutions that did not fit the categories 
above or were unusual conglomerations of them and court 
orders) 
o Not Gladue 
o Unknown Charges 
o Incomplete Observation 
IV. Sentencing Principles (Any statement whatsoever, even outside of the 
sentence) 
o Denunciation 
o General Deterrence 
o Specific Deterrence 
o Rehabilitation 
 Case-Wide coding for cases with rehabilitation as a 
sentencing principle 
o Protection of the Public (Includes Incapacitation) 
o Other (See Appendix A2 below for details)  
o Mitigating Factors 
o Aggravating Factors 
V. Bail Concerns (Primary Grounds = assure attendance at court, Secondary 
Grounds = Protection/safety of public/reoffending, Tertiary = maintain 
confidence in Criminal Justice System) 
o Primary Grounds 
o Secondary Grounds 
o Tertiary Grounds 
o Other (See Appendix A3 for details) 
 Past Treatment Failures 
 Surety Viability 
 Bail Program 
256 
 
VI. Actors (note, unknown comments/actions are left uncoded) 
o Aboriginal Court Worker (ACW) 
o Community Council of Toronto (CCT/CCP) 
o Treatment Agencies 
o Victim 
o Offender/Accused Person 
 Offender/Accused Person’s Family/Support 
o Public 
o Politicians/Government 
o Defense Counsel (General ‘Defense Counsel’ code used for 
unknown defense counsel) 
 Private 
 Duty Counsel 
o Judge 
o Crown Prosecutor(General ‘Crown prosecutor’ code used for 
unknown/Provincial Crown prosecutors unless determined 
otherwise; note that only Old City Hall has Federal Crown 
prosecutors present) 
 Federal 
o Court Staff (Not ACW) 
o Other (See Appendix A4 for details) 
VII. Informal Processes 
o Reconciling Offender/Accused Person’s Desires  
o Defense counsel-Crown prosecutor negotiations 
o Crown Discretion 
o Fines/Victim Fine Surcharge 
o Mandatory Minimums/Considerations 
o Impact on Victim/Community 
o Informal Background reports 
o Personal Responsibility 
o Threats/Warnings/Appeals 
o Reaction to new legislation 
o Impact on Offender/Accused Person’s Relations 
o Aboriginal court worker (ACW) workarounds 
o Offender/Accused Person Negotiations with Defense Counsels 
o Proof of Claims 
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VIII. Characteristics of Victim & Offender/Accused Person 
o Parental Disadvantage 
o Parental Addiction 
o Intergenerational Trauma 
o Abuse 
o Addiction 
 Drugs 
 Alcohol 
o Foster Care 
o Homelessness/poverty 
o Criminal/Treatment History 
 Youth history 
 Recent history 
 Successful 
 Failure 
o Trauma (Includes undisclosed/incomplete victim impact statements 
(VIS)) 
 Mental Trauma 
 Physical Trauma 
o Family Issues 
o Community Factors 
o Remorse/Desire to Change 
o Mental illness 
o Other/Unsure (See Appendix A5 for details) 
IX. Discourse Analysis 
o Out of Court discourse 
o Off the record Discourse 
o Deliberately on the record Discourse (more so than usual, as all 
statements are made on the record) 
o What is left unsaid (refers to discourses/actions considered 
inferior/invalid/deliberately hidden) 
o The unstated alternatives (refers to alternative but still valid 
discourses/actions) 
o Implied threats/commands (explicit threats are in ‘informal 
processes’ above) 
o Subversion of punitiveness 
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o Reinforcement of new punitiveness 
o Restorative Justice 
o Communal Justice 
o Reinforcement of legal authority/power  
o Negotiated Discourse 
o Situated and context-specific discourse (Only extreme incidences, 
or discourses that are referencing a specific 
time/place/positionality, are dependent upon them, or reference 
contextual factors directly)  
o Directed discourse (usually explicitly directed towards the Crown 
prosecutor/defense counsel/judges or to/from outside court 
informants) 
o Other (See Appendix A6 for details) 
X. The sentence/decision itself (Sentencing speech/rationale only) 
o In favour of  
 Crown Prosecutor 
 Defense Counsel 
 Compromise 
 Unknown 
o Probation 
o Other orders (DNA, S.11, Community Service, etc.) 
o Conditional 
o Intermittent 
o Suspended 
o Joint Submission (includes Consent Release) 
o Fines/VFS/Restitution (note : most sentences include VFS and it is 
only sometimes mentioned directly when the judge is passing a 
sentence) 
 Waived Instead 
o Case-Wide variants on sentence/decision 
 (As the above code-sets, only applied to the whole case not 
just the sentencing speech/rationale made by the judge at 
the end of the trial – made for cross-analysis purposes.) 
XI. Other/Unsorted (See Appendix A7 for details) 
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A1 : Includes fail to attend court, prowl by night, fail or refuses to 
comply with treatment, fail or refuses identify, unlawfully at large, 
threaten damage to property, carrying concealed weapons, operate 
a motor vehicle while disqualified, utter forged documents, 
possession of identity documents, impersonate with intent, 
intoxicated driving, possess proceeds of crime 
 
A2 : Concerns of public ‘mind’/interest (x2), chance of being 
overturned, Crown prosecutor’s recommendations (x2), victim’s 
wishes, is a joint submission (x42), sentence is ‘the bare 
minimum’, employment/income (x2), having no record (x2), desire 
to avoid incarceration (x2), confusion over past sentence and 
possibility of pleading innocent (x3), triable issues/chance of 
conviction (x6) , ‘trump principle’, no recollection of facts, past 
punishments/record (x4), vague mention of ‘circumstances’, is a 
joint submission and ‘reasonable’, no Victim impact Statement 
(x5), need to balance all factors (x4), difficult probation was 
ordered, is not a joint submission, presence of a redundant 
probation, desire for alternative sentence (x2), medical 
appointments/concerns (x2), injuries/extenuating circumstances 
(x5), no Gladue report, ‘snowball effect’, past ‘soft’ sentences, 
custody is merited, need to infuse responsibility, proportionality 
(x3), inappropriate situation  for a therapeutic sentence, likelihood 
for further offending (x3), no plan of care, inappropriate plan of 
release, has not met the onus, possibility of dangerous offender 
inquiry, Crown prosecutor’s position is already lenient (x2), 
housing concerns (x3), is within the normal range, incarceration is 
inappropriate (x3), past cooperation with Crown prosecutor, 
communicable disease concern, criminal record grounds, judge 
explaining her methodology, concerns about future offense 
classifications, probation is a ‘waste’ (x2), approaching decision as 
a ‘what if’ scenario, offender/accused person ‘wants to get it over 
with’ (x2), benefit to community, court is ‘only capable of 
incapacitation’, protection of peace officers, sentence is ‘better 
than jail’, punishment compared to time served (x2), step principle, 
Crown prosecutor’s concerns alleviated, ability to avoid 
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complainant, proof of donation, Gladue principles (x4), treatment 
sometimes connects Aboriginal peoples, effect of addiction on 
reporting to probation/bail program, background and trauma (x2), 
jail is called useless (x2), consent to detention, political case 
alleged, papers written incorrectly (x2), effect on future sentencing 
will be beneficial, family concerns (x2), need to attend at certain 
locations (x4), possibility of reparation, past problems with 
church/religion, desire to graduate treatment program first, 
problem of treatment in jail, long wait before appearing at court, 
intensive treatment plan, mandatory minimums/new laws (x7), 
lawyer disappeared, concerns relating to conditional sentence, 
waiting for paperwork/proof, addiction issues, no past diversion 
attempts (x2), restorative principles (x3), vague factors (x2), 
compassion of Crown prosecutor, no stated reason (x3), police 
recommendations. 
 
A3: Section 515 s.6, offender’s ability to consistently report, 
ability to arrive at a specific time, housing stability, other residents 
at facility, protection of complainant, no victim impact statements, 
question about allowing contact between the co-accused persons, 
joint submission question, past experience in sentencing the 
offender/accused person, concerns about onerous conditions, vague 
rationalizations to alleviate concerns. 
 
A4: Aboriginal community, court officer (x3), co-accused 
person(x5), interpreter (x2), witnesses (x4), arresting officers, 
notable cases (x3), external officer/police (x5), cases under 
publication ban, unfinished trials, specifically named individuals of 
unknown position, behind the scenes workers, Aboriginal Legal 
Services of Toronto. 
 
A5 (Note : Many code sections involve multiple different groups): 
Aggravating location, letter submissions (x5), vague 
statement/filing of Background/Gladue report (x140), Foetal 
Alcohol Syndrome, Gladue principles (x15), past progress in 
treatment, desires to learn to cope/complete course, Aboriginal 
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cultural roots, statement that ‘it is up to you’, motive to get/follow 
treatment, questions of past knowledge of the offender/accused 
person’s history (x3), inadequate sureties, injured/needs medical 
attention (x10), motive for alcohol use (x2), refugee status, little 
understanding of his own crimes, victim wants to leave 
relationship, victim impact statement declined/not present (x7), 
mixed message in victim impact statement, immature love, 
dysfunctional relationship with victim (x3), is in denial about need 
for treatment, wants some luck, lack of report review time, need to 
be pushed into counselling, medication issues (x10), need for 
movement allowances (x2), possible future problems (x3), surety 
still wants to help, past non-Gladue dispositions, good impression 
of offender/accused person (x2), desire for Gladue report or VIS 
(x4), age is relevant consideration (x6), no past treatments (x2), co-
operative with police, need to satisfy judge, treatment environment, 
undisclosed factors, sexuality, harmful to community, delays in 
treatment applications (x2), shoplifting issues, Aboriginal heritage 
(x13), has been an activist, has avoided contact with victim, 
custody would be a waste, happiness with a supposedly deterrent 
sentence (x2), prison events (x2), stole for another, ‘the accused is 
just telling the court what they want to hear’ (x2), vigilante 
mindset, no memory of incident, other person identified as criminal 
in photos, some extenuating circumstances, stole as a last resort, 
systemic Aboriginal issues (x4), will ‘struggle’, dysfunctional 
relationship with co-accused person, needs to prove he has 
changed, poor choice of friends, no report ever done (x2), has 
shown some promise (x2), inconsistent grieving story, housing 
problems, need for accused person to want help (x2), recent 
accident, fasting, ‘is on the radar’, reason for crime, no record (x4), 
is a caregiver (x2), crime a plea for help, living arrangements, past 
trauma with church, moving to a new city (x2), need for VIS (x2), 
‘alcohol is not the issue’, work difficulties, ensuring accused 
person is capable, arguments with defense counsel, unintentional 
crime, grew up surrounded by drugs, missed bus stop, ‘need to do 
some work’ before Crown prosecutor gives him options, 
employment workload, no community contacts, is employed (x2), 
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questioning of willingness of Aboriginal roots, no diversion 
attempts before, relationship with victim was problematic (x2), 
need for medical info, character information (x2), ‘low-man’ in the 
crime, victim choice to air details publicly, currently out of the city 
(x2) 
 
A6: Interpreter issues, old documentation provided, paperwork is 
missing, no past Gladue report, Gladue doesn’t allow for 
disclosure, judge note of age, video remand in future with lawyer, 
‘regular stream’ is quicker, custody conceptualized as ‘dry’ and 
rehabilitative, ensuring judge is acceptable, loss of credibility, 
Crown prosecutor lacks brief so defense counsel does it instead, 
this Crown prosecutor disagrees with other Crown prosecutor, 
Crown prosecutor sort of admits record, probation called a ‘waste 
of paper’, judge uses a ‘what if’ position, Gladue means ‘less’, 
offender/accused person admits cost was baloney excuse at first, 
under publication ban (x5), Gladue principles not important in this 
case (x2), old Gladue report, ‘telling court what they want to hear’ 
alleged by Crown prosecutor, victim impact statement read by 
offender/accused person, DNA order is mandatory, further 
incarceration doesn’t address all principles, crime was one of 
necessity, lawyer is not in contact, treatment attempts were not 
authentic, no need to hear defense counsel final submissions, 
neither Crown prosecutor nor accused person too familiar with the 
case, desire to improve family’s life, comparison to youth court, 
limitations on judge mandate, jail has little beneficial effects, 
altering documents due to typist errors, helpful demeanour, rehab 
considered important, offender/accused person is not serious in his 
statements about the record, past opportunities were ignored, need 
for victim impact statement is mandatory, sent out of court/to 
another court, information remanded incorrectly (x2), order to 
follow probation, Gladue said to apply at imprisonment not bail, 
most ACWs said to have knowledge of Aboriginal history, 
memory of mandating past probation, judge says ‘thanks’, papers 
are signed, 20 seconds long case, parting words, threats of suicide, 
representing self in a bail hearing (x2), business-like atmosphere 
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(x2), circumventing defense counsel, duty counsel unprepared, not 
a joint submission, privacy in airing Gladue report suborned to the 
victim, report speaks to his honesty, court order to attend regularly. 
 
A7: No Gladue courts outside Toronto, Toronto started Gladue, 
Publication Ban case, a case where the relevant charges were 
withdrawn (x7), modifying bails to allow for access to court, 
another case had diversion for this case planned, unknown 
treatment location (x5), plea was struck out, short sentencing, plea 
converted/forced into a trial, release due to time served being done 
today, charges stayed for no apparent reason 
Appendix B : A brief note on the coding software and its terminology 
 Much of the data used in the cross-tabulation tables were based on what 
the qualitative analysis software terms ‘passages’, which can be roughly described 
as any unbroken section of text. Because of this, multiple lines of 
text/statements/discourses are interpreted by the software as one ‘passage’, and 
therefore some total values may be inappropriately high or low. This effect only 
applies to code sets whose total number is an important variable, or code sets 
which entail passages that are excessively long. The vast majority of the analysis 
was not affected by this since the primary concern is how the different code sets 
interact and overlap. Another error/quirk of the software is that if multiple 
passages from the same code set overlap with a separate passage from a different 
code set, then the software interprets that as 1 single instance of correlation rather 
than 2 instances. When this effect applied the researcher made sure to analyze the 
passages directly and make note of how such errors applied to and affected the 
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research. Again, much of the analysis is not particularly affected by this problem, 
and it mostly served to make more work for the researcher in order to allow for 
more discrete cross-analyses. 
Appendix C : General Observations, per Table 
C1 : Table 2 
The notable observations were as follows : 
1. Drug offenses were more likely to involve a community 
release/supervision than other offenses. 
2. Violent offenses were the least likely to involve community 
release/supervision. 
3. Roughly half of all offenders/accused persons end up in some kind of 
custodial location. 
4. Only 13% of all bail cases ended resulted in bail being denied. 
5. Half of all prison//custodial sentences involved failure to comply 
offenses 
6. Cases that involved the Anchorage treatment facility resulted in very 
lengthy proceedings and was applicable to both bail and plea 
resolutions 
7. Treatment centre releases were always combined with other forms of 
custody/supervision 
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a. These releases also frequently involved failure to comply 
offenses more than half the time (more than any other sole 
location) 
8. Diversion was mutually exclusive with regards to other treatment 
locations. 
a. These releases were the least likely to involve failure to comply 
offenses 
C2 : Table 3 
The notable observations were as follows :  
1. Denunciation, general deterrence, and specific deterrence were 
frequently mentioned directly alongside one another 
2. Only 3 bail cases referenced denunciation, general deterrence, or 
specific deterrence 
3. Protection of the public was the last common sentencing principle 
(note that its effects are still significant – see later tables for details) 
4. Rehabilitation is the most common sole sentencing principle. 
a. Disregarding ‘other’ code passages, rehabilitation and 
mitigating factors make up over 55% of all sentencing 
principles stated. 
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b. Rehabilitation is the only sentencing principle applied to bails 
in any appreciable amount 
c. Rehabilitation was often mentioned directly alongside minor 
punitive sentencing principles – General Deterrence, 
Denunciation, and Specific Deterrence, respectively. 
5. Diversions never mentioned any of the punitive sentencing principles. 
6. Though mitigating factors are as common as rehabilitation discourses, 
they overlap directly only 71% of the time 
a. Both mitigating factors and rehabilitation are mentioned 
repeatedly over the course of the same case. Mitigating factors 
average 2.4 passages per case and Rehabilitation averages 2.2 
passages per case. 
7. Aggravating factors apply to only slightly less cases than mitigating 
factors 
a. Similarly, aggravating factors are often repeated during a case 
– an average of 2.0 passages per case. 
8. The most common bail concern is the secondary grounds 
a. After this, concerns based around discourses of reoffending are 
the second-most common (past treatment history and surety 
viability, primarily) 
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b. Similarly, these common bail concerns are also stated about 
twice per case. 
9. There is little direct discursive overlap with any bail concerns barring 
the primary and secondary concerns 
a. There is an average of 3 bail concerns mentioned during each 
case. 
b. Rehabilitation, mitigating, and aggravating factors are the only 
sentencing principles mentioned in bail cases regularly 
c. When aggravating factors are mentioned, it is often in respect 
to past sureties and treatment failures 
C3 : Table 4 
The notable observations were as follows : 
1. Prison/Custody cases reference the most bail concerns or sentencing 
principles out of any location 
a. Prison/custody cases are the only cases that reference the 
protection of the public in any appreciable amount. 
b. Prison/custody cases reference failed treatment history at 
slightly higher rates than treatment-centre cases. 
2. Only treatment-centre cases reference rehabilitation more than 
prison/custody cases 
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a. Note that rehabilitation references include both positive (it 
should be allowed) and negative (it should not be allowed) 
references. 
3. Community release/supervision have fewer sentencing principles in 
comparison, with the only particularly punitive sentencing principle in 
large amounts being aggravating factors 
a. Aggravating factors are lower in number than mitigating 
factors and rehabilitation discourses, however. 
b. Community release/supervision also referenced the primary 
and secondary grounds the most, though after a brief 
calculation it seems that treatment-centre releases had slightly 
higher rates. 
4. Treatment-centre releases are similar to community 
release/supervision, but reference rehabilitation the most out of any 
treatment location. 
a. Treatment-centre releases overlapped with community 
release/supervision over half the time. 
b. When it comes to bails, the bail concerns referenced for 
treatment-centre releases show a marked similarity to those of 
prison/custody releases (the exception being past treatment 
failures and bail program accessibility) 
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5. Anchorage treatment facility cases were too small in number to assess 
reliably. Otherwise, they appeared to be similar to treatment-centre 
releases. 
C4 : Tables 5 & 6 
The notable observations were as follows : 
1. Half of all joint submissions were also bails/consent releases 
2. Half of all sentences decided in line with the Crown prosecutor’s 
recommendations were bails as well 
a. In comparison, only 1/3 of cases that followed the defense 
counsel’s recommendations were bails 
3. Compromise positions were the most common result 
4. Joint submissions had low numbers of any sentencing principle 
a. Those punitive sentencing principles present in a joint 
submission were more likely to be mentioned by the judge 
during the sentencing rationale than in other cases. The only 
exception to this seems to be aggravating factors. 
b. Joint submissions were the least likely cases to reference 
rehabilitation 
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5. Probation cases (which can apply to any ‘winner’) had the largest 
amount of punitive sentencing principles, with the exception of 
protection of the public. 
a. For bails that included probation, the only punitive grounds 
that probation did not have the highest correlation with was the 
secondary grounds and past treatment failures. 
6. The only punitive sentencing principle that sentences decided in favour 
of the Crown prosecutor’s recommendations had in any exceptional 
amount was the protection of the public. 
a. Protection of the public and aggravating factors were the only 
real punitive sentencing principle that was repeated by the 
judge. 
b. Bails that were denied referenced the secondary grounds the 
most and past treatment failures the second-most (exceeded 
only by compromise cases, which see past treatment failures 
referenced in both bails and pleas) 
7. Compromise cases had the largest rates of all punitive sentencing 
principles excepting the protection of the public. 
8. Cases where the judge agreed with the defense counsel’s requested 
sentence tended to have sentencing principle rates somewhere between 
compromise and joint submissions 
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a. That said, they had high rates of mitigating, aggravating, and 
rehabilitative factors – with similarly high retention rates. 
b. Bails that followed the defense counsel’s recommendations had 
high rates of the primary grounds, but lower rates of any other 
bail concern. 
9. In general, compromise cases had the second or third-highest rates of 
all sentencing/bail principles – there is no one case type with the 
highest rate of all sentencing/bail principles. 
a. The exception to this is aggravating and mitigating factors, of 
which compromise cases had the highest rates overall. 
b. Roughly half of all compromise cases involve probation as 
well. 
C5 : Table 7 
The notable observations are as follows : 
1. Parental disadvantage was often cited in cases with an unknown 
winner, followed by joint and compromise submissions/positions 
a. It was also the least common characteristic, and so the sample 
size is likely too small to be considered significant. 
2. Intergenerational trauma was the second least common characteristics, 
and it was frequently cited without a direct link to other characteristics. 
272 
 
a. It generally resulted in a probation, compromise positions, or 
joint submissions. Note that the total values remained very low 
and the sample size is likely too small to be statistically 
significant. 
3. Parental addiction is the third least common characteristic, and it 
similarly mostly led to joint and compromise submissions/positions, 
followed by the defense counsel’s recommended sentence being 
followed. 
4. Abuse discourses often directly made mention to foster care, 
physical/mental trauma, or family issues. 
a. Joint submissions, compromise positions, or cases where the 
defense counsel’s recommendations were followed were the 
most common results when these characteristics were present. 
b. The Crown prosecutor’s recommendations were never 
followed in a case where this was cited. 
5. Alcohol addictions were the most common addiction, but they had less 
links to other characteristics in comparison to drug addictions. 
a. Alcohol addictions were more likely to be repeated during the 
case in comparison to other addictions. 
b. All addictions have relatively similar rates of being referenced 
during the sentencing speech/rationale. 
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6. Drug addictions were slightly more likely to result in the judge 
agreeing with the Crown prosecutor’s recommended sentence, whereas 
the other addiction types were slightly more likely to result in joint 
submissions. 
a. All addictions have roughly equal rates of having the sentence 
be resolved in favour of the defense counsel’s 
recommendation/submissions.. 
7. Foster care passages rarely directly referenced other characteristics. 
a. Foster care was often cited in cases that involved probation. 
b. Foster care was never mentioned directly during a sentencing 
speech/rationale. 
8. Homelessness/poverty references were the second most common 
characteristic. 
a. It was also rarely mentioned directly during a sentencing 
speech/rationale. 
b. It often led to joint submissions and compromise positions. 
9. Criminal/Treatment histories have large total passage numbers, but 
surprisingly low correlations with other characteristics. 
a. Cases where the judge agreed with the Crown prosecutor’s 
recommended sentence and cases whose sentence was a 
compromise between that and the defense counsel’s 
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recommendations had slightly higher rates of this characteristic 
being mentioned during the sentencing speech/rationale. 
b. It was often highly correlated with sentences involving 
probation. 
c. It was often mentioned more than once during a case. 
10. Youth history had very low total references – it is likely they were 
only referenced in the form of specific offenses within the overall 
criminal record. 
11. Recent history was primarily referenced during sentencing rationales 
in joint submissions and sentencing rationales decided in favour of the 
defense counsel’s recommendations, and not once in cases where the 
judge agreed with the Crown prosecutor’s recommendations. 
a. It was the characteristic with the strongest rate of cases decided 
in favour of the Crown prosecutor’s recommendations, though 
the judge was still more likely to agree with the defense 
counsel’s recommendations than not. 
12. Successful treatment histories had the second highest total passage 
count 
a. This characteristic only really overlapped with recent history, 
general criminal/treatment history, and remorse/desire to 
change 
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b. This characteristic was rarely mentioned during the sentencing 
speech/rationale. 
13. Failed treatment histories were less common than other histories, and 
rarely overlapped directly with other characteristics. 
a. This characteristic was often repeated during a case, especially 
by the judge during the sentencing rationale 
b. It had low rates of probation or compromise decisions, in 
comparison 
14. Physical and mental trauma were somewhat uncommon 
a. These characteristics primarily overlapped with abuse, 
followed by mental illness. 
b. These characteristics had high rates of joint submissions and 
the defense counsel’s recommended sentence being followed. 
c. These characteristics rarely led to probation. 
d. Only joint submissions would mention the trauma directly in 
any significant amount. 
15. The other category was mostly made up of vague or undisclosed 
background information (see Appendix A for details) 
a. These characteristics were most likely to be repeated during the 
sentencing speech/rationale when the defense counsel’s 
recommended sentence was accepted, and least likely to be 
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repeated when the Crown prosecutor’s recommended sentence 
was. 
16. Family issues were often directly cited alongside 
homelessness/poverty, followed by undisclosed addiction and drug 
addictions. 
a. This characteristic was rarely mentioned during a sentence. 
b. When the Crown prosecutor’s recommended sentence was 
followed, this characteristic was not mentioned, while when 
defense counsel’s recommended sentence was followed it was 
most likely to be mentioned. 
17. Remorse/desire to change was the third largest code set in this table 
a. It was primarily directly mentioned alongside 
criminal/treatment history. 
b. There was seemingly little influence on the final sentence – 
possibly a result of its position during the proceedings and its 
sheer commonality. 
18. Mental illness was primarily directly referenced alongside undisclosed 
trauma and criminal/treatment history 
a. Therefore, it likely was mentioned in a historical context – 
either how the illness arose, or how it affected past offending. 
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b. This characteristic somewhat influenced the sentence towards 
being in favour of the defense counsel’s recommendations, and 
significantly skewed the sentence away from a compromise 
position. 
c. This characteristic rarely resulted in probation. 
d. This characteristic was rarely mentioned during the sentencing 
speech/rationale. 
C6 : Table 8 
 The notable observations were as follows : 
1. Defense counsel-Crown prosecutor negotiations often directly 
referenced the offender/accused person’s desires and negotiations 
between the defense counsel and offender/accused person. 
a. Similarly, this informal process also often referenced Crown 
Discretion 
b. If the decision was in favour of a joint submission, then this 
informal process would often be referenced during the 
sentencing speech/rationale. 
c. The only characteristics mentioned alongside this informal 
process in any significant amount were criminal/treatment 
history, remorse/desire to change, and addictions of all kinds 
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2. Crown discretion was primarily mentioned alongside Defense counsel-
Crown prosecutor negotiations. 
a. Drug offenses had the highest rate of this informal process (not 
the most instances total). 
b. Nearly all diversions were mentioned alongside this informal 
process 
c. This informal process was more likely to result in the judge 
agreeing with the crown prosecutor’s recommended sentence 
than other processes, though such results were still the minority 
of resolution results. 
d. Primarily referenced criminal/treatment history, and 
remorse/desire to change 
3. Fines/VFS were somewhat uncommon, but were primarily mentioned 
alongside mandatory minimums and reactions to new legislation 
a. If fines/VFS were present, they were likely to be mentioned 
during the sentencing speech/rationale. 
b. The only characteristic mentioned directly alongside this 
informal process was homelessness/poverty. 
c. Note that background reports made indirect references to 
poverty as well. 
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4. Mandatory minimums only directly mentioned/were mentioned 
alongside Fines/VFS and reactions to new legislation 
a. This correlation was only present in guilty pleas 
b. When this informal process was noted, it was likely to also be 
mentioned during the final sentencing speech/rationale. 
5. Reactions to new legislation are almost identical to the two above 
informal process and suffer from a small total passage size (and thus 
possible sampling problems). Discourses that mentioned the impact on 
the victim/community were mentioned 2+ times per case roughly half 
the time. 
a. Note : Some VIS mentioned support for rehabilitation. The vast 
majority, however, were not disclosed to the public 
b. VIS were most common in cases involving violent offenses. 
c. When present, they were likely to be mentioned during the 
sentencing speech/rationale. 
d. The only characteristics directly referenced alongside this 
informal process were criminal/treatment history and alcohol 
addictions 
6. ‘Reconciling the offender/accused person’s desires’ was a relatively 
common discourse/informal process that was primarily based around 
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the offender/accused person’s final statement prior to the judge 
pronouncing their sentence. 
a. These statements primarily referenced personal responsibility 
discourses. 
b. This informal process was most commonly utilized in cases 
where either the Crown prosecutor or defense counsel’s 
recommended sentences were agreed with by the judge, with 
joint submissions utilizing it only rarely. 
c. If this informal process was present/mentioned during the 
sentencing speech/rationale, it was more likely to be a case 
where the Crown prosecutor’s recommended sentence was 
followed. 
7. Offender/accused person-defense counsel negotiations were often cited 
alongside threats/warnings/appeals as well as defense counsel-Crown 
prosecutor negotiations. 
a. It was primarily utilized during drug and property offense-
based cases. 
b. The characteristics most commonly mentioned alongside this 
informal process were undisclosed addictions, alcohol 
addictions, and remorse/desire to change. 
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8. Discourses that discussed the impact of the sentence on the 
offender/accused person’s relations usually directly mentioned/utilized 
concerns relating to the impact of the crime/sentence on the 
victims/community, informal background reports, and personal 
responsibility discourses 
a. This informal process was almost never utilized outside of 
pleas. 
b. This informal process, if present, influenced the proceedings to 
be more in favour of the Crown prosecutor’s recommended 
sentence. 
9. Personal responsibility discourses were the most common informal 
process discourse. 
a. This was likely due to the mandatory plea inquiry made at the 
start of any proceeding. 
b. This informal process was almost always mentioned twice 
during a sentence. 
c. This informal process was mentioned less often if the 
proceeding involved drug offenses. 
d. This informal process rarely involved diversions or joint 
submissions. 
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e. Remorse/desire to change often directly made mention of this 
process. 
f. Remorse/desire to change was somewhat directly referred to 
alongside failed treatment history and general 
criminal/treatment history. 
10. Threats/Warnings/Appeals showed similar values to personal 
responsibility discourses, and often were mentioned alongside them. 
a. There are some discrepancies between these two with respect 
to the plea inquiry being done/performed outside of the court. 
b. This informal process was more common in joint submissions 
and compromise positions followed by sentences decided in 
favour of the defense counsel’s recommendations. 
c. While remorse was mentioned relatively frequently alongside 
this discourse/informal process, it was less common than 
general criminal/treatment history. 
d. Note : Personal responsibility discourses were repeated more 
often per case than this informal process – 1.9 per case 
compared to 1.5. 
11. Proof of claims mostly overlapped with informal background reports, 
attempts to reconcile the offender/accused person’s desires, and 
personal responsibility discourses 
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a. This informal process was rarely applied/present in bails. 
b. Only cases where the defense counsel’s recommendations were 
followed had a high chance of this process being mentioned 
during the sentencing speech/rationale. 
c. This informal process was mostly referenced/referring directly 
to treatment histories (notably successful treatment histories). 
12. Implied threats/commands were almost entirely made up of directed 
forms of discourse. 
a. Half of these implied threats/commands were made 
deliberately on the record (primarily during the plea inquiry, 
and the judge’s sentencing speech/ rationale). 
b. Roughly 1/3 of these informal processes directly referenced 
personal responsibility alongside them 
c. Nearly all of these passages involved the judge and/or the 
offender/accused person (again, likely due to the plea inquiry 
or the sentencing speech/rationale). 
C7 : Table 9 
The notable observations were as follows : 
1. ‘What is left unsaid’ is primarily linked to discourses/processes that 
reference personal responsibility. 
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a. When this discourse is linked to conversations/discourses 
outside of the court, it was likely referring to custodial 
locations relevant to future sentences. 
b. The location in question varies depending on which actor is 
utilizing this discourse. In the case of victims, this discourse 
referred to undisclosed VIS. 
2. Discourses that referenced unstated alternatives implicitly reinforced 
legal authority/power. 
a. These discourses also frequently subverted and reinforced 
punitiveness 
b. These discourses also referenced Crown discretion and 
personal responsibility discourses to a lesser degree. 
c. The actors in question were much the same as ‘What is left 
unsaid’, with more references to the CCT and less references to 
victims. 
3. Discourses that reinforced the new punitiveness were rather similar to 
the above two discourses, albeit with the caveat that offenders/accused 
persons speak/engage with it as often as judges do. 
a. Treatment agencies almost never are referenced with regards to 
reinforcing the new punitiveness. 
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4. Discourses which subverted the new punitiveness sometimes 
overlapped with discourses that reinforced the new punitiveness 
a. These discourses often referenced defense counsel-Crown 
prosecutor negotiations and Crown discretion (likely a sign of 
diversion agreements). 
b. This discourse also referenced personal responsibility 
somewhat often. 
c. This discourse was mostly utilized/applied to Crown 
prosecutors and judges, followed by the offender/accused 
person and the public. 
d. Any instance of discourses relating to reactions to new 
legislation were also referenced alongside discourses which 
subverted the new punitiveness. 
5. Restorative justice discourses were stated infrequently compared to 
communal justice 
a. Both were likely to utilize/reference discourses that subverted 
punitiveness. 
b. Defense counsels primarily utilized restorative justice. 
c. Treatment agencies show no preference between the two types 
of rehabilitative ideology. 
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d. Communal justice is more likely to involve/reference 
discourses that mention unstated alternative sentences. 
6. Situated discourses were only surprising in that they frequently 
overlapped with discourses of the ‘unsaid’. 
7. Negotiated discourses were primarily dualistic in nature – while they 
reference and reinforce legal authority/power and Crown discretion, 
they do not reinforce said influences and often occur outside of the 
court. 
a. Negotiation is the primary means by which diversions are 
enacted, and they are dualistic in nature in that they reinforce 
the Crown prosecutor’s authority while also restricting such 
power via a voluntary and conciliatory negotiation with a 
presumed adversary. 
8. Expressly ‘directed’ discourse tends to subvert rather than reinforce 
punitiveness. 
a. This process typically involves judges, and any one other actor 
b. This is the only major discourse type that references unusual 
actors such as sureties, the offender/accused person’s 
family/support, CCT, and treatment agencies with any 
regularity. 
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9. Out of court discourse is mostly part of the other discourse types rather 
than its own unique group. 
a. Primarily, it is used in concert with subversions of 
punitiveness, situated/context-specific discourses, negotiated 
discourses, and directed discourses. 
b. This discourse also had the highest count of victim, ACW, and 
treatment agency speech/references. 
10. Off the record discourse is small and mostly involved small question 
and answer sessions with judges and other interested court actors. 
a. In general, judges are more open to research students than we 
may initially assume and frequently initiate conversations with 
members of the public watching the court proceedings. 
11. Deliberately on the record discourses, when combined with 
threats/commands, were likely a sign that a plea inquiry had occurred. 
a. Subversions of punitiveness, when combined with this 
discourse type, likely represented diversion agreements/cases. 
b. This discourse type also involved the final statement from the 
offender/accused person. 
C8 : Table 10 
The notable observations were as follows : 
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1. Punitive factors included denunciation, general and specific 
deterrence, and protection of the public. 
a. Deterrence was stated frequently, but primarily directly 
alongside mandatory minimums/considerations. 
b. General deterrence rarely referenced anything, with 
criminal/treatment history and remorse being the most common 
(relatively speaking). 
c. Duty counsels never cited/were directly referred to with respect 
to general deterrence. 
d. Specific deterrence only directly referred to/alongside personal 
responsibility discourses and threats/warnings/appeals 
e. The only notable victim/offender/accused person 
characteristics referenced alongside specific deterrence were 
criminal/treatment history and remorse (and at low rates as 
well). 
f. Protection of the Public was only directly referenced alongside 
the sentence/crimes’ impact on the community 
g. Protection of the public was usually spoken by/to judges and 
Crown prosecutors. 
h. Only once was protection of the public mentioned with regards 
to the victim. 
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2. Rehabilitation was coded both with regards to the final 
sentence/rationale, and with regards to its mention anywhere in the 
case. 
a. When comparing the two sections on the basis of informal 
processes, there was little change with regards to personal 
responsibility discourses, proof of claims discourses, and 
discourse that dealt with reconciling the offender/accused 
person’s desires. 
b. Homelessness/poverty, criminal/treatment history, failed 
treatments, and all forms of trauma held a 50% ‘retention 
level’. That is, roughly half of such instances were not 
mentioned during the sentencing speech/rationale. 
c. Over half of the passages that referenced the victim in some 
way were in a case that referenced rehabilitation as well. 
d. When treatment centres were referenced alongside 
rehabilitation, they often did so more than once per case. 
3. Mitigating factors mention all of the usual actors (Crown prosecutors, 
defense counsels, offenders/accused persons, judges) as well as 
victims and politicians/governments. 
a. Treatment agencies, in comparison, referenced mitigating 
factors comparatively rarely. 
290 
 
4. Aggravating factors differed from mitigating factors with regards to 
criminal/treatment history, failed treatments, and all types of trauma. 
a. Crown prosecutors referenced aggravating factors the most 
often out of any actor. 
b. Victims were mentioned alongside this sentencing principle 
relatively often as well. 
c. Strangely, treatment agencies were also referred to alongside 
this discourse as well 
5. Bail concerns have little overlap or distinct cross-tabulations, likely 
due to their significantly smaller total passage numbers. 
a. Primary grounds had so little total values that they can almost 
be ignored. Any direct references were with personal 
responsibility discourses and failed treatments. 
b. Surety viability is also very low, though this bail concern also 
frequently references/is referred to alongside the 
crime/sentences impact on the offender/accused person’s 
relations 
c. Secondary grounds primarily directly referred to failed 
treatments and, to a lesser extent, personal responsibility 
discourses. 
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d. Past treatment failures overlapped even more with personal 
responsibility discourses as well as threats, warnings, and 
appeals. 
e. Past treatment failures often involved references to treatment 
agencies – only slightly less than judge or Crown prosecutor 
discourses – but were primarily referenced/spoken by the 
offender/accused person. 
f. Past treatment failures were often mentioned/referred to more 
than twice per case – this calculation was based on its direct 
correlations with failed treatment histories. 
C9 : Table 11 
The notable observations were as follows : 
1. ‘What is left unsaid’ and discourses relating to unstated alternatives 
were analyzed together. 
a. Unstated alternatives were more likely to be referenced in joint 
submissions. 
b. Unstated alternatives were primarily concerned with 
characteristics relating to homelessness/poverty and general 
criminal/treatment history. 
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c. ‘What is left unsaid’ had more direct references to failed 
treatments, family issues, and mental illness (in comparison to 
discourses relating to unstated alternatives). 
d. The overall sentencing trends between the two were almost 
identical. 
2. Implied threats/commands had nothing particularly interesting/notable 
beyond what was discussed in previous tables. 
3. Discourses relating to the reinforcement of legal authority/power 
similarly had no new information/conclusions. 
4. The analyses of discourses relating to the reinforcement and 
subversion of punitiveness were combined 
a. There was a clear split amongst the two with regards to the 
final sentence – subversions of punitiveness had higher 
comparative rates for joint submissions, both types had roughly 
equal rates for suspended sentences and fines, and instances of 
the reinforcement of new punitiveness had higher rates for the 
remaining types in comparison.  
b. Note that both had equal numbers of sentences decided in 
favour of the Crown’s recommendations, and the actual totals 
were rather low and accounted for approximately 1/3 of such 
cases, separately. 
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c. The only characteristics referenced alongside reinforcement of 
punitiveness in any appreciable amount were general 
criminal/treatment history and failed treatment history. 
d. The only characteristics referenced directly alongside the 
subversion of punitiveness in  any appreciable amount were 
undisclosed addictions, homelessness/poverty, general 
criminal/treatment history, and remorse/desire to change. 
5. Restorative justice and communal justice were also analyzed together. 
a. Only communal justice had any significant direct references to 
characteristics – unsurprising given its larger number of 
passages. 
i. For reference, these were primarily discourses related to 
homelessness/poverty, family issues, and community 
factors. 
6. Situated/context-specific discourses had no new conclusions to draw. 
7. Negotiated discourses were primarily used/referenced in joint 
submissions. 
a. These discourses rarely referenced any victim/offender/accused 
person characteristics besides general criminal/treatment 
history. 
8. Directed discourses had no new conclusions to draw. 
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9. Out of record discourses were likely ‘inflated’ in number due to the 
plea inquiry. 
10. Discourses made deliberately on the record is likely also ‘inflated’ in 
number due to sentencing speeches/rationales being mandatorily on 
the record, alongside the plea inquiry, arraignment, and record 
allegations. 
a. With regards to victim/offender/accused person characteristics, 
the only noticeable ones were homelessness/poverty and 
remorse. Again, this is most likely a reflection of the 
offender/accused person’s final statements. 
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